The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1917. A REAL WAR MINISTRY

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2997, 7 February 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1917. A REAL WAR MINISTRY

i _. . Taking the news and particulars cabled at the time .as a .guide, it was possible to ctmclude pretty confidently that the reoent chaugo of Government in Groat Britain was necessary ancl warranted, and that 'political intrigue, though it operated to some extent, was a factor of minor importance. Perusal o£ the fuller reports and comments now available goes far to confirm this view. Too much has probably been made of tho Press campaign, against Asquith and in favour of Mu. , Lloyd George, in which tho newspapers of tho Northclifue group took such a prominent part. Tho truth seems to be that these jourpome of them of a, noisy and abusive type, selected as the subject -,of agitation cbangos in the constitution of tho Ministry, for which an irresistible demand was already rising in political circles, in the country at large. This, of course, is to say that in their treatment of the 'political crisis, setting aside what was objectionable in their methods, the Northcui'FE newspapers, in common with others outside the group, did good and useful service. But it is not to say | that Mr. Asquith was deposed and Me. Lloyd George swept into power I by the combined force of a political [ intrigue. and an engineered Tress j campaign.. That estimate of tho .crisis will not commend itself to : anyone who looks with an open mind into tho circumstances in which it r arose. - The real causes of the British political' crisis -appear to have arisen out of untoward developments in the war at a time when 'better things had been hoped for, and a • widespread belief that tho Asquith Government was in some degree responsible for these reverses of fortune, i

.Views commonly held by thoughtful observers were expressed by a a English writer who said, in reviewing the change of Government:

Of late it has bcon obvious that no amount of effort can disguise tho Rumanian disaster, the Greek absurdity, the comparative stagnation on tlie Western front, and the subwarino successesadded to all which is a disquiotingnrray of purely home problems—such as llvo provision of men- for tho, armies, tho steadily decreasing food supplies, a'ud the need, generally, for comproliensivo organisation of'the country's resources— 'which appear to havo been handled weakly and irresolutely by the Astjuith Government. That accumulation ol' reverses and difficulties without doubt has irritated tho public mind, and, rightly or 'wrongly, tho blame for most of it lias been attached to Mr. Asquith and his colleagues. Rightly attached to them at least to this extent, that Mr. Asquith aud' hir immediate surrouuding of Lord Grey, Mr. M'Konna,' Mr. Runciman, I,ord Crewe, and Mr. Harcourt, for example, are, by temperament and training, cautious rather than aggressive men. They cut no knots. They prefer to toil painfully, towards, tho unravelling of them. They seom always to havo bcon disinclined to move firmly in any direction without safeguarding themselves by consultation with any and ovory section of their support.

So it came about, the same commentator remarks, that interminable Cabinot discussions so often usurped the place of Cabinet decisions. The problems of the war were at tho mercy of-a debating society of 23 members, in which the enterprising outlook of one set of men was fought by tho more cautious outlook of another sot of men. These conditions tended at best to produce delay, and at worst stagnation. Tho hesitating irresolution of the Asquitq Government and the open reluctance with which some of its members consented to measures obviously demanded in the interests of the effective prosecution of the war were unquestionably the chief causes of its downfall. The evidence on this point seems clear enough from the reports now to hand. And in any way descending to tho level of somo of tho critics by whom Mn. Asquith was so bitterly assailed, it is possible to say that he has a full personal share of the faults and shortcomings which made his Miufsl.ry unfit to rule Great Britain in the time of a lifc-and-death war. Somo ol

his late colleagues were more op-m to ovitiirism than their chief iu matters of vital detail. .But it is said that no member of the Cabinet was morn, cautious and deliberate, or more inclined to compromise, than Mr. Asquith himself, and his utterances in Parliament since the war began certainly tend Lo support the charge. The Lloyd Geojioe administration, with its compact War Cabinet, is obviously much more likely to meet the exacting demands of tho_ war than the cumbrous and slow-moving Ministry which preceded it. ' Such criticism as was directed against the new Ministry at the time tho change took placo savours largely of personal or party bias. The general opinion appears to have been, and it has been borne out since by tho actions of the Government, that the new Ministry, with its small Cabinet, would act baldly and promptly as occasion required, and that such weaknesses as might be found in it would arise out of departmental administration outside the larger issues with which the AVar Cabinet would directly concern itself. But at the present time the oiiTy thing that counts is the efficient direction af tho war, and if the Lloyd George Government is open to criticism, it is a Government to which the nation ■looks with confidence, to substitute enterprise and resolution for, to quote Me. Lloyd George, "improvidence,. hesitation, and lack of imagination." It might have been all the better for the absence of such members as Mr. Balfour and Lord Kobert Cecil. This, at least, is an opinion which appears to bo hold in some quarters, and the grounds quoted in support of it carry weight. Both the Ministers named are held in the highest personal -respect, both for their capacity and statesmanship, but their temperament and training, as well as their record in the. Asquith Coalition Government, do not commend thom as Ministers in a War Ministry such as is required 11 Britain to-day. But it was. perhaps inevitable that in a Coalition Ministry formed under such' circumstances as Mr. Lloyd George was confronted ■ with there should bo weak spots. Tho main consideration is that the new Government both in its personnel and in tho reduction of tho really vital War ■ Cabinot to five members, all of the bold, forceful, aggressive, and cnergetio typo, which tho situation call- ; ed for, is generally admitted to ho a marked improvement on its pedecessors in those essentials which are of most concern at tho moment. Evon thoso critics—fairly numerous in Great Britain—who are apparently incapable of fully grasping tho fact ; that party politics do not matter in time of war, ■ seem as a rulo to think it quito likely that Mr. Lloyd George and his mixed following may give a good account of themselves in the conduct of tho . war. People in tho Dominions who Eave seen tho Lloyd George Government take prompt action in Greoce [ and in the matter of summoning an Imperial War Council, over . which the Asquith Government had ; so long pondered and dallied, will I no doubt be inclined on these and , other grounds to hold tho same opinion.