The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1917. CHECKMATING A TRAITOR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2990, 30 January 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1917. CHECKMATING A TRAITOR

■ Even if it should prove,, as r#w seems likely, that King ConstAntinr has played his last card on behalf of Germany, the verdict will hold good that his record as a monarch is one of the worst known to history. There have been some very bad king's, but few indeed have gone as far as Constantine in attempting to wreck and ruin thenown, country in the interests of an Power. Utter indifference to '""the welfare of Greece and an ignoble subservience to Germany have > been obviously the dominant fea- : tures of Oonstantine's policy ever ? since he broke his own pledged * word, and that of his nation, to • Serbia. In his own mind he must have determined to make Greece- a oatspaw of-the Teutonic League long before the question of honouring or dishonouring the Serbian treaty arose. At the outset he was no doubt obsessed by a belief in the ultimate, victory of the Central Powers, and his treason was directed chiefly against his sworn allies and the nations to whom his tountry owes its existence as an independent State. But later events showed that he is, or was, as ready to sacrifice Greece m the jntarraui of Germany as ho was to sacrifico wie allies and protectors of Greece. This was. made fully apparent when he handed over Greek forts, war ■material, and even military forces, to the Bulgars, and laid a wido extent of Greek territory open to invasion by theso horeditary enemies of Greece. There is no doubt that in still more recent times he has planned to strike a blow for Germany by making a treacherous attack upon the rear of the Allied Army in Macedonia, Even now it is not absolutely certain that he has finally abandoned this design. If he has it is because the crushing pressure of tho Allied blockade leaves him no option in the matter. In his obstinately continued efforts to make common cause with Gotmaiiy we have a definite mcasaroi of the character and principles of the Greek King and of his absolute indifference to the welfare of the country over which ho is appointed to rule. To what extent Greek Royalist intervention on Germany's side would have" affected tho general military situation in Macedonia it is hard to say. But Jt is absolutely • certain that war against the Entente would have brought irretrievable ruin and disaster upon that part of the Greek population which still yields real or nominal allegiance to King Conbtantine. The evils which Constantine and his faction wore prepared to impose upon C.Tcece for the sake of striking a possibly ineffective blow on behalf of Germany were very clearly set forth by a recent writer in the Economist.

Supposing (he remarks) that a Graecotreraian victory in Macedonia were complete, what then? The Central Powers are said to have promised, if King Constantino will declare war against tho JBii- •» V. "■ l ' o0 P e,L the communications" with Central Europe. These consist of a single-line of railwuy, supplemented by a more or loss incomplete system of bad roads The railway, some 650 miles long in all, connects Athens \\;ith Belgrade. Its nnal section, opened last May, is tho lino from Larissa, through tho Vale of Jompe, and along the coast of the Gulf 01 Salonika to a junction near that city Tvith the railway from Mitrovitza. For thirty or forty miles it is exposed to attack from the sea. From Salonika to Kisn ami Belgrade, before tho war, tho two or three trains running over it daily had. a speed of about twenty miles an hour, and it can nowhoro bo'fit (n lake, very heavy traffic. Between Larissn and I hobos and Thebes and Athens it'hns somo very heavy gradients and sharp curves, notably on tho slopes of Mount Othrys and in its roundabout .course through Northern Attica. There also the traffic is light and the speeds equally low. Now, tho old territories of the Greek Kingdom import nearly half of tho wheat they consume. About twoelevenths of tho population live in the Cyclades and tho lonian Islands, and would thereforo be supplied by sea in any case; but how. aro the two and a quarter millions or thoreabouts, who would have to follow King Constantino into war with tho Entente, to be supplied by one railway single-track lino with grain which could only conic via Belgrade from Rumania? Moreover the blockade would deprivo Greece (as at present) of hor other foodstuffs, and of all her coal and petroleum, and would shut in hor staple exports, notably currants, wine, and oil. As to tho 'roads, tho route by which the Greek Army advanced in 1913, by Elassova to Salonika, may be tolerable, though tho Mehina Pass which it traverses is two thousand feet above sea level; but the roads north of Monastir must bo very- much tho reverse. Possibly tho King's German advisers count on tho island waters behind Buboea as a sure harbourage for submarines. But how can submarines operato without petrol? .Greece, in short, if slie joins the Central Powers, must starve, unless they command at least, the Adriatic. ;

In a word, if Constantine had crowned his infamous policy by attacking the Allies in Macedonia he might or might not havo rendered useful sorvice to Germany, but ho would almost certainly havo condemned his own country to starvation and ruin. In order to take a gambler's chance of upsetting the Entente military plans in the Balkanß he was prepared to annihilate the comparative plenty and Jhe

business tthich reigned in Greece t» lOtt . th{ , AlU|ft luted „neu blooks<J&,

As baa beoii uaid, present indications arc that the criminal designs ■of tho Greek ICing have been filially checkmated, and that during the remaining period of tho War the discomfited Royalists will ptav an insignificant part as compared With the National Government, which is 'irganisiug forces at Salonika to tako the Held side by side with the lintmle armies. The Allies, for reasons that are as yet obscure, have come tardily to the point of giving free scopo to tho National Government, and firmly repressing the treacherous activities of the Royalists, but this policy seems now to be established, and the political outlook in Greece and tho military outlook in tho Balkans are equally brightened as a result. Provided the Allies abstain from further political and diplomatic blunders in Greece, there should be little danger of the Royalists recovering their former command of the situation. As matters aro going, Constantjne seems to be nearing the end of his tether. Even in his own stronghold of Old Greece he is threatened with loss of popularity. It was reported yesterday that the Gounarists, hitherto Constantine's most ! devoted followers, are now accusing him of treason. Bearing in mind that--tho people of Old Greece are • tfotorioiisly fickle and inconstant—at least as ready to punish failure as : io'applaud success—it seems not unlikely that the report is accurate, and that Constantine is losing his hold upon the section of tho population which has hitherto followed his lead. In. any case, his reign is certainly threatened by the rising National movement headed by M. Venizelos and his colleagues. M. Venizelos has from the outset disclaimed any anti-dynastic purpose, and has stated his aims in the following terms: ... "as soon as the war is terminated we will see what guarantees can be obtained for the futuro against the possibility of a certain limited number of persons around the King imposing upon the Crown opinions which are in direct contradiction to the will of the people,_ and forcing upon the people against their will a policy calculated to drivo our country to national-suicide." No one doubts that M. Venezilos would bo content to see constitutional government reestablished in Greece without any change in tho occupancy of the throno, but taking account of Conetantine's own temper, and that of his subjects, it seems unlikely that any smooth and easy settlement of the Greek political problem will be .achieved. It is much more likely that by the time the revolution has done its work Gonstantine will be a "king without a throne. It is to be remembered in this connection that- Britain, France, and Russia are pledged to maintain Greek independence and to presorvo tho country from tyranny or disorder, if necessary by the introduction of armed force. Tho guarantees relato wholly to the nation and not to any individual sovereign. There is nothing to prevent his subjects deposing Constantine if they feci so inclined, and it is inorc than likely that his treason will (ultimately bo punished by the loss of his throne.