PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2988, 27 January 1917, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Several forecasts of impending war developments which have come through Holland lately make it impossible to forget that Holland is the next door neighbour of Germany. The latest addition to the number has at least the merit that it docs not attempt to sail under false colours; It is a message from the Berlin correspondent of a Dutch newspaper, and no doubt may be accepted as a fair sample of the talk with which the military clique in Germany is' attempting to beguile tho general public. The correspondent s predictions, or rather assertions, will-assuredly impress no one out«ide_ Germany who has followed the major developments of the war. From first to last ho proceeds on the assumption that Germany is in a position to choose her policy and to dictate the strategy of the war when tho return of spring permits a resumption of operations in tho main theatres. That assumption, as. ,wo

know, h false, ;uu! tlw predictions based upon if- are as nonsensical as might, te expected in the eircuinsLiUU't'S.

PiEMEJiDEKiNG what befell the. Central Powers last year—their_ complete loss uf the initiative in the main theatres, and the disastrous defeats they suffered in defensive warfare —we can afford to sinile. at statements that. Germany will seek to force a decision in" the West and that Austria, "will settle accounts with Italy after the fashion of Rumania," while "there will be only sufficient fighting on the Eastern front to preserve the status quo." The struggle that lies ahead is likely to be grim enough, and to exceed in intensity even the tremendous conflicts which the war has already witnessed, but it assuredly does not rest with Germany and tho ramshackle Empire she is dragging with her to disaster to lay down the lines upon which the struggle will henceforth proceed. Tho time has passed when Germany could hope to concentrate to her own advantage in any one main theatre. If she is permitted to develop an offensive-, on one or other of the main fronts when the weather opens it will assuredly be for the reason that tho Allies find it profitable to let her do so. She certainly cannot hope to impede the development of tho Allied plans even' to the limited extent that she succeeded-in doing so last year. Such a. programme as the Berlin correspondent has airily sketched ..has no practical bearing upon the outlook in tho war. Like other talk of the kind it is interesting and significant only as indicating that the German authorities have no better resource than to buoy up their people with shams and delusions which are kmnd'to be speedily dissipated.

If talk of this kind came only from irresponsible correspondents its significance would be slight enough, but' the fact is well established that it is the settled policy of the German Government to- encourage the nation and army under its control with hopes which it knows to bo false. Even Hindenbueg has been pressed into service in the manufacture of delusions which is as much a matter of organisation in Germany as is the manufacture of munitions. For instance, when the enemy Generalissimo was put up some time ago to 6peak words of comfort to Austria, he said, amongst other things, that tho Eussian armies were exhausting themselves and had made no progress in a military sense. This was said within a few months of the time which witnessed the practical annihilation of the Austrian Eastern armies. Hindenburg added: "Only the Eussian artillery has become more effective, thanks to teaching by French and Japanese officers, who in some cases actually command it. But even now our German and Austro-Hungarian artillery is superior. For one period the Russians had more ammunition than formerly. Now their supplies of ammunition have diminished, and as soon as winter comes they will be tonable to receive ammunition by Archangel and Vladivostock." Tho truth is, as most people know by this time, that 'Russia is not only rapidly expanding her internal production of munitions, but is in a position to import supplies continuously throughout tho winter both by_ way of the Siberian railway, which is in touch with open ports on the Chinese coast, and by way of her open port on the Arctic coast, which is -now , '.linked up ■with lief interior depots by' a double line of railway. Hindenbueg, of course, was aware of these facts when he spoke, and knows that Russia will open the impending campaign far better armed.and equipped than at any previous stage, of- tho war. This is. only one of many instances that m u? r< citocl in whicn a responsible German leader has set himself to deceive his own nation and its allies as to the position and prospects in the war. The famous "look at the map" speeches of tho German Onancellor constituted a precisely similar attempt, though upon a more elaborate scale. s

General prospects on the West tront were interestingly discussed last month by the military contributor to the Manchester Guardian. His immediate topic was the moral to be drawn from the French victories at Yerdun, iri the last of which, in mid-December, the French took more than nine thousand eneniv Pnscmers "There is -no reason whatever,; he wrote, "why the French victories at Verdun should not be repeated once a week at different, parts of the front. Express the military problem of the West front in terms of a break-through and it is seen to be a problem of enormous complexity. Its difficulties increase with each mile of fresh advance. The breakage has to be on a very wide front indeed to produce the desired results. Had the if I'u °l thc Somm6 offensive broken the German lines all the way from Gommccqurt.to Montauban we should have had very different suits from those which were actually achieved, valuable though these were/ As.it was, the break was only partial, and the narrowness of the- breach committed us to' siege operations with this great drawback, tnat the fortress to be captured had an almost indefinite backward extension. To rush it was out of the question. On tho other hand to employ thc slow methods of siege was to give the enemy time to prepare fresh defences It was like the old fable of the hydra."

"These objections, however," (the English.winter..continues), ."do- not apply to.an enterprise limited as was that ot the French -at Verdun llip victory was ■ gained, .first, by clever tactics, which deceived thi enemy as to the-exact point' of attack west or east of the Mouse; secondly, by overwhelming concentration of artillery a fc the point selected for tho breach; and, lastly by tho extreme rapidity of move' rnent which .comes from having a limited objective. Seven weeks elapsed between the last offensive of tho French, which recovered them fJouamont, and the offensive of last week. In that time they were able so to perfect their roads, trams and railways, even on ground that had been torn out of all shape by bombardment, that by rapidity of movement and artillery fire they defeated the Germans with four divisions against five. Tho same thin* could be done at other points o"f the front given tho same conditions—namely, superiority of artillery, elaborate communications to securo rapidity of movement, and superiority in the air to secure secrecy. Inasmuch as it is only at a tew points of the front that tho ground has been so pitted and mauled as it was at Douamont, there- seems no reason, given sufli-

cient guns and sufficient elaboration of communications, why the same thing should not be done once a week. If it were, it would automatically bring about the contraction of the German lines. The military problem of the West is thus .seen to present two aspects. There is; first, that of the- breakthrough ; secondly, there is that of the successive thunderstorms, like that at Verdun last week, rolling backwards and forwards along the front.' The broad difference between the two plans is that the first demands an enormous expenditure of men, the second enormous expenditure of labour in making roads and railways and in providing the superabundance of munitions. The two plans are .not necessarily antagonistic; they are alternatives both of which should be kept in view."

Reasons appear for dissenting in part from the views expressed by tho writer just quoted. He seems to take a. somewhat conservative view of what was accomplished in the Somme offensive, and of the possibilities of its further development, and to make too little of the fact that the Thiepval ridge, from which tho Germans were dislodged, was , a vital stronghold stiffening their line. As to the even more important features of the offensive, it t; to be remembered that fourfifths of the German divisions on the West front.were successively thrown in the path of the Allied assaults, and that the enemy's losses wore considerably greater than those of the Allies. s The correspondent performs a useful service, however, in emphasising the fact that the French victories at Verdun have a material.bearing upon the course of the war in the Western theatre, and demonstrate that the Allies, in their efforts to overthrow the enemy, are far from being restricted solely to the _ policy of concentrating heavly against a single section of the front.

To an extent the particulars of the enemy submarine campaign and its results-supplied to-day by the Daily Chronicle's naval correspondent had.been anticipated by earlier information. For instance, the correspondent mentions that the total tonnage of new British ships launched during the war to September 30, 1916, was 1,873,985 tons. It had already been authoritatively stated that up to the end of September the enemy submarines had sunk British ships aggregating. about 2,250,000 tons, and that about four-fifths of this loss had been made good by new construction and in other ways. The correspondent states that the progress of shipbuilding in Great Britain has never been more rapid than at present. If he is right ships are now being turned out at a rate Miich will result in an annual output of two million tons or more. In 1913, the shipping launched in Great Britain amounted to 641 steamers and 47 sailing vessels, aggregating 1,032,153 tons. During the first two years of war this rate of construction was reduced to less than half, but the output of the shipyards is now again rising. Even at the reduced rate of building, new construction (supplemented by s a certain amount of purchase and commandeering) made good fourfifths of the destruction effected by the submarines in 25 months of war. Had the pre-war rate of shipbuilding been maintained, new construction would have much more than matlo good submarino losses. It Would have added nearly twice the tonnage destroyed.

. :So. far; as. new. construction and. its ratio-to losses'is-concerned the outlook' is fairly promising. The serious features of the position are brought out by tho Chronicle correspondent when he states that though many submarinej are probably being destroyed .(the Admiralty docs not as a rule announce their destruction), the enemy is turning them out faster than they are being destroyed, and that our tonnage losses are increasing. Ho appears to rely in part, however, upon German figures of British tonnago destroyed, and theso are possibly exaggerated. He mentions that the British official figures admit a loss of 787,575 tons from January to October, 1916, and that the Germans claim to have sunk .719,000 tons of British shipping in two months (November and December)." No means are available at the moment of checking these figures, but even if it is true that the rate of destruction has risen of late it. .does not , follow that the increase will.be maintained. Account must be taken of the progressive, develop■ment of the anti-submarine campaign. In particular, time is needed lor the extended arming of merchant ships which it is hoped will impose an effective check upon sub\. marines cruising in.the outer sea's, A big industrial effort is involved.. It is, in fact, so great that some naval, experts in Great Britain hold that it would be better, to-increase the number of light cruisers and other mobile naval craft than to attempt to arm any large proportion of the merchant fleet. This opinion, • however, is evidently not heid by the eaval authorities. ■ Definite,- tliougn not detailed, information in regard to. arming merchantmen was supplied by Me. Waltee Runciman in a valedictory, speech which he delivered last month on the occasion of retiring'from the office of President of the Board of Trade. The retiring Government, Me. Runciman stated,' had been pressing on with the arming of our merchant vessels against submarines with accelerated activity during the last twelve months. Amongst the decisions of last August was that tho production of armaments for the defence of merchant vessels should take first place, and he had no doubt that his decision, would be endorsed % the incoming Government! '.'■