PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2982, 20 January 1917, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

. So little is known about the undercurrents of Russian politics that it is 'almost hopeless to attempt to weigh the significance of this or that Ministerial resignation or appointment. A few days, ago some uneasiness was awakened by the announcement that Prince Nicholas Golitzine, a reputed reactionist, had been appointed to succeed General Trefoff as Prime Minister. The uneasiness was due not so much to anything that is known against Prince Golitzine personally as to the , fact thj,t some members of the class to whioh he belongs arc suspectcd of pro-German sympathies. Suspicion of Prince Golitzine is perhaps not warranted. 'JTo has, at all events, taken occasion to affirm the determination of Russia to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion, he has stated that he is not opposed to responsible government, ancl to-day it is,reported that he has telegraphed assuring Mr. Lloyd George of his: loyal _ co-operation in rendering more intimate the Anglo-Russian union and ensuring the triumph of honour and right. In itself the announcement made to-day that the Minister of AVar, General Shuvayeff, has been superseded, is even more calculated to awaken uneasiness than was the appointment of Prince Golitzine. It will he remembered that when a political crisis' arose in November last General Shu.vayeff and his colleague, Admiral Grigorovich, Minister of the Navy, co-operated with the Progressive majority in the Duma in compelling_ the resignation of the then Premier and Foreign Minister (M. Sturmer), who was suspected of intriguing with a view to a separate peace. The action of the War and Naval Ministers made it possible to say that tho people, the Duma, the Army and the Navy, stood s'olidly arrayed against the pro-German coterio. It would, therefore,seem that in the retirement of General Shuvayeff, the Progressives, who, apart from their attitude towards domestic reforms, stand also for the unfaltering prosecution of tho war, have lost a powerful friend. As has been said, however, the apparent significance of Ministerial changes in Russia is not always the real significance. Not infrequently theso changes Occasion doubts and fears, but when all is said the simmering of Russian politics is very completely overshadowed by tho nation's noblo rccord in the war. Bitterly tried and fighting her way upward through defeat, Russia lias developed and is using an increasingly effective military power. 'Her chivalry appears in the unselfish efforts sho has made on. a number of occasions to bring relief to her hard-pressed Allies. It puts no strain upon faith to believe that a nation which rose superior to such calamities and trials as descended on Russia in 1915 without being betrayed by what is_weak,and defective in lier. political constitution will creditably weather the remaining storms of tho war t- *

Reports from Grccce arc still to somo extent in conflict. It is stated that the Athens Government has released the Vcnizclists whom it lately held'in durance, and there are other indications that it is under the necessity of submitting to the will Vf the Allies. A Rome correspondent points out, however, that while tho Athens Government, in obedience to an Entente demand, lias retired General G'allaris, who was implicated in the treacherous' attack on Allied landing parties on December l, it has appointed as his successor in the Athens command General Yanakitsas, a notorious proGerman, who negotiated tho sinrender of Fort Eupcl to tho Bulgarians. This certainly looks like a sheer act of defiance, and runs counter to other evidence, suggesting that Constantine and his cotcrio have been brought to sco the wisdom of submission.

A review of the position by Mr. Jeffries, the correspondent of the Daily Mail at Athens, would bo moro interesting and possibly more convincing if he gave some inkling of tho ovidrtice upon which ho bases his confidently stated opinions. He takes the complete submission of the Athens Government for granted and apparently rejccts the possibility that CoNsrANTiNE may even now be cloaking evil designs with f a j r words. Mr. Jeffries declares, indeed, that in the event of the nonacceptance ol the Entente ultimatum, General Sarhail was prepared

to entirely destroy tho Greek army. As information stands this might have been 110 easy matter in the circumstances that lately threatened to arise. It has, of course, never been in doubt that- tho Allies arc well able to hold Greccc in control unless she is very powerfully assisted by tho Germans and Bulgars, but it seemed distinctly possible a day or two ago that this assistance might be rendered. Mr. Jeffries evidently assulnes that an enemy offensivo in Macedonia is no longer in prospect. _ This is a matter upon which it is impossible to bo dogmatic, biit his assumption is certainly supported to some extent by tho late turn in Rumania. In that theatre tho Allies are still successfully attacking. Enemy defeats and tho capturo of enemy prisoners are officially reported s>ii some sections of tho front, and sJ Petrograd message, unconfirmed as yet, states that the enomy is evacuating Braila._ As matters stand the enemy* has failed, though by' a > narrow margin, to gain t.he short and advantageous front which until a day or two ago he seemed certain to gain, and if the Allies are able to persevere in their present effort ho will have some cause to be dissatisled with the results of his Rumanian adventuYe.

Events in the.Balkans in recent times have arrested attention in their immediate aspect, but it should never be forgotten that this theatre holds possibilities which bear intimately upon some of the most important issues of the war. It has been said often, and quite justly, that Germany has no visible pect of driving _ her Rumanian offensive to a point of decisive sucress, and she would not be more likely to gain such a success in tho south if she turned her attention to General Sareail's army. Even if she contrived to break the Macedonian front the resumption, of opera-, tions in the main theatres would probably find her still hammering vainly at the fortified lines around Salonika. But the issues open in the Balkans are very far from being measured by what Germany may do or-attempt in whatever time is lett to her. to. concentrate' in that theatre. A good deal has been heard from mibfcary writers of' a pamtully shortsighted ancTunimagmative type. about- what- they • call the folly, of wasting strength in secondary operations in the Balkans, but there-is much to be said in favour of ,a_ totally different estimate of the importance of the- Balkan campaign and its place in the soheme of the war.

. In this connection it may be of interest to quote observations made some time ago by a neutral soldier who that' the Allies are faded by a great opportunity in the southeastern theatre of war. "The failure of the Quadruple Alliance to break down German resistance so f!£f ti + " is dll 6 the fact that the Alliance, unlike Germany m France, Russia, and the .Balkans, has never thrown "an overwhelming force on one front while taking risks on the others. That results only in part from the Entente Powers' peripheral, positions; in part, it results from the lack of a plan. The hntente has on two occasions (Gallipoli- and Salonika) transported very large forces to the jbalkans, reasoning, rightly, ■ that this was a critical front: but on both occasions it has. stopped short or transporting 'overwhelming' forces,' though an extra hundred thousand-say a hundredth part "of the total Entente forces— would probably. have brought decisive local Soon have ended the war everywhere. The main difference between the Entente and Central. Powers' strategy is that the Central Powers have wiSh J vays had * re ?- erve a ™y which has been revealed only at the 1 moment it began to execute a n6w pkl \ That w why the Kt l° WeiS have s " rvived D ew thieat • after new threat, the entry of Italy, the practical destruction last summer ot Austria's Eastern swssr * nd mw

The Quadruple Alliance • could oven now raise a large reserve army, to be kept for a crushing blow when the time comes or for preventing a reverse such as is now threatened in .Kumania. (Tins was written at an early stage of the. enemy's Rumanian offensive.) The ability of the Alliance to keep even a million men in reserve is beyon'd doubt.' ' The contingents of which it would bo foi mod need not bo concentrated in one spot, but could be kept in tho respective countries, under guarantees against their use for pending strategical problems, until the time came to strike. Had Russia, Prance, England, and Italy each had a reservo of 250,000 men equipped for mobile war, the entrance of Rumania into the war could have been made to mean tho end of German domination in the Balkans, the end of Austria-Hungary, and the edcl of Germany. The reconquest milc-by milo of territory on the Russian, I 1 rench, and Austro-Italian fronts is a pis aller.. In the Central Powers war-making a dominant strategical aim has been the motive all along,- and tho German failures, due to other causes, should blind no one to the fact that this policy is right."

It is not to bo claimed that the observations of this neutral authority are in all details above, criticism. Much that ho ascribes to bad generalship and neglect of opportunities _ on tho part of the Allies might with a better show of reason be attributed to tho handicap under which they laboured in the earlier stages of tho war, from an inferiority of developed and available resources. Ho makes much too light also of tho extent to which it is possible to hasten tho enemy's defeat by straightforward operations in the main theatres. Events both in the East and West should have induced ill in to modify his remarks under this head and to abstain from ;r\ h °P, clcssl y misleading remark that tho rcconquest mil© b,y mile ■ J cr . rltor .v on tho Russian, French, and Austro-Italian fronts is a pis ttller. The Allied offensive in tho main theatres has resulted-in much mfcro than tho reconqucst of territory nnlo by mile. Our authority himself remarks that the Russian offensive resulted in "tho practical destruction ol Austria's Eastern Army, and ill the Sommo offensive, from first to last, more than half,the total German Army was badly shattered and defeated. But when all jiicccssary modifications and reservations have been made on theso lines tho neutral soldier's contention that it must be- tho aim of the Entente not only to meet and defeat the enemy where he is strongest, but to strike him with overwhelming force whero he is weakest, is sound and irrefutablo.

The principle involved—ono that is as old as war—is, of coursc, of gcnei'al application, but the placc that tho Balkan Peninsula occupies in tho map of this war gives it an unrivalled claim to be selected as the sceno of a powerful Allied offensive when the enemy is fully held and occupied in the main theatres. If the Allies wero in a position last year, when they had the enemy thrown back upon tho defensive in tho main theatres, to simultaneously T> a i S i S an ovenv helming forco in the Balkans, they wero guilty of a tremendous blunder in not doing so. In point of fact wo do not know that their preparations wore then sufficiently advanced to permit a-' full-powered effort in the Balkans.' lherc is every reason to believe that they were not. But whatever the blunders of the past may havo been, tho way to repair them is assuredly not to give up the Balkan Peninsula as a bad job, or make it a place for marking time, but. to turn to account as soon as may bo tho unexampled opening and opportunity which it offers. \Yhatover success may attend the Allies in tho main theatres in the future stages of the war, their victory will certainly be hastened by a drive through the ■Balkans into tho territory of the Dual Monarchy.