PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2975, 12 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

filil'dßTS from different quarters testify that the Russian offensive on tho Baltic front is developing on an important scale. Telegrams fruiil IWlin by wily of Holland dta-io that tho Russians have never used ammunition more freely than iii the. vigorous attacks they arc now delivering on their northern front, aiid admit that tho .Russians have achieved a real success. The inevitable tag is appended that this success was purchased at a heavy price, but tho gist of tho news from all sources is that the Russians have already achieved important results, and that tho offensive is developing with good promise. A Russian report gives BUggestivo figures of artillery captured. It states that since January 5 tho attacking troops luivc captured 21 heavy and 51 light guns. Tho abnormal proportion of heavy guns can only bo taken to mean that tho enemy was dislodged from positions he had hoped to retain. Reports are somewhat in conflict as to whether tho Russians sprang a, surprise upon the enemy when they opened the offensive. According io one message to-day, the first move was made by the enemy. Preparations for an attack on the grand scab under modern conditions arc hard to hide, and it is likely . enough that.4bo Gormans attacked in tho hope of deranging Russian preparations of which thoy wcro aware. But the progress of events makes it quite clear that the Russians are conducting an offensivo for which they bad fully prepared, and which the enemy is not .well placed to resist.

The unknown author oE a London messago published- to-day is at some pains to show that the Russian offensive- is doveloping on a great extent of front. He infers that the .Russian activity extends along a. front of 150 miles—that is to say, along the whole Riga and Dwjna front to beyond Dvinsk. 4 s it is presented, the argument is rather fine spun, but in point of fact no such argument is needed to establish the- importance of tho Russian offensive. It may rank as an affair of magnitude though its main weight should continuo to fall; as has happened up to the present, on tho enemy positions west and south-west of 'Riga. Attacks in this region, sufficiently driven homo, would upset tho whole front of about 150 miles to which the writer of the message refers. As ho mentions, the most important of the strategic positions threatened by the offensive is Mitiui, a road and railway centre sfca.ndingi about) Iwenty-liv© miles south-west of Riga.

From Mitau railways run northeast to Riga and noyth-wesfc behind tho enemy front as it is at present located. Mitaii ,is also ,the meeting point of railways from west and south which serve tho enemy as supply lines. Losing this useful junction tho enemy would have >to retreat from the front he now holds around the southern oud of the Gulf of Riga and along the Dwina, and any limited retreat would carry him not to a shorter front, but to a much longer ono than ho now holds. Tho position at present disclosed is that Mitau is somewhat seriously menaced. The Russians are within a dozen miles of the place, and they have captured a series of strongly-fortified positions on high ground which, covorcd it against attack on tho north-west. It is now possiblo to say even more confidently than it could bo said yesterday that tho Russian offensive is likely to draw considerable enemy reinforcements to the Baltic front. Even if these reinforcements aro forthcoming—and ,tho enemy is not likely to find them without reducing his effectivo strength in other areas of conflict—he will still bo faced by a difficult and embarrassing problem in the Baltic Provinces. Therk is a. very "maTWTcI cbnfra* between the conditions disclosed on tho Baltic froat aTrtl th'oso. which have lately obtained in Rumania, and in the contrast there is a plain suggestion that tho Russians now consider that action on their main front is more likely to checkmate tho enemy's designs in Rumania than a local effort to roll back his offensive in that country. It is evident that the- Russians on the Baltic front aro labouring under, no such handicap as is imposed upon the Allies in Rumania through lack of a sufficient force of artillery and adequate munitions. Probably tho conditions ruling on the Baltic front reUccii iKore accurately the balanco of strength between the Russian armies and tho forces tiho enemy is' able to array against them than does tho one-sided conflict in Rumania. It must bo supposed that at the outset the Russians would have sacrificed a good deal to hold up tho enemy on the frontiers of Rumania. But having failed in that it is likely enough that they may find a more profitable field of activity on the main front than in the path of the enemy's offensive.

Colonel Repington's survey of prospects in the 1917 campaign is rather fanciful. He- is credited in the first place with ■ the statement that HiNDENBUIiG will probably adopt the defensive on tho .West front, lessening tho German inferiority by massing vast supplies of heavy guns and men. "And men" is probably a mistake in cabling. This apart, however, the leading idea presented by Colonei, Repington is that the Germans aro likely to make a great attempt this year to crush Russia. Taking this line, he assumes that tho enemy will bo stronger during the coming spring and summer than- he was in the late summer and Autumn of 1916, when ho was reduced to purely defensive tactics in .all • the main theatres. The assumption is contrary to all known facts, and until it is supported by something like tangible evidence- it hardly deserves attention. Colonel Reping'ton states, it is true, that Hindenburg's intention is to shorten his lines after tho Rumanian campaign, thus giving him nioro reserves to use where ho desires. Passing over tlio fact that the military correspondent of The Times cannot be in tht> confidence of tho enemy Generalissimo, it is not clear where and how the shortening is to be carried out. On tho Eastern front the enemy will have a. much longer front to'maintain than lie had-last year, and while he retains a footiug anywhere in Rumania' and in the Baltic Provinces a retreat in the' Eastern theatro would not shorten but lengthen his line. A retreat from tho Baltic Provinces would recluco the front to bo defended, but such a retreat is hardly likely tn be nuicli; until it is enforced by .Russian attacks. The enemy has said., bo much about hi , ; intention of retaining per-

mancnt possession of tho Baltic Provinces that to retreat from them Would bo a mosL damaging confession of weakness and failing power. A successful retreat in fcho Western theatre to tho lino of the Meuso would release a considerable liody of strongtli for service elsewhere, but for reasons that have been often touched upon it is extremely doubtful whether such a retreat is practicable or could be made without disastrous loss.

'JL'riEM; is really no visible evidence for Colonel 11kpi_nqton's assumption that the enemy is likely to recover in 1917 the initiative which he lost in 101(5. That the Western. Allies and .Italy will resume active, operations with their existing superiority in lighting power considerably augmented may be. taken for granted, and as to .Russia thcro is. to be set against Colonel Kepington's estimate of the outlook a statement mado not long ago by General BnusrLOFF. ' "If there remain .any Germans -still hopeful of their cause," said the .Russian commander, "lot thorn realise that to-day, when' tho Central Powers have already lost the initiative and arc finding a difficulty in refilling their ranks, llussia lias not yet reached tho zenith of her power, which will only bo approached next year (1917), when we shall have the largest and best army since the beginning of the war. Even this year, wo have been obliged to conduct our offensive with an inferiority in material and heavy guns. Next year wo shall have material on an equality with the enemy, and a superiority ii\ human resources which should steadily increase as long as tho war endures."

It is again reported to-day that Greece has submitted to the Allied demands, but there is mention also of enemy reinforcements assembling on j>ho Macedonian front as if in readiness for an offensive. The possibility still exjsts that General Sarra'ii. may have to deal with a. Gennan-Bulgar attack before he has put the Greek Royalist army out of harm's way.

No very important development is reported at time of writing i n the Rumanian campaign, but light is cast upon a passage of tho retreat from Wallachia which has hitherto been obscure. Jfc will be remembered that the Rumanian army holding the Predca-1 Paps was placed in great peril when tho -Germane advanced on Bucharest, and on the junction of Ploesoi further north. This a.rmy successfully resisted the enemy's attempts to- break through the Predeal Pass, through which'a railway runs to Bucharest, but it waa ultimately taken in rear by tho , enemy's eastward advance, and the Germans alleged that it was enveloped and caplured. It is 'now stated by a Times correspondent at Jassy, tho temporary Rumanian capital, that the army in question (tho Second) crowned its achievement in defends iug the Predeal Pass by effecting a, safe rotreat. Rearguards were sacrificed and some guns were abandoned, after being first destroyed, but the main body of the army escaped to take a prominent parfc in tho subsequent stages of the campaign.