PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2972, 9 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Immediate prospects in the Rumanian campaign are not growing brighter. Not vory much weight can be attached as yet to the fact that tho Russo-Rumanians have on some parts :of tho Moldavian front successfully .taken the offensive. These movements are evidently local and limited, and quite possibly are intended to serve no more important purpose than that of covering and safeguarding the general retre.it. It will be noticed that a London message to-day sums up the position in the statement that the Russians are apparently successfully extricating their right wing (which extends through the mountain territory of South-Western Moldavia) from General von Falkenhayn's encircling manoeuvres. This probably states the facts accurately. Certainly tho Allies, though they have of late gained tho upper hand in some local actions, have lost a good deal of ground in South-Western Moldavu during the last day or two. Further east towards tho Danube and on tho banks of that river, they have, as was shown yesterday, been thrown almost right back upon their nsiin defensive line. Braila is only eight miles south of tho 'Sereth where that river enters the Danube, and/the enemy is now somewhere beyond Braila in his advanco upon the Sereth. In .the Dobrudja the enemy is now on the south bank of tho Danube, and if he crosses either the Sereth or tho Danubq in forco the whole scheme of the Allies' defence, as it is at present organised on tho Tro-tus-Sereth line and along the Danube, will break down anct they will have to retreat.

According to_ Colonel Feyleu, who is a Swiss military export of some distinction, it now seoms clear that tho Sereth lino must perforce- be abandoned. Ho adds that stubborn rearguard actions aro likely, with a view to covering tho evacuation of Galatz, which _ is scarcely tenable now that Braila has gone. Galatz stands soveral miles north of tho Sereth lino, and if the enemy roaches Galatz ho .\vi!I x of course,,

have turned the Sereth line and made it untenable. Colonel l r ßi'IjEß's reasons for assuming that Galatz is doomed and that a successful stand on the Screth line is not to be expected care not stated, but they may be inferred. Recent events faavo made it plain that the enemy is still operating in a considerable superiority of force. It.is possible, indeed probable, that the margin of superiority with which he opened the campaign has been reduced. His progress of late, though steady, has not been rapid; and the RussoRumanians have offered a stubborn resistance to his advance on the Sereth lino, which suggests that they are less seriously handicapped in tho factor of artillery and in other respects than they were in thq earlier passages of tho campaign. Nevertheless they are still under the necessity of giving ground and are reduced in tho main to defensive tactics.

These conditions hold out no great hope of a successful defenceof the Sereth line. Speculation upon a matter which is unlikely to remain much longer in the region of speculation is not of much use, biit, as most people know, by this time, an army reduced to defensive tactics is by that* very fact heavily nandicapped. If, before the fate of tho Sereth line is determined, an influx of reinforcements (particularly of artillery, the arm to which it is believed tho enemy owes his present predominance in Rumania) enables the Allies to even threaten a powerful counter-offensive at any point, tho position may be speedily transformed. Tho enemy's dispositions would then bo. governed by the necessity of making provision against possible attack and nis striking power would be correspondingly reduced. But if, as seema to bo tho case, the Russo-Rumanians aro restricted at present to defensive tactics, the enemy, is free to concentrate practically at will against whatever section of tho front ho may select for a full-powered effort. He has the priceless advantage of tho initiative, and in the circumstances it is not unlikely that his freedom of concentration may outweigh whatever advantages the Allies derive from tho strength of their, 'defensive line's along tho Moldavian rivers and tbo Danube.

From the point of view of tho immediate defence of Moldavia, the outlook is bad enough. It is distinctly possible that the Sereth lino may prove to bo only a temporary stopping place in tho Allied retreat) through Rumania. There is a. visible danger that tho population of tho small part of Rumania still held against tho enemy may share for a, timo tho hard fato of their compatriots in the! larger part of the country which tho enemy has already occupied. And tho enemy has prospects of gleaning in Moldavia-, as in Wallachia, such supplies of grain and oil as the Allies, are not ablo to romove or destroy. Turning, howovor,.from this limited point of view to tho larger aspects of tho war, the outlook is by no'means bad. Only those in whom tho. press of immediate events ha-s destroyed a senso of proportion will forgot ihat for tho oneniy tho past year has been one of terrible disasters in which his ultimate fate is foreshadowed and which ho has no visible prospect of retrioving. Tho trend of tho war is'! to ho observed, not in tho Rumanian campaign, but in what happened during 1916 at Verdun, on the Italian front, on the Russian southorn front, and, above ail, on the Somme. After these mighty conflicts, iu whieli' be suffered irreparable defeat, the.enomy's Rumanian enterprise, at its present stage of development, resembles not so much a purposeful effort for victory as an expiring flicker. On the same evidence —that of tho tremendous battle's fought on the main fronts during 1916—w0 are justified in believing itfiat tho enemy is no longer capable of mustering tho force which, would give- him prospect of success in ii. major offensive in any theatre.

Measuring by the standards of the war his present success in Rumania, is comparatively insignificant. To lift it out of that category and improve his prospects in the 1017 campaign, which in all likelihood will j open, on a big scale in the spring, he must not only defeat tho Allied armies in Rumania, but press forward to such a success against the Russian main armies as will reduce them to comparative inactivity during, tho approaching months of intense contflict. For the time being he is using up force in achieving a slow advance through the remaining area of Moldavia, and the Allies are delaying his progress with small forces, while their main armies are making ready for. the decisivo conflict impending. There is a pretty obvious distinction to be drawn between the deplorable calamity which has overtaken Rumania—a calamity which does not involve the Rumanian army—and any really formidable threat to the Russian main armies.

There is every reason to believo that the enemy will be stopped a long way short of that successful attack upon the Russian main armies which alone would justify his present effort. So much assured by far the most important result of his exertions will be to give him a bigger area to defend, with a longer front and longer line of communication to maintain. This fact goes far to explain wijt the Allies, having failed to defend Rumania and the Danube, are content as the next best thing with a fighting retreat through Rumania which merely holds the enemy in play and delays his progress. This policy was adopted in tho first instance owing to temporary inability to mass force in a particular area, and in itself ft looks weak. But it serves reasonably well as leading up to a time not distant when the struggle will bo resumed in all theatres with the enemy in. a still more pronounced inferiority than in 1916. '■••

In tho light of past experience it cannot reasonably bo regarded as within tho enemy's power to inflict decisive defeat upon tho Russian main armies. That bo will derive any great advantage- from tho occupation of Rumania without defeating and crippling the Russian main armies is not a theory which can be seriously entertained. There •is no special virtue in a line of battio drawn through Bukowina or along the Pruth, or through Bessarabia, which would enable the enemy to deal moro easily with superior forces in these regions than in the vicinity of fclio Danube. Tho essential fact at tho moment is nofc that tho invasion of Rumania is extending, but that nothing has happened which promises the enemy relief from an overwhelming pressure of attack when tho hour strikes for the opening of the Allied concerted offensive.

It may be thought that the turn of events in Rumania, with the consequent postponement of that simultaneous attack on Bulgaria from north and south which was formerly expected, has opposed now difficulties to the development of the Allied offensive in Macedonia. This view of tho matter, however, must bo qualified. When the Allied forces elsewhere arc ready to strike, General Sarr'ail's army in Macedonia will be able to play a full part. That the extent of ground to be covered is not in itself ,-a vital factor is sufficiently exemplified in the enemy invasion of Rumania. It is the balanco of force that tells. The enemy has been ablo to bring a temporary and local superiority of force to bear during the winter, but there is every prospect that tho Allies will be abfe to develop a permanent superiority in all theatres before many months have passed. Taking a reasonably long view the outlook is as good in Macedonia as elsewhere.

Some observations upon tho situation in Macedonia are mado by the military contributor of the FortwigM'j Review, in the December issue of that publication. They are the more interesting since the same writer stated in his November article that tho situation in Macedonia was negativo aAI iadecisivo, and that General Sarrail appeared to have a smaller force under his command than had been reported. "\Yriting a month later, at a timo when the capture of Grajova, which was the first big step in the enemy occupation of Rumania, was already regarded as imminent, tho Fortnightly Review contributor took a, much more hopeful view of the position in Macedonia. Remarking first that the capture of Monastir gavo General Sakr'ail an advanced base for his projected campaign t in. Serbia, he went on to state: "The enemy's defences in the Yai'dar valley, are now turned, and tho road to Uskub is open. Further than this, General Sakrail will now bo able to open up communications with tho Adriatic, and by so doing relieve tho congestion at Salonika. There is a good road to Santi Quaranfca, and a bad oiie to Diirazzo. (Both places are Adriatic piorts). i . . All that remains to do is for tho 'Higher Commands' of tho Alfied Powers to reinforce General Sarrail, not with men, of whom ho has enough, but with munitions, to enable him to reconquer Serbia and carry the war into Hungary." Events in Rumania and new difficulties in Greece have for the timo dimmed tho prospects thus, sketched, but have not by any means removed them from sight.