PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2970, 6 January 1917, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

, ■ A point of extreme tension has ! now been reached, or isheing very rapidly approached, in the Rumanian campaign. . French experts ' are no doubt right in their opinion that tho Battle of the Sereth has begun, and'''that it will determine the issue of tho whole Rumanian campaign. The -(mestion immediately at stake is whether the RussoRumanians can hold' Moldavia- (except tho small portion, already occupied by tho enemy)' against invasion. But if the enemy succeeds in breaking through the Sereth line, or contrives to outflank it by way of the Moldavian . western ' frontier, larger issues will be raised than that of the retention or loss .of the remaining area of Rumania. A mere extension of his invasion in Rumania would profit the enemy very little. Any further territory he may gain will almost certainly be swept b.ore. of most things'-"he would be likely to find useful: . The' richest part of the country, and its greatest depots for .the storage of commodities, are already in his hands, but the removal or destruction of supplies has reduced his gains 'to a minimum. He is not likely to fare better,in this respect if Moldavia shares the fato of ■ Wallachia. His : .prospects, even if. he succeeds on ; the Sereth, of enveloping any considerable section of;the Allied forces, are also probably poorer now than at an earlier stage of tho campaign. It to be. remembered that the enemy has now gained all but com-, plete command of tho Danube. His operations up to tho present might conceivably bo subsidiary to a purl/os'e;of completing',his hold on the great river to the sea.'.'But if, hav- , ihg gained the Danube, he.continues to prSss northward, advancing from a. strong and short front to one that is much longer, and for defensive -purposes much weaker, it ,will follow that he'has some'larger'purpose in view than the. occupation of Moldavia. We must then assume that he.contemplates, the advance upon Odessa, about, which there has'beeJi some talk,.or, if not that,' at all ■events an attack-in force upon the southern.flank of the Russian main armies. , x . *'t " .-■'■ * • » »

Offly time and events will disclose the scale upon, which the enemy Lab .planned his enterprise, but in any cas© the Battle of fcho Sereth is likely to rank as the most important of tho Rumanian campaign. Now. for.the first time since the campaign opened, the.Allies ara concentrated on .what Wears the appearance of being a sound line. , Hitherto they nave been.handicapped, not-only by the.inferiority in artillery j-"and in supply of munitions,, which may he a.determining.factor.'even'-in the present bafcfie, but by other circumstances of the campaign. In Walbchia theenemy had a very complete initiative by .reason of his artillery superiority and the vulnerability of the greatly extended Allied line, and was'enabled to concentrate upon main lines of communication, while' tho Allied forces were in continual clanger of being cut off and isolated. These conditions will not recur while the Sereth line holds firm.

\** * • I* On tho eastern part of their front tho Allies have lost all but a, small fragment of the Dobrucl.ja, but if this goes, and tho river-port of Braila with it, they will still havo tho Danube to defend from near Galatz to tho sea. West and north across Moldavia the Allies are established on river lines, the western part of the .front—tho right wing which is named to-day as tho critical section—running into mountain country and turning noi'th along tho Carpathians, where'they divide north-western 'Moldavia froin Transylvania. If tho Allies fail to hold this lincthey will have little prospect of stemming the enemy offensive short of tho confines of Moldavia on north and cast. At time of writing there is nothing to show definitely how the Battle of the Screth is going, but the Russians havo on ono section of ' the front struck an effective blow, which resulted in the capture of GOO prisoners, several guns, and a number of machine-guns. In another locality persistent enemy attacks were repulsed. Apparently the fighting to which these reports .refer occurred in tho western mountain country.

It has been said that if the enemy contrives. to break through the Sercth.line and drive north through Moldavia, it will bo' reasonable to assume that he contemplates an attack in force on the southern 'flank of the Russian main armies. But that such an attempt is possible does not necessarily mean that it would bo likely to succeed, or even to do-' velop' to a,] dangerous point. Dislodged from thovScrcth- line, tho Allies would certainly have to- retire towards the Moldavian • frontiers on the east and north, but they would probably make a, slow, fight-ing-retreat, as they did'in 'Wallacnia. At best,- from, his point of yieV, tUe enemy would :.bo like)y 4 to spend a great part.of .what- remains of win-, tcr in gairiing a sufficient hold upon Moldavia to enable him to strike into Bessarabia. Whatever the outcome of the Sercfch battle may be, it is rather more .likely. that tho return of spring will find the enemy, with an uncompleted campaign, in the south-eastern" theatre added to his already enormous than that he will be able to anticipate tho resumption of. the Allied grand offensive by carrying h'is south-east-ern campaign to a. point of decisive success. *.

The Battle of the Sereth may determine tho issue of the whole Ru- ■ nla'nian ciimpaign, but\if its outcome • is unfavourable to the. Allies it will i not determine) the larger 'issues > which are- involved in tho enemy's sciith-eastern venture. • There - is p much .to indicate that in his activities in Rumania, the enemy is spoiling his own remaining prospects.' If his south-eastern campaign is in essence defensive, . its purposo is already as far. as possible served, or wilj bo when the, last Allied rearguard passes out' of the Dobrudja across the Danube. Holding thatriver, with the "exception only of J some of its and with I a short cross-country line to the Transylvanian frontier, tho enemy would bo as-well-placed as he can hope to be for' a defensive stand. Extending his invasion; of Moldavia and not getting beyond the limits' of that province, he would in all likelihood weaken his position instead' of making it stronger. It only re- . mains, to add that though the plans of tho Allies are veiled, tlfcro is no doubt' thai 'any really (dangerous threat to tho Russian-flank would influence eyents in all theatres in a manner hardly likely to work out to ,the enemy's advantage/ Hindenburg may be wholly inclined to stake everything upon an offensive against Russia, but in-'View of present-day .strength of ..Russia and ' that of her Allies ibis reasonable to believe that such an-attempt would. not'only encounter powerful opposition' in its immediate path, but would be turned to profitable-account by the Allies in the.general.development of their offensive. . . -.-. . ..-..".

■Apart .from tho messages dealing yxith Rumania, little war news of importance is in hand at time of writing, except in regard to East Africa. Iu that theatre the British lorces.havo won another important success, and are making good headway in-rounding up the enemy troops remaining at large.' -No'new development is'reported in Greece, nor is any big event in the Western theatre chronicled in available reports. ,

An addition is raajle to-day to tho limited list 'of British transports sunk by'eneniy, 'submarines...'.' The Ivernia, sunk 'in the Mediterranean during bad weather, with a loss of over 150 lives, was a ship of 14,000 tonsj. a Cunard liner built in 1900. Tho only, redeeming feature of the affair is that the size'of'the ship and the casualty figures show'that much the greater, number'of those on board were saved. Probably the number lost is a very small 'proportlon of the ship's total complement.