PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2958, 22 December 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Except on the Rumanian front, where the Allies are fighting rearguard actions and falling back upon the line which has'been recently described, few war events of any importance are reported at time of writing. Brief messages dealing with the Western front speak of intermittent bombardment and minor operations. Bad weather rules in Macedonia and the threat of an enemy offensive in that quarter has not visibly developed. The Austro-Ger-mans_ are apparently keeping up a certain amount of activity on the Riissiain southern front. A Petrograd communique mentions that enemy attacks were repulsed southwest of Brody, in Northern Galicia, but there is nothing to indicate that the operations were upon a scale of any great importance. In Rumania, the enemy has now advanced to the near neighbourhood of the SerethDanube line, and it seems likely that he will soon add the river port of Braila to his conquests. The Russians, however, who have for 'the' time relieved their Rumanian allies on the front extending from the Danube to the mountain countryof • the western frontier, are evidently making_ a slow and orderly retreat Fighting a delaying action in the country west of Braila, which stands on the Danube about ten miles south of the Scrcfch line, they have gained time to remove the great quantities of wheat stored there, and it is stated also that they have provided a clear retreat for the, troops in the - Dobrudja, who are' now reported to be heavily engaged. The enemy now occupies practically all Wallachia and is in a fair way to gain complete possession of the Dobrudja and occupy the southwestern corner of Moldavia. It will very shortly be known whether b contemplates an attempt to break through the Screfch line and further extend his invasion.

The removal of grain supplies from Braila as a preliminary to tho evacuation of that place is possibly representative of much that has happened in the course of the Rumanian retreat. At all events a message from Switzerland states that the German Government has issued' a warning through tho Cologne Gazette and other newspapers, that the "conquest of Rumania" will not produce any immediate relief in connection with the food supply, and that it will bo impossible to increase rations of bread, meat, or anything else. The immediate suggestion, is that supplies captured in Rumania are to be reserved for army use, but the report tends to bear out statements made by some correspondents recently that these supplies will not in any material degree relieve the food problem of the Central Empires.

A late development in the Greek situation is the presentation of a Note of protest from the Athens Government against the landing of Yenizelists at various islands, under Allied protection, and demanding the restoration of these islands. The demand is not likely to elicit a very favourable reply. It is tho announced policy of the Allies to recognise and support the authority of the Provisional Government in those parts of Grceco where its rule is .accepted by a majority of the population, and it is in the Aegean Islands and in Macedonia that this condition chiefly obtains. Himself a native of Crete, M. Venizelos is backed by practically the whole population of that island, representing what has been described as unquestionably the most forceful element in tho Greek nation. With the Cretans are associated tho virilo population of the other large Aegean Islands and Macedonia. No doubt the Venizelists are busily gathering in the manhood of tho islands as recruits for the National Army, and the Note above-mentioned may be regarded as an indication of the anger with which tho process is regarded at Athens.

An interesting passage in the speech by Mr. Asquitk reported today relates to the Sommc offensive and Verdun. The primary object of the Somme operations, he said, was to relievo Verdun, which for months was the principal objective of German strategy. The loss of Verdun would have been the greatest blow to the Allied cause in the war. "Primary," is a wordof rather wide meaning. Using it on this occasion the ox-Prime Minister possibly meant no more than that the Sommc offensive served its first purpose in

relieving the tremendous strain bearing upou.tho Verdun defences. Certainly in its development to date it'has done a great deal more than relieve Verdun. Great interest attaches, however, to Ma. Asquith's estimate of the importance of Verdun, the more so since it is strikingly at variance with an opinion widely held at the time when the famous fortress was the storm-centre of the war. At one stage the possibility that the French might retire behind the Meuse at Verdun was freely canvassed, and many authorities held that this course would be much preferable to risking undue, loss and sacrifice in holding the fortress area. A totally different view of the matter had been taken in some quarters, however, before Mb. Asquith spoke in the terms reported to-day. For instance Mr. Frank H. ■ Simonds, writing in the Now York Tribune, in November, stated that just aftor the capture of Fort Douaumont by the Germans the decision to hold fast before Verdun was made, not by generals, but by statesmen. He adds that the decision was based, not on military, but _on moral, grounds. Soldiers like Joefre, Osstelnau, and Petain, yielded to the statesman Briahd, and carried out his ideas without flinching. Mb. Sijionds's statement of the reason is worth quoting:

In this time we have terrible anxiety in Paris and grave division of opinion between the French Army and ITrench statesmen. The army believes that the policy of wisdom ia to fall back behind the flooded Menee, not to attempt to restore a line on a hillside, with the river out of its banks and just behind, not to risk a great disaster and the loss of the whole army. In the view of the soldier Verdun is worthless, if the hills behind it can be held, and the soldier guarantees this. • But the statesman sees more clearly. He recognises that ail Prance, all Germany, the whole world, will read in the evacuation a confession of terrible, defeat.

Mr. Asquith's statement suggests that this account of the circumstances in which the decision was formed to hold fast at Verdun is in all likelihood substantially accurate.