PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2956, 20 December 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The best prospect held out in the lator news from tho south-eastern I theatre is tliat of a Husso-Rumanian stand in fortified positions on or south of tho Sereth line. This line originally constructed as a defence against invasion by way of Bessarabia, extends east from the mountains in the internal angle of the Rumanian crescent to the Danube. Approximately it divides Wallaohia, of which all but a fraction is now invaded, from tho smaller province of Moldavia. If the Allies are driven right ba-ck upo n the Sereth line the natural extension of their front eastward will be along the Danube and through its delta to the Black Sea.. If the enemy is iblo to carry the war even to the borders of Moldavia the continued occupation of the Dobrudja by the Russo-Rumanians will hardly be practicable. This point, however, is not yet reached. At his nearest approach the enemy is separated from the Moldavian border by a distanoo of twenty miles, and where the present line of contact crosses the Danube into the Dobrudja it ia about forty miles south of the Moldavian border. Late events suggest that tho enemy is concentrating upon a drive along the central trunk railway, which runs right through Rumania, hoping that his progress on this lino will turn the Allied positions to the south-east and make them untenable.

At the moment the Allies are fighting with a very strong defensive line behind them, and with a fairly extensive margin to come and go upon before that line is reached—a margin of twenty miles in the western sector, where their front runs into the mountains of the Transylvanian frontier and increasing to twice that' distance at the eastern end of the front where it reaches the Black Sea, by way of the i)obrudja. On the Sereth if the enemy gets so far, the possibility of bringing the invasion to a halt should be definitely tested. Very important issues turn upon the secure defence of this line-. Breaking through it, the enemy would not only invade Moldavia, but would clear the way for an extension of his invasion into the Russian province of Bessarabia. Tie suggestion is again mooted to-day that Hindenbuhg has designs upon Bessarabia, and while events in- the main theatres must largely determine possibilities in this direction, the local circumstances are worth noting. As one message points out today, it is a circumstance in the enemy's favour that winter conditions in the territory along the Black Sea coast are comparatively mild. If only climatic conditions had to be . considered, an enemy advance around the north-western coast of the Black Sea to Odessa might be well within the bounds of possibility.

On the other hand, as -has been said, the Sereth line lends itself admirably to a strong defence. The immediate problem of tho Allies (assuming that they are thrown hack upon the Sereth. line) will be to hold up the enemy in a space of about fifty miles of comparatively open country between the Carpathians on the west and the Danube on the east. Granted a sound defence of the open country, they are not likely to have much difficulty in holding their own in the western mountains, or on the lower course and delta of the Danube., Attempting to break through the Sereth line, the enemy may be expected to encounter not only the consolidated strength of tho Rumanian army, which has retreated unbroken, though, of course, not without loss, but a full-powered effort by Russia. Hitherto an overwhelming artillery superiority has enabled the enemy to carry all before him in Rumania, but it does not follow that' he is likely to solve such aproblem as the Russo-Rumanian defence of the Sereth lino may be expected to present. The ability of tho Allies to stem the invasion will depend very largely upon the volume of their available supplies ot munitions. In this matter it is so much to the good that f Russia now has very much better facilities ior obtaining supplies from abroad than she had last winter. In the interval, the open port in Kola Bay has been brought" into touch by a double line with the Russian main railways, and the Western Allies should bo able to lend material assistance to Russia and Rumania by supplying munitions as well as by developing their own winter ..offensive.

A -rather plaintive note pervades German newspaper references to tho Verdun battle, and some surprise, it is stated, is expressed that Hindenburg allowed the French to gain so much ground and take so many prisoners at tho present moment when bis political colleagues are industriously intriquing for peace. This surprise, of course, iB groundless. At Verdun the Germans paid a part of the penalty they have incurred by transferring troops from tho most important of all the theatres of war to one in which they have no visible prospect of achieving decisive advantage.^' A locally unfavourable situation in Rumania is to a great extent redeemed by the expectation that Hindenburg will purchase each forward step of any importance in that theatre at the cost of "allowing" the Western "Allies to further and notably increase their gains. News from several theatres to-day indicates that the enemy is endeavouring to set his affairs in such order as would permit an ambitious extension of his south-eastern venture. On the Italian front ho is powerfully fortifying tho approaches to Trieste and increasing his artillery, and he has attempted to assume the offensive in Southern Russia; as reports stand, without achieving any success. Tho weakness of his position, in spite of these (B.ffortfl, was made most strikingly manifest at Verdun. Tho significance of late events in that quarter is intensified by the hews from Russia to-day that German prisoners captured in Rumania state, that they were broughli from tho West front.

That the enemy counter-attack at Verdun was so long delayed—apparently for.,two days or more—is in itself a suggestive indication of lowered efficiency. Though it was violently pressed the counter-attack broke down at most points, but tho onemy scored a local success in the recovery of Ohambrettes Farm. This is a high position of somo importance adjoining tho road from Bras to Ornes, which runs north-east through the middle of the front on which the French attacked. Though it is not unimportant tho enemy's recovery of Ohambrettes Farm is relatively a small matter in comparison with the sweeping success of the "French assault. The latest report on the subject shows that over eleven Germans were taken prisoner, while 105 guns, nearly half as many mine-throwers, and 107 machine guns were captured or destroyed. It has been stated also that the French losses were light, and this need not be taken as a mere figure of speech. The fact is now well established that the Allies are able to develop the offensive at lighter cost to themselves than to the enemy. To oita a single example, a French military "Eye-Wit-ness," reviewing the capture of Tort Douaumont and attendant operations, stated that the total French losses did not exceed half the number of enemy prisoners taken. This refers to a battle in which the number of Germans captued was close upon five thousand.

• * ¥ # A late message states that the whole of the Ohambrettes Farm position has been recaptured. The enemy has thus failed' to in tho slightest degree improve upon the position in which he was left at the conclusion of Saturday's battlo.

With remarkable hardihood King Constantine and his Government have caused a warrant to bo'issued for the arrost of M. Venizelos on a charge of high treason. Since M. Venizelos is at Salonika, and the Entente Powers are bound to afford him the fullest possible protection, the warrant is hardly likely to be executed, but. the incident is' not without significance. Presumably fchp action of the Royalist Governi nront is based upon its manufactured accusation that M. Venizelos sought to secure his .own installation at Athens, with recognition by the Entente Powers. This, however, matters very little. What does matter is that in seeking to impeach M. Venizelos, Constantine and his faction are offering a direot insult, almost a defianoe, to the Entente Powers. It was already evident, however, that positive measures are needed to repress the hostility of the loyalists, and the attempt to impeach M. Venizelos only confirms this conclusion. The unpleasant feature of the affair is in its suggestion that the Royalists still feel it safe to play upon the forbearance of the Entente.