The Dominio. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1916. THE WAR OUTLOOK

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2953, 13 December 1916, Page 4

The Dominio. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1916. THE WAR OUTLOOK

We do not know that Germany and hor allies have reached the end of their tether in the south-eastern theatre.. There is some reason to apprehend the contrary. But it is possible now to form a fairly defin'ite_ estimate of. what Germany has gained and may pain in her southeastern venture and the extent to which the general war outlook is altered as a consequence. The chief distinction to be drawn in considering this matter is one between present advantage and ultimate prospects. It is an obvious and great advantage to Germany to remove the impression of failing strength created by the successes of the Russians in the East, and tho British and French in the West, during tho summer and autumn months, but in order to improve her ultimate prospects she must do more than win successes in a secondary theatre which are chiefly important, at ' a broad view, as opposing new and perhaps formidable obstacles to Allied attack in that quarter. Allied hopes of'eventual victory rest primarily upon a sea blockade a'nd upon an aggregate superiority of land force in the main theatres of war. In order to really better her prospects Gernvahy must do more than place new obstacles in the path of the Allies. She must break their power. This she has no visible prospects of doing either on land or sea. The only qualification for which this epitome of the position calls is that in lengthening the war, as she is no doubt doing by her present efforts in South-Eastern Europe, Germany gains extended scope for political intrigue—for attempts to sap the determination of the Allies or to destroy their present loyal cooperation. But from this point of view the outlook at present gives little cause for concern. Russia, Britain, France, and Italy, have all of late given unequivocal tokens of their determination to persevere until their goal is reached. They have gone to almost revolutionary lengths in their determination to ensure the more effectivo use- of the tremendous resources at their disposal. There is ground for confidence also in the spirit and constancy of the smaller Allied countries. It will not be forgotton that from Rumania, on the immediate eve of her worst disasters, there came assurances that she had received from Russia all tho aid that a loyal ally in the circumstances could be expected to render. Simultaneously with events which mean obviously that Germany has_ laid bare the weakness of one section of the Entente, cordon there has occurred a demonstration of ,the solidarity of tho Entente which in itself affords a strong guarantee that the weakness is not beyond repair. Given the continued stability of tho Entente _ and loyal cooperation between its members Germany is not at all likely to reap permanent or decisive advantages as a result of her south-eastern offensive. At the same time the immediate profits of tho venture are considerable.

This is best realised by looking back a month ' or two and comparing tho outlook then with the outlook to-day. Ten weeks ago the position in the main theatres and at sea was broadly as it is to-day. But the Allies at that time, in addition to their dominance in the main theatres and their supremacy at sea, had another string to their bow. Hopes were entertained o£ speedily' cutting off Bulgaria and Turkey from the Teutonic Alliance, and it was considered not impossible that spring might find the Allies in position on the Danubian frontier of Hungary. These hopes havo vanished, and it is possible that in the outcomo tho south-eastern theatre may witness only minor passages of the campaign of 1917. Already the Allies have a great deal of leeway to make up in order to regain tho favourable position they held at the time of Rumania's intervention, and they will havo much more to make up if Hindenburg is able to develop his project of linking up with Greece and driving Okner.ai, Sakkail .back _ upon his fortified lines at Salonika. It is, of course, not certain that Germany has gained tho upper hand in tho southeastern theatre for any length of time. The position in Greece has yet to be put to tho lest, and while a great part of Rumania is invaded most of the Rumanian Army has escaped. The prospect appears also of a Russian invasion of Hungary by way of tho north-western frontiers of that country. It is a point of much importance that reports from various quarters agree in stating that the Germans havo drawn a great part of tho force they are using against Rumania from the main theatres, where it is likely before long to be badly needed. All things considered it is possible that events in the south-east-ern theatre during the next few months may afford a practical de-

monstration, of tho truth that to have and to hold are two different things. Even if it were assumed that the onemy's success is likely to secure his Near Eastern communications and the frontiers of | Hungary, for some considerable time I to come, it .remains true that much [ more vital issues aro at stake and await determination. While some other points aro obscure it is quite | tlaar that the enemy's south-eastern enterprise, as 1 far as it has gone, is, in the final analysisj. defensive. The simplest .statement of tho position, and one that would hold good evon if success in Greece were added to success in Rumania, is that the Teutonic Powers have propped up a corner of their fortress which threatened to give way. In this ; thoy have been markedly successful, but they have not to anything like tho same extent, or indeed to any appreciable extent, weakened the forces by which the fortress as a whole is (beleaguered. That the enemy has more or less effectively strengthened and consolidated a weak section of his defences is obvious, but he would have to greatly expand and extend this success to materially improve his general standing and ultimate prospects in the war- On present appearances the resumpticrfj. of active operations in the. theatres, whether it falls m the winter or the spring, WI U reduce him to tho necessity of "landing everywhere on tho defensive. It seems unlikely that he will gain more in his present effort than tho measure of advantage afforded by a better front and a wider margin of security at.some critical points. That Hindenburg would bo content to develop the policy of the Eastern offensive within'these narrow limits if he had any. option in tho mattet is unlikely. But its development on a larger scale would almost' certainly demand a shortening of the Western front, involving the abandonment of much of the occupied French and Belgian territory. It must be recognised that a successful retreat by the Germans in the Western theatre, while freeing France and at least portion of Belgium from enemy occupation, would enable Hindenburg to operate more freely in other theatres. But this course would mean not only the loss of the occupied territory and the advantage derived from coal and ironfields, and the labour of the French and Belgians still remaining there, but the moral effect on tho German nation and on neutrals would bo greatly to the detriment of tho German War Party. . Taken on the whole, therefore, the situation, though it has its dark spots, has not been affected by the recent German successes in the south-east-ern theatre to tho extent that might be imagined by those who take only a narrow view of events. That is has left the Allies with leeway to make up goes without saying; that the main campaign will be little affects cd by recent events may be regarded as equally certain. It should assist to make us realise that the enemy has still resources to draw on and that though we are now his superior in strength we cannot afford to slacken our efforts. It is in the main theatres of the war, on the East and Wcsl fronts, that we must look for a final decision, and only the exercise of our full powers there will'win us that decision.