PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2951, 11 December 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Thk disagreeable fact has to be faced that the war situation at the present moment resolves itself very largely into a matter of waiting for the enemy's next move. To say that tbo Austro-Gcrmans have recovered the initiative in the war would be incorrect. Such a statement would bo warranted only if they demonstrated their ability to force the issue in one or other of the main theatres, compelling one main section of the Entente forces_ to fight at a disadvantage while its allies stood inactive.. But, though the Teutonic Powers have failed to alter to their own advantago the bad position in which they were left in tho main theatres when a lull lately succeeded to the storm of battle.on the Sommo and in Galicia, it must bo admitted that they are showing no little enterprise in profiting by this lull to improve their position in a socondary theatre. They are perhaps Hearing the end of their drive through Rumania, but ono of the possibilities mentioned to-day is that they may attempt to extend their offensive into Bessarabia, and so convert a campaign in a secondary theatre into an attack upon the southern flank of the Russian main armies.' Another and a much more disquieting theory is that tho enemy is on the eve of an attempt to link up with the Royalist army in Greece. As information stands there is no more dangerous possibility in sight than, that a powerful assault on the Allied line in Macedonia may bo more or less effectively seconded by the unscrupulous traitors who hold sway in Greece south of tho neutral zone. Italian newspapers, however, insist that the enemy's next move will be a new offensive against Italy. For tho time thoreis a rather open situation in which the enemy may make any ono of several moves. There is no immediate promise that the Allies will forestall his action, but they have not necessarily shown their hand.

Much as ho is profiting by it for the time being, the enemy's initiative in the_ south-eastern theatre is a very different thing from an initiative applying to the total scope of the war, and the distinction would be of material importance even if ■ho _ showed himself still capable of flying at rather higher game' tb.an is afoot in the_ Balkans, and launched _ the offensive against Italy of ; which there is now some talk. The Central Powers would only improve their ultimate prospects in the war by, effective attack upon their mostpowerful enemies. The view (most recently expressed by the German Socialist paper Vorwaerts) that the enemy's south-eastern campaign is of a defensive character is no doubt strictly accurate. The Germans are concentrating, not without success, upon an effort to strengthen their battlefront in a region where they were, as matters recently stood, exceedingly vulnerable, and where they arc still'far from being secure. Tho chief importance of the southeastern theatre from the Allied standpoint is that it offers possibilities'of _a. powerful, -and effective diversion (by a joint invasion of Hungary) which would most valuably second the efforts in the main and Italian theatres upon which they must at all times chiefly depend.. : It would be foolish not to recognise that the Austro-German successes in Rumania will make it much more difficult for the Allies to turn, to account such possibilities of profitable actiou as the south-east-ern theatre holds. This, with the fact that such a fcorribjo calamity has overtaken Rumania individually, and anxiety as to the stability of the Allied position in Greece and Macedonia, makes the outlook for the time being dark. On the other side of the account it is to be said that Germany and her allies are very possibly paying too dear a price for their present tide of success in the* secondary theatre of bouth-eastern Europe. i ■So far as immediate' events are concerned, no very important development is disclosed at time of writing. • Not all the later news of the Rumanian retreat is bad. The Germans, indeed, report further captures of prisoners, but a mes-| sage from Potrograd states that all the guns in the Bucharest forts were saved, and that the Rumanian

Army retired in an orderly manner. These guns represent an asset an tho more- valuable sinco it is chiefly in the factor of heavy artillery that tho Russo-Rumanians are at a disadvantage as compared with the enemy. That the Rumanians were able to remove the fortress guns makes it likely that they wore able, by the removal and destruction of grain, oil, and other supplies, to materially reduce tho amount left to be captured by the enemy. This is a point upon which little definite information is available. At best the quantity of food and other useful supplies captured by tho enemy is no doubt considerable.

Little has yet been told about the detail circumstances of the Rumanian retreat, but an account given by a correspondent of a battle southwest of Bucharest indicates that the Rumanians struck somo punishing blows as they retired. Four Rumanian divisions, tho correspond dent states, defeated an enemy force of equal strength and captured -26 guns. His final remark that tho battle was indecisive presumably means only that the victors were not in a position to follow up their advantage, and despite their local success had to conform to the general retirement. Tho most important question raised in tho news' as it stands concerns the,fate of the Rumanian Second army, which until recently was holding tho frontier in tho region of the Predcal Pass. The retreat of this army was endangered by the enemy's eastward drive against the Ploesci railway junction ' and the railway system which it commands. It will be noticed that the Germans report officially to-day that they have cut off and - taken prisoner most' of tho Rumanian troops in the Prcdeal region, but the assertion would be more convincing if it were cast in more definite and detailed terms. If the enemy statement is true, the Rumanians nave suffered in the isolation of tho Second Army .their heaviest loss of tho retreat, and flic enemy has registered an achievement upon which lie might bo expected to enlarge. But meantime there is to be set against tho German claim the statement of M.

Marcel Hutin, that the Rnmaniim Second army, with the First army, has safely reached the Buzeu lino. It is highly probable that_ M. Hutin is in possession of reliable information, and that the Germans are endeavouring to magnify some smjaller achievement, Jmck as the capture of rearguards, into the capture of an array. A Rumanian division—part of the force which retreated from Orsova, at the western extremity of the fighting front—has surrendered in the Alt Valley,, in Western Walkchia, after fighting for three weeks in rear of tho German main lino. Tho whole division is spoken of as "the Orsova rearguard," from which, and from tho absence of news to the contrary, it may be inferred that a larger force formerly established at Orsova escaped.

Tub outlook in Greece has not improved. The enemy is stated to be reinforcing heavily on tho Macedonian front, and in Greece Uonstantine is mobilising and taking other measures which, would leave no room for doubt as to his intentions even if ho had not already mado them plain in his treacherous attack upon the Allied detachments which were landed at Athens and in approving or permitting a series of outrages, rivalling tho deeds of tho Germans in Belgium and elsowhore, which have drawn a Note ol protest from tho diplomatic representatives of America, Spain, and Holland. That the Allies havo not before now taken extreme measures with tho Royalist faction implies that tho force required is not yet available. There is no assurance at present that the blockade will bring Oonstaotinb to submission before the enemy inaugurates the attempt to open tho laud communications ot Greece upon which he is believed to .be intent.

It is very possible that the retention by the Allies of their present footing in Macedonia depends, as much larger issues depend, upon their ability to take the decisive action on all fronts which a. Russian newspaper, quoted to-day, declares to be necessary before trie enemy has had time to complete his programme. There is a natural tendency for observers in each belligerent country to look at the war from their own standpoint, and while the Italian newspapers are confidently predicting another offensive against Italy, the Russian journal mentioned considers' that the enemy is in a hurry to finish with the Balkans m order to begin operations against Russia in the spring.. It must be said that of these conflicting theories the last-mentioned is the most plausible. ' An ultimate attack on Russia would be a logical development of tho enemy strategy, and a natural sequel to his present efforts in tho Balkans. His •aim in the south-eastern , theatre is to maintain commuflioations with Bulgaria and Turkey, and to hinder to tho utmost-possible extent free communication between Russia and her Allies. As matters stand, and are likely to stand for some time to come, the Teutonic Powers (in spite of their disasters on the Russian southern front during last summer).arc able to turn their military, resources to better account in the Eastern theatre than in the West, and it is on the Russian main front, if anywhere, that they must profit by this circumstance in a fashion to better their ultimate prospects. in tlic war. But. while an ultimate attack on Russia would be a. logical development of the enemy's strategy, it will hardly be ;t possible development if the Allies mako the most of their opportunities. Short of a safe and extended retreat in the Western theatre, which is now probably beyond their power, the A'ustro-Gcrmaus are unlikely honccforth to achieve an effensive concentration against . Russia which would give them even a pvospe'ufc of winning decisive advantage.