PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2948, 7 December 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Therb is still no improvement in the aspect of the Rumanian campaign, and this, with an absence of. events elsewhere, makes the immediate outlook in tho war rather gloomy. In order to preserve something like true perspective it is necessary to remember that tho Teutonic Powers are very far from having counter-balanced tbo disastrous, defeats they have suffered in the main theatres during the last six months. At the moment their successes in Rumania loom large, f>ut it is still well within the facts to say that what they have achieved and _ are likely to achieve in Rumania promises them no great relief from the crushing pressure to which they will be subjected when active operations are resumed in tho main theatres. The merits of the policy which has taken shape in the invasion of Rumania will not be fully tested for, some time to come. It is at least a question, meantime, whether tho Austro-Germans are really compensated by their gains in Rumania for _ the expenditure of strength which tho enterprise involves. Existing circumstances in the Rumanian campaign have much in cpmmon with those of the main Eastern campaign during a great part of its progress. Handicapped by their inferiority in material equipment, and particularly in artillery, tbo Allies aro reduced to fighting rearguard _ actions. _ No doubt they are losing heavily in men, but the loss, though serious, is one they can better afford than the enemy, and their turn will come when tho Austro-Germans are no longer in a position to concentrate as heavily as at present in one comparatively small theatre.

This being said, it ■ must be admitted fftat affairs in Rumania are for tho timo being going from bad to worse. Having been heavily deHeated in the area north-west of Bucharest, the Rumanians are retiring towards that 1 city,. A3 a Russian report states, under the incessant attacks of superior enemy forces. In these circumstances the fate of Bucharest is not likely to tie much longer in doubt, but the j situation owes its critical features not so much to the rapidly developing_ threat to the capital as to tho ■ serious _ danger of envelopment to which the retreating army is exposed. The enemy is evidently intent upon gaining a commanding position on the railway sySH tem of Eastern Wallachia, and if speedy success attended his efforts his prospects of gathering' in a big haul of prisoners would Hs notably increased. A glance at the map will show a lenot of railways, north of Bucharest, radiating in all directions from the junction of Ploesci, midway between the capital and the northern frontier. It is upon this range of railways, particularly upon Ploesci and' the line connecting that place with Bucharest, that tho Rumanians are now being driven back in retreat. The Russian account of the retreat shows that the Rumanians are now very near to tho Bucharest-Plocsci line.

As information stands, Rumanian troops are still holding the northern frontier zone in the region of the Predeal Pass, which lies north-north-wesfc of Ploesci. Reaching Ploesci the enemy would be astride the only railway available to these troops as a line of retreat. On the other hand, a retirement from the vicinity of the Predeal Pass would leave the way clear for an enemy turning movomont from the north. Similar dangers exist in regard to other sections of the front, south towards tho Danube, and tho, position as a whole is so critical that it will be a matter for congratulation if tho Allies are able to carry their retreat east of Ploesci and Bucharest without suffering further jieavy losses in men and material. Jp to tho present their losses, .even by enemy accounts, have not been heavier than might havo been expected in such a retreat as circumstances havo forced upon them. But the stage of the retreat which lies immediately ahead is in the highest degree difficult and dangerous.

Considering tho position readied in Rumania it is a. matter for roal congratulation that tho AustroGermans did not direct thciv main effort eastward early last summer instead of squandering their legions at Verdun and in tho attempt to break into Italy from tho Trentino. No doubt they would have staked everything upon a summor offensive in tho East if Hindknbuho had at that timo been invested with the supreme authority ho now wields. As matters stand thero is a reasonable prospect, at least, that Mackensen may be stopped on a line extending across Moldavia to tho Danube. If ho gets no further tho Allies will have reasonably good prospects of. rapidly retrieving the position in tho south-eastern theatre when conditions permit a resumption of their general offensive. Had

the Germans struok eastward at an earlier period of the year the outlook from the Allied standpoint might easily have been much worse than it is, and there is little doubt that in concentrating against Verdun instead of on the East front the enemy missed a great opportunity.

Discussing this matter recently, when tho aspect of the Rumanian campaign was already critical, tho military correspondent of the Manchester Guardian remarked that Hindenbueo, if he could, would like to give Gorman strategy the direction that it would have had but for the unfortunate (for the enemy) interlude of Verdun. The progress of the Russians on their southern main front and the intervention of Rumania prevented the enemy Generalissimo from taking up the line of attack from Itovel and Lemberg towards Kieff and along tho Dniester towards the Black Sea, that is to say from developing a powerful offensive designed to turn the Russian southern flank in tho main theatre. It was, therefore (in the viow of tho writer quoted), by way of making tho best of his remaining and much diminished opportunities that Hindenburo concentrated all available . force upon the invasion of Rumania. Prospects of driving round tho Russian southern flank _in tho main Eastern theatre having to all intents and purposes disappeared, tho possibility remained that Rumania might be crushed and an AustroGorman defensive lino extended across that country from Transylvania to the Dobrudja.

This design, as matters stand, has been .in part accomplished, though very possibly at a cost which, materially detracts from the value and significance of the achievement. Against the extended invasion of Rumania and the enemy's capture of great quantities of food, oil, and other things h9 badly heeds, thore is to bo set the faot" fiat the Rumanian Army is substantially intact,- and that the prospect- of an effective return offensive by tho Russo-Rumanians has by no means disappeared. It is, of course, manifest that the enemy is opposing additional a.nd serious obstacles to the Allied conquest of tho Balkan corridor. But all things considered the campaign agalnst_ Rumania, though it has brought dire misfortune to that country, is likely to prove a poor substitute for the' more ambitious enterprise sketched by the Manchester Guardian's correspondent—van enterprise which would very probably have been attempted if the German General Staff had not been fin the words of the same authority) so infatuated with tho campaign in the West. Rumania remains and is to remain -a far more potent military factor than the extent to which her territory is being invaded would suggest, and the might of Russia, though she has not been able to avert the immediate misfortunes of her neighbour and ally, is not appreciably impaired by what the enemy has accomplished in Eumania.

A statement by the Marquis of Orewe which appears to-day indicates that the Allies are still halting distinctly short ol the _ resoluto measures which are so obviously demanded by late events in Greece. He speaks, indeed, of unshaken determination (on. the part of the Allies) to fix responsibility for Friday's events and ensure that they shall not recur, but in such a caso as this words and phrases are a most unsatisfying substitute for action. Possibly Allied action in Greece is hampered for the moment by the political crisis in Great 'Britain, but in any case while matters remain in their present state there are distinct grounds for uneasiness on behalf of the Allied forces in Macedonia.

Actual changes which have lately occurred on the Macedonian front are to the good, the Serbians having advanced in-successful attacks north of Monastir. But it has to be recognised that the enemy may at any time now make a big effort to gain the upper hand in the Macedonian campaign. It is not at all unlikely that Mackensen may presently be ablo to detach strong forces from Rumania to reinforce tho Bulgar-Germans on tho southern front, and take tho offensive against General Sarrail. To leave the Kinq of Greece in a position to second such, an enterprise even in a minor degree would be inexcusably foolish, and we hae not as yet any satisfactory guarantee that the Allies are avoiding this folly. What evidence there is indicates that they are still pursuing their extraordinary policy of giving Constantine a' comparatively free hand. The danger involved is not necessarily limited by the' extent to which the troops at Constantine's disposal are dominated- by the land and naval forces of the Allies. To give the devil his due Constantine is enterprising in his treason and fanatically devoted to the service of his chosen masters. He has shown that he is ready to wreck and ruin his country for Germany's sake, and quite possibly recent events in Rumania have revived his faith in the ability of the Central Powers to win the war. The contingency _ the Allies should be guarding against, and_.apparently are not, is that Constantine may throw all his resources into an effort on behalf of Germany at a moment when enemy reinforcements_ have materially altered tho conditions at present ruling on the Macedonian front. To assume, that considerations of prudence or tears for his army would induce the Greek King in such circumstances to hold his hand would bo to ignore tho lesson of dvents.