PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2945, 4 December 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As news stands at time of writing the fate of the Rumanian capital is still hanging in the balance. It will bo determined apparently by the outcome of the battles that are being fought west and southwest of Bucharest, though heavy fighting is in progress simultaneously along the Moldavian frontier and iu Bukowina and in the Dobrudja. In the last-mentioned areas the Allies are pressing the offensive, but Bucharest is now held by such a narrow margin that its occupation will hardly be averted unless by operations in its immediate vicinity. M. Marcel Hutin is quoted to-day as saying that it will he difficult to save Biicharesfc from the fate by which it is threatened, but detail news in hand hardly warrants as definite an opinion. The Rumanians seem to be putting forth a big effort in the battles around their capital, and one passage in a Russian communique shows that they" have not done so without achieving some results. This is the statement that the enemy has been driven out of Comana and another place, apparently in the same vicinity. Comana is the railway town,. 17 miles south and a little east of Bucharest, which the enemy was reported to "have captured at the end of last week. Comana stands on the south bank of the River Arges, whioh affords the last defensive line covering Bucharest on the south. It is stated to-day that a close investment of Bucharest will be in prospect if Maokensen crosses the Arges .■east of Comana. The possibility stands that the Rumanians, if they suffer defeat in the present struggle, may prefer to abandon their great fortress. rather than risk an army in its defence.

The capture of Comana was obviously an important step in the converging movement in which the enemy is seeking to surround Bucharest, and its recovery is corre-spondingly-important. There is no definite evidence that .the enemy has suffered a general sot-back in his advance through Wallachia, and reports in their total effect are not particularly hopeful, but tho possibility still exists that the Rumanians and their allies may succeed in stopping tho enemy short of Bucharest. It seems to bo accepted, however, that the fate of tho city will be decided in tho battles now being fought on the Wallachian front, and that if they fail in their present effort the Rumanians will havo to retire to a lino eastward of tho capital.

With the position before Bucharest more than over critical, tho general outlook is affected to a material extent, and is already somewhat improved, by the turn events havo taken on tho Carpathian front—tho seeno of a Russian offensive which promises to develop on a big scale—and in tlio Dobrudja. As to the latter area reports aro somewhat scanty, but indicate that tho .allies are now attacking in strong force. Practically the only detail news in hand relates to the position at the Ccrnavocla crossing, which tho evidently been making determined efforts to secure. It is now stated in a Russian official report that the Allies have gained possession of tho western part of the C'ernavoda bridge. This is good news in itsolf, bub points to the fact that a very dangerous situation has only now been partly retrieved. Command of the C'ernavoda crossing would enable Maokensen to take the Rumanian forces in Wallachia, around tho capital and further north, in rear. It will be remembered that tho Danube is bridged in two arms from C'ernavoda, and that beyond the western bridge, the railway is carried over tho marshes on the Rumanian side on a long viaduct. Tho Russian report shows that tho enemy had gained possession of both bridges, though ho has now lost that which crosses the western arm of tho Danube, and so had made considerable headway towards gaining command of tho crossing. The report suggests also that, the bridges, aro citnor substantially intact or havo been repaired to a condition which permits their use. Presumably the viaduct also remains undestroyed; otherwise the Allies would scarcely have been able to recover tho western bridge. The security of the crossing, of course, depends in any caso upon the enemy being opposed in adequate force, though the destruction of the bridges would have formidably increased his difficulties. The statement recently made that tho Rumanians attempted to blow up tho bridges, but failed, is not particularly convincing. Possibly tho Allies hopo to retain command of the crossing without sacrificing the bridges. The consideration that the enemy is not likely to retreat without blowing them up is met to some-extent by tho fact that the western bridge has already twice changed hands.

Somewhat conflicting estimates arc current of the probable- effect of the offensive opened by the Russians in the Carpathians. Ifc h as been attended already by a considerable vneasuro of success, but reports like that from Rome which speaks of 'Gkneeal Beusilobt's evident intention of penetrating into Hungary and getting behind von Falkenhayn's army in Wallachia are running somewhat ahead of events. It is true that the Russian offensive threatens an invasion of Hungary and an attack _ upon von Falkenhayn's communications, but the difficulties as well as the possibilities of such an enterprise must be taken into account. The difficulties arise from the season of the year and the fact that the Russians are at all points faced by a wide belt of mountain country. The offensive has opened on the vital sections of a front of nearly two hundred miles from the Jablonitza Pass, through which a railway from Galicia runs into Hungary, south-east through Bukowina opposite the main chain of the Carpathians and thence along the greater part of the frontier of Rumanian province of Moldavia

Throughout tho Bukowina the enemy holds the main chain of the mountains. It is suggested that the immediate aim of 'the Russians is to gain command of tho Kirlibaba Pass, which penetrates the Carpathians about '25 miles north-west of ... tho Rumanian frontier, and so clear the way for an advance clown the Szamos valley, which Tims south-west into Transylvania.

As reports stand, the Russians have made material progress towards capturing the Kirlibaba Pass, and have mastered heights along a great part of the front further south. A rapidly developing invasion of Hungary is hardly to be expected at this time of the year, but tne Russian offensive nevertheless has a potent bearing upon events in Rumania. The enemy is bound to regard any considerable movement towards an attack upon his Hungarian communications with the utmost concern, and it is in fact stated that the Germans are bringing up big re serves against the Russians and are counter-attacking. Accepting this as true, it follows that the Russians are already creating a powerful diversion, and the statement, made in one message that the offensive cannot- immediately affect the position in Wallachia calls on this account for modification. ,

On what is known of the general position in the war considerable importance must be attaohed to the transfer of force the enemy is boimd to effect in order to resist the Russian effort. There is every reason to believe that he is .working upon definitely limited resources in his south-eastern venture, and hope has by no means departed that the Allies may be able before long to profit by this circumstance. Speaking some weeks ago of the redistribution of enemy forces involved in the Rumanian offensive, the military coriespondent of the Marichester Guardian remarked that there had been a great deal of reorganisation, and the size of units was believed to have been decreased. "But when everything of this kind has been done," he added, "neither the Germans nor anyone else can get a quart out.of a pint pot. The mon for this offensive have been obtained either by drawing on the reserves that would normally have been ready for the field next spring or by withdrawing men from other fronts. There is no sign of extensive withdrawals from the west since the end of the first Bix weeks of the Somme battle, but there must be a weak point somewhere, and in view of the known opinion of Hindenburg on German strategy aud the known view of the Chancellor on the political objects of the war, that weak point is not unlikely to be in the west. The arguments for a continuance of the western offensive throughout the winter are becoming stronger every day. In spite of the enormous difliculties of our task on tho west, we are able there to inflict losses on the Germans that are in excess of our own—a tremendous achievement ia view of the amazing strength of the German positions. Ihe Germans have less reason than ever since the Battle of the Anci'e to anticipate immunity from attack on the west front during the wintor, and, considering only tho immediate outlook, it is on that account all the pore likely that the Russian offensive may have a pronounced effect in weakening the onemy's attempt to overwhelm Rumania. * * # V Whether tho enemy can be kept out of Bucharest is admittedly an open question, but it does not necessarily follow that ho has good prospects of attaining his essential objects in tho south-eastern campaign. His aim was, and is, to crush Rumania and to oppose tho greatest possible obstacles to effective combined action by tho Allies in southeastern Jiurope. He would have to very largely develop his presont success to achieve these ends, and tho Russian offensive which holds attention at the moment as a diversion in favour of Rumania is x likely to ultimately pJay a very important part in defeating his designs. Tho Rumanian array may or may not be ablo to save Bucharest, but, as is remarked to-day, it is intact, with its heavy and field artillery, bailing better fortune, 'it should have good prospects of holdlu g n'r a n defensive lino between the Moldavian frontier and the Danube until Allied pressure ao other points compels the enemy to relax' pis efforts in Rumania. Late ovents in the Dobrudja and notably at tho Lernavoda crossing arc hopeful in this connection. If the resumption of active operations in the main theatres finds tho Rumanian army intact, the Russians pressing 'forward to an invasion of Hungary and the Allied offensive gathering head in Macedonia., von Falkenhayns enterprise will hardly be justified in its results.

Messages from Greece afford little ground for satisfaction. They report a certain amount of fighting between the Allied forces landed at Athens and the Greek Royalists, but reach the tame conclusion that the allies withdrew the bulk of their forces on Constantine's agreeing to surrender 'half a dozen batteries of taountam artillery. An .Allied withdrawal cm such terms seems almost incredible, particularly in view of reports that the Greek troops had actually set out upon a march to the north as if to attack the Allies in rear, and it can only be hoped that later messages will show that a farmer'policy is being pursued. A report just received speaks of an armistice having been signed, but does not confirm the earlier statement that the Allied detachments were withdrawn.