THE MACEDONIAN OFFENSIVE

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2945, 4 December 1916, Page 5

THE MACEDONIAN OFFENSIVE

PROBLEMS INVOLVED

KING CONSTArjTINE'S HOSTILITY,

A special correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian,'' in- Greece) recently supplied his paper with the following interesting account of the military position in Greece on tho evo of the Aliied offensive, and of the manifold diiiiculties which up to that time- had heeu overcome hy General Sarrail and the forces under ids command.

On tho eve of the great offensive in the Balkans it is perhaps not without interest to review tho position of tho array of the East under the supreme command of General Sarrail. By its composition it is certainly tho most c-xtraordinary army ever united under '■tho command of a single general. Tho only precedent is the international expedition to China, under the command' of Field Marshal von AValdersoe. But tho difference between that force and the one under General .Sarrail is' that the former had absolutely no homogeneity; every section regarded the others with distrust to such an extent that the Field Marshal never gave aii order without first assuring himself privately that it met with the approval of the commanders of the various units: whereas the army of the East has blind confidence in its commander and obeys his slightest order with prompt enthusiasm. Many armchair strategists have found fault with tho apparent inaction of the army at Salonika. They jiare measured the number of. kilometres separating Salonika from tho Bulgarian frontier, and expressed surprise that the army was not long ago in Sofia. Merely to look at a map gives no indication of "the complicated problem that confronts General Sarrail or the difficulties he haa to face. The first of these is the international character of the force, whioh consists of British, French, Italians, Russians, Serbians, and Albanians. Suoh a force must bo distributed in sections, each holding a certain part of the line. They cannot be mixed without reviving Babel and the confusion, of tongues. Tho disombarking of an army of hundreds of thousands of mon, hundreds of miles from their base, is a long and difficult matter. It means the accumulation of hundreds of thousands of tons of food, munitions, and war stores of every kind. _ No advance is possible till the base is prepared for ail emergencies. The fighting line has to be rearranged with the arrival of each contingent, so that it shall bo placed with its-proper unit. King's Hostility Known. But General Sarrail is not only confronted with a difficult military situation, he had when ho arrived problems of a political nature to solve. He was, operating in a foreign country which had its army of 300,000 men mobilised. Though the Athens Government nover ceased to proclaim its benevolent neutrality towards tho Allies it was notorious that the King, the Court, and the General Staff believed in and desired tho victory of the Central Powers. Tho Gieek Press, with the exception of a few Venizelist journals, was hostile to the Allies. The music-halls of Athens night after night produced revues holding them and their cause up to derision and contempt. The notorious Baron von Schenck sat in his villa at Athens openly distributing largesse to' tho Press and the political world. It was common knowledge that _Greek vessels supplied German submarines with petrol, munitions, and food. With such an equivocal situation General Sarrail was justified in regarding the Greek Army with tho gravest distruct, and in hesitating to undertake operations against a strongly entrenched enemy as long as there y was an army of 300,000 men in his rear which might at any moment stab him in the back. A forward advance, only became possible when the Greek Army had been demobilised. The distrust in King Constantino's Army was increased by tho evident understanding which existed between the Greek General Staff and the enemy. When Greek troops were ordered to hand over forts which had cost millions of pounds to construct, with all their guns, ammunition, and food supplies to the Bulgarians, it was out of the question that any confidence could be placed in the protestations of friendly feelings on the part of the Athens Government. Military operations had therefore to <bo subordinated to the political situation, and had to await its settlement. In addition to the military and political difficulties tho Army of the East had grave natural impediments to come. Macedonia is a country almost without roads. It would have been impossible to manoeuvre an immense' army and to keep it supplied with food and munitions with the means of communication existing in 1914. The first task was, therefore, t& construct hun ; dreds of miles of new roads and puf> In repair the roads already existing. This task has been admirably performed. I have ridden twelve hours a day for two days at the front, and 90 per cent, of tho excellent roads covered did not exist twelve months ago, or were mere mountain sheep tracks. _ Road-making is not a very glorious or inspiriting part of tho soldier's profession, but it is as necessary as the most dashing bayonet charge. One good thing Macedonia will have derived from the war. When it is ended she will, possess hundreds of miles of roads' fitted for motor and wheeled traffic such as would probably never have been constructed without the pressure of war. "A quclquo chose mainour est bon," as our. French friends would say. Trackless mountains were not General Sarrail's only obstacles. There was also the climate. The heat in summer in and around Salonika is terrible. If the army lihd begun active operations at the end of June the sun would have killed moro men than the Bulgarian bullets. Macedonia is a treeless land, thanks to the ruthless deforestation of the former Turkish masters. The rainfall is light, and dust and drought prevail everywhere. AVith these are united the plague of flies and mosquitoes, which render the life of- a European a burden. But worse than the flics and the mosquitoes is the malaria which rages throughout tho whole district between Salonika and the Bulgarian frontier and makes campaigning in Macedonia essentially a "doctors' war." It is true that the number of fatal cases of malarial fever is not great, but the prostration caused by the attacks renders men utterly unfit for active duties. It will perhaps be said that this state of affairs would handicap the enemy as much as the Allies. Such is not tho fact, as the Bulgarians are in position in the mountains and the Allies have to traverse the fever-haunted valleys in order to reach the lino of contact. Yet, in spite of all tho difficulties, General San-ail's army is full of enthusiasm and confidence in its leader. For weeks past reinforcement's have been pouring into Salonika, stalwart Russians, Italians bronzed by the sun of the Isonzo front, and now French and British levies trained to the hour, Tile various sectors have been laid out, and each contingent moves up to its appointed position as 60011 as it disembarks. All the country between Salonika and the fighting line is dotted with camps and supply dpots of every kind. Light railways have been constructed, and everything done to assure tho smooth working of the immense machine AVhen General Sarrail gives the word it will wovo forward with irresistible force. Bulgaria's position, now that • Rumania has come in, between tho upper and tho nether millstone, put her to a desperate pass.