PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2944, 2 December 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

What uncertainty has arisen as to the recent progress of events'in the Rumanian campaign is to a , great extent cleared up to-day in : news which must be called distinctly bad as it bears upon the immediate outlook. As matters are going, no bettor prospect seems to be open to the Rumanian Army than that of a retirement into Moldavia, leaving the capital and a large part of the national territory:to be occupied for the time by. the enemy. In view of the enemy advance in Northern and Southern Wallachia, ' particularly in the latter area, it would not be surprising to hear at any time that Bucharest has fallen, unless, indeed, the Rumanians elect to stand a siege in defence of their capital, and that would bo a policy of cloubtful wisdom. If the Russo-Ru-manians are not yet in a' position to meet and defeat;the enemy in the open, an.army thrown into Bucharest would probably, -bo sacrificed, without any commensurate gain which would warrant the sacrifice. Hope of an Allied counterstroke which would break the force of the enemy invasion and save the Rumanian capital has not finally departed, but there is no visible promise of such a development. - Short of a sudden and dramatic reversal of_ the present trend in the campaign it will follow practically as a matter of'course that Bucharest will very soon be either occupied by the enemy or besieged. * * * • • The significance of. the enemy's latest gams in AVallachia—Campulung in' the north, and Koman (or. Comana) south and slightly east of Bucharest, is evident at a glance. It is not in.the north that the campaign wears its v most serious aspect, though even here tho outlook is bad Campulung is tho northern terminus of a branch railway. Fighting has been in progress for weeks on the road, about 15 miles long, which connects Campulung with the Torzbiirg Pass, on the' liqrth-east. The fate of Campulung might have been anticipated when it was announced yesterday that, the onemy had occupied Pitesci, for .the latter place is the junction on the trunk railway through AVallachia, from jwhich the ■ Campulung line north. Holding Campulung and Pitesci, the enemy is operating in open country only about twenty miles further west than .the Predeal Pass, a frontier gateway through which he has not yet been able to break his way.. The Rumanians report to-day that they have gained some ground in the vicinity of the Predeal Pass and in.the Buzeu valley, further east, but the enemy is in a fair way to take in rear tho forces defending the frontier in these areas. At the same time ho is in position for adrive iuto the knot of railways north of Bucharest, which, 'if successful, would enable him to work round the capital on the north. ... ' Such a development as is imminently threatened Northern Wallachia is visibly taking shape in the south.' The .enemy is manifestly pressing forward rapidly from the point at which he crossed the Danube south of Bucharest. / The line of advance follows a railway and Comana is a town more than halfway along this railway from the Danube towards Bucharest. As is mentioned in the Russian communique which reports tho event, Comana stands just 17 miles south and slightly east of Bucharest. The occupation of Comana alone, apart from the developments further north to which it is related, makes it almost certain that .the Rumanian retreat must .extend considerably beyond Bucharest. The position in a nutshell is that tho enemy is already working ruuud the capital city on the south and seems likely to be very soon working round it also on the north. It 'is possible, of course, that the strategy of the Allies aims at a defensive stand with Bucharest, which is a great fortress, as an integral part of the lino to be defended, but in view of the general trend of the campaign, this ddes not seem particularly probable. Had such a stand been contemplated it is likely that greater efforts would have-been, made to stem the enemy's advance from the Danube. ' ;

One big question awaiting an answer is whether the Rumanians, failing any belter solution of their difficulties, will attempt to hold the Bucharest defences, in the hope of delaying and impeding the enemy's advance, while the main body-of the army retires into Moldavia. It is stated in ono of to-day's messages that an army of at least 100,000 men would bo required to man the Bucharest fortifications. If further retreat is inevitable it is hardly likely that tJio Allies will leave such a force in Bucharest unless they arc of opinion that tho enemy offensive is nearing the point of exhaustion. The fortified camp of Bucharest is the. : largest in the world, except Paris. It is tho principal element in tho Runiauiau fortifications which were designed in 1852 by the Belgian engineer General Bbailmont, and wore completed, to the condition in which they stood-before'the war, at a cost of more than '£4,000,000. Apart from the Bucharest defences, which consist of powerful and heavily, armed forts spaced in and around a railway circle having a diameter of about 15 miles, the Rumanian fortifications consist of a fortified entrenchrucrft, 45 miles long, which extends_ half-way across SouthernMoldavia, from the north-western comer of the Dobrudja to the Moldavian trunk railway. It is upon tho Bucharest circle, however, 'that expenditure in fortifications has been chiefly lavished and the result, as indicated, has been to create one of the most powerful fortresses in the world. *«■ * ' . Nevertheless the prospect of a siege of {Bucharest is not one that could bo regarded without serious misgivings. The experience of the war has been that even the strongtes fortressestare incapable of withstanding for any length of time an adequate force of modern artillery, such as' the Germans presumably command in Rumania, Practically the pnly long siege which the war has witnessed was that of Przcmysl by tho Russians, and it was a siege of unprecedented character.' The Russians sat down before Przem'ysl with a smaller army than the' Austnans had inside and without a siege-train. SEf the Rumanians elect to stand a siege in .Bucharest they will be risking an army and an immense amount of artillery and war material, without' much prospect, if tho experience of the war can be taken as a guide, of indefinitely prolonging the defence. It is not unlikely that they may have chosen instead to dismantle tho forts and remove the artillery. If their plans aim, as seems increasingly probable, at a defensive' stand in Moldavia, heavy guns may be turned to a more profitablo purpose than they would serve in the armoured forts around, the capital. ■ •** - * * It is not yet quite certain that a conflict is about to open in Greece between the Allied forces and those of KINQ■■-CONSTANTINE, but indications manifestly point in that direction. According to the latest messages in hand the Athens Government' is contumaciously resisting the Allied demand that 'it should surrender its' surplus war material, and it ig stated also that the Kino. has instructed his officers to. resist by force of arms any attempt by the troops which the Allies are landing at Athens to occupy. buildings in that city. In addition Constaktine is said to be arming and equipping the reservists who have come chiefly into prominence hitherto as roughs disturbing the public-peace and attempting to terrorise their Veriizelist fellow-citizens. If he forces a conflict with tho Allies, Constantine will no doubt render' a last and not unimportant service to Germany, but General Sarrail and Admiral Dtr I'OURNET will presumably not be taken unawares. Greece is exceedingly vulnerable to blockade; being largely dependent upon importations of food and other necessary supplies, and the combined exercise of sea and land power should enable the Allies to. quickly quell any such outbreak as is now threatened. It seems possible that the matter may soon be put to a practical test. *•*■«• • AccoKDiNG to a late message Admiral du Fournet anticipates a. quiet surrender' by the .Royalists because his forces are backed by the heaviest artillery." The reason seems good, but it is not yet quite certain that Constantine'will .bow gracefully to necessity.