PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2943, 1 December 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It is not easy to draw a coherent story from current reports.dealing with the Eumanian campaign, but as far as they go these reports point to a situation of increasing gravity and suggest that Bome hopes lately entertained wero possibly premature. Numerous statements have como lately from different quarters about powerful Russian reinforcements assembling in support of the retreating Eumanian Army. It must be confessed thatHhe circumstances ( of the campaign, as they aro revealed, do not show that such reinforcements are yet making their weight tell.. The enemy invasion is extending rapidly _ and dangerously, and important issues are in the balance and must very speedily bo decided. _ Hopes have been entertained during _ the last day or two of tho Rumanians ending their retreat on a dofensive lino west of Bucharest. These hopes are somewhat weakened by the enemy's claims—as yet neither substantiated nor definitely rebutted— that ho has_ crossed the Danube and gained positions from which ho is able to directly threaten Bucharest itself. Unless tho Rumanians are able to hold tho Danube south of Bucharest and further east, any defensive stand west of .Bucharest will, of course, be impossible. It must; be emphasised that the situation is at tho moment in some respects obscure, but tho silence oi available Rumanian and Russian

reports in regard to some vital dc- | tails suggests that the enemy claims are not wholly unfounded. In London, it is stated, news of a great battlo in defence of Bucharest is hourly awaited, and it seems increasingly probable that a development on these lines 'is almost the only alternative to a further retreat which _ would leave tho capital city in the hands of the enemy. One other hope exists—that of a diversion sufficiently powerful to _ compel _ the enemy to detach portion of his invading armies to meet it. In this connection a ray of hope appears in the Russian official report indicating that an offensive has been 9pened in the wooded Carpathians, in south-western Bukowina.

The position reached in Rumania, as far as it is disclosed in reports, will be readily grasped with the assistance of a map which is published on another page to-day. All the places mentioned in the following survey are shown on the map, unless the contrary is stated. Fal- | kenhayn's original design (disclosed as tho campaign developed) Was to break through the northern frontier of Wallachia by way of the Predeal and Bodza passes (north of Bucharest), and to strike across country, to a junction with Maokbnsen, who had invaded the Dobrudja. Possibly it was hoped that Mackensen would bo ablo to force the Danube from 1 tho Dobrudja and advance to a meeting with Ealkenhayn in the interior of Rumania. _ At all events it Was the enemy design to drive across the middle of the Rumanian crescent and cut off the Rumanian armies in Wallachia. Tho design was foiled by the firm defence of the frontier north of Bucharest (where the enemy has even now progressed only a little way into Rumanian territory), and by the limits Bet to Mackensen's invasion of the Dobrudja. Subsequently, as is known, Falkenhayn broke through tho frontier defonces of Western Wallachia, and from this point, with Mackensen co-operating on and north of the Danube front, the invasion has developed to such a;n oxtent that about one-half of Wallachia is now in/enemy occupation. Tho essential difference between the plan originally laid down by the enemy commander and that to whicn he is now working may be stated in few words and is extromoly important.

* * * * Success in tho original design (that is to say, an advance by way of tho Buzeu valley to the Dobrudja) would not only have given him speedy possession of an even greater extent of Rumanian territory than he now holds, but would probably havo enabled him to envelop a great part of the Rumanian Army. . As matters arc now going, the Rumanian Army is retreating, substantially , intact, before the enemy advance._ Efforts have been made by successive crossings of the Danube at Zimnitza and latterly (according to an enemy report) at Giurgevo, to turn and envelop the southern flank of the retroating Rumanian line. But there is nothing, at time of writing, to show that success has attended these attempts so far as their essential object is concerned. Tho enemy's northward advance from the Danube, whatever its actual measure of progress may be, of necessity complicates the Rumanian retreat. But as reports stand the retreat is being continued in good order. It is a leading fact to be kept in mind that so long as tho enemy has the Rumanian Army unbroken before him his success will bo partial and incomplete, even if the Rumanians and their Allies find it necessary to abandon Bucharest and retire _ into Moldavia. Only absolute military neoessity could justify this course, and the consequent abandonment of a large proportion of the Rumanian civil population to' tho horrors of German invasion, but the occupation of territory, even _of tho capital, will not in itself give the enemy the decisive success for which he is striving.

As has been said, reports in hand do not,define with precision and certainty the position reached in Rumania, but there is no reason to doubt that the enemy, moving eastward from the Alt valley, has occupied tho railway junction of Pitesci. The enemy advance in this region, though it gives him a footing- on a further important section of tho Rumanian railways, affords no particular occasion for alarm. It is in Southern Wallachia, along the Danube, that the most critical situation exists, and no very clear light is thrown upon developments in this quarter. It is admitted, however, that the enemy is moving north, or north-east, in the region of Alexandria, and a Russian report states that he is advancing also in tho direction of "Koulongoureki." This is possibly Oalugareni, a place which is not shown on the published map, but is situated about midway between Giurgevo (where the enemy claimed yesterday he had forced the Danube) and Bucharest. If Calugareni is in fact the place referred to in the Russian report it would follow that the enemy had crossed tho river at Giurgevo, and the threat to the Rumanian capital would be intensified.

Therb_ is neither amplification nor denial at time of writing of a message received yesterday from Copenhagen to the effect that German telegrams stated that the Rumanians had destroyed the Cerna-voda-Bucharest railway, and were taking other measures to hold up the enemy's advance by this route upon the capital. Messages of this kind carry little weight in the absence of confirmation, and it is certainly to be hoped that the one quoted lacks foundation. An enemy advance from the Danube at Cernavoda would bo fatal to a sound Rumanian defence, not only in tho region of Bucharest, but in territory much further east. A glance at the map will show that as the campaign is now proceeding, with tho armies in contact west and south of Bucharest, a forward movement from Cernavoda would striko into the Rumanian communications a long way in rear of what is at present tho main lighting front. The message from Copenhagen would attract little attention but for the fact that an ostensibly authoritative Russian communication published a day or two ago indicated that the position at Cernavoda was possibly not as safe as could bo desired. It stated, in effect, that tho Rumanians, whon they retired to the left bank of tho Danube, failed 'to effectively destroy tho bridge, it was added, however, that enemy attempts at a crossing had been repulsed, and that tho bridgo was under the fire of fiusso-Runianian batteries. Thin account of the aitua-

lion presumably still holds good, since no authoritative news of a less _ favourable character has been received. In any caso tho safe defence of the Cernavoda crossing is a vital matter to the Rumanians. It may be added that defeat at this point would imply either laxity, or an extraordinary weakness, in the defence. Apart from the existence lof the bridge—or rather bridges, for the Danube is bridged in two arms from Cernavoda—an enemy crossing at this point is opposed by maximum difficulties on account of the marshes which border the river. _ The railway crosses by the two bridges mentioned, and a long viaduct on the Rumanian side, tho •,total length of tho bridges and viaduct being about twelve miles. It is not easy to believe that, with the facilities which exist for opposing and impeding a crossing by the enemy, the Rumanian defence at this vital point has broken down. Only tentative anticipations can be based as yet upon the suggestion that a Russian offensive has been opened in Bukowina. Heights have been captured cast and . south oi, Kirlibaba, which is a commanding position in the main chain of the Carpathians. in South-western Bukowina. A German report shows that the Russians havo also gained local successes further south, in Eastern Transylvania. No very definite opinion can be formed meantime as to how far these operations are likely to develop. An offensive in the Carpathians at this time of the year probably does not hold out particularly good prospects. Beyond the_ main range, in the region of which tho Russians are attacking, there lies a wido extent of mountain country, opposing serious difficulties to the passage of armies at any time, and exceptional difficulties in early winter. That an offensive has opened in the Carpathians, however, does not necessarily imply that it is confined or limited to the mountain country. Tho interest of the occasion is largely in the possibility that exceptional activity in the Carpathians may herald an offensive stroke by the Russians in some locality which lends itself better at the present time to action. _ on a big scale. Some such intervention by Russia certainly scorns to be essential if the Rumanians are to be afforded the relief they so badly need, and . it cannot bo doubted that Russia will assist her ally to tho utmost extent that her means and opportunities wfll permit.