PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2935, 22 November 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

What is to happen in Rumania is still a somewhat open question. The rather meagre reports in hand at time of writing show that Rumanian and Russian troops are still slowly giving ground at some points in tho Wallachian frontier zone before the driving power of von Falkenhayn's .offensive, and until the after events of tho fall of Monastir have been more clearly detailed it will be impossible to estimate the immediate value of the' diversion effected in that quarter. But if the situation in Rumania continues to give some ground for uneasiness, it is true also that as time goes on it becomes more clearly evident that the enemy is unlikely to reap permanent advantage from bis heavy concentration of force in a secondary theatre. The anxiety admittedly felt at the present time is for Rumania, and certainly does not apply to the general outlook in the war. Against the measure of success achieved by the enemy in Wallachia there is to bo set a state of affairs on all the main fronts which wears an increasingly threatening aspect from the Austro-German point of view, and if his most sanguine expectations were realised in Rumania the enemy would still have ample cause to regard the outlook as gloomy. The motives which induced HisMNBUBO, though EojDressed Jn the

iiw]n theatres, to open a fresh campaign against Rumania, and the conditions in which the campaign was undertaken, wero interestingly discussed last month by Colonel Bepington, the military correspondent o£ the London Times. Thorn arc many reasons, ho remarks, for the enemy decision. "Hungary was hard beset and had to be appeased. It was a question whether Rumania or Bulgaria would bo crushed first between upper and nether millstones, and, if Bulgaria were the victim, then two out of the three confederates of Germany might secede from the. cause, the road to the East would be lost, and the armies of Salonika, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus would bo set free. Germany could ill afford the further extension of fronts implied 'by the Rumanian continuation of thq Russian line, and it was worth trying, a short, sharp, and violent offensive to bring Rumania down. These reasons wero good enough if the necessary troops could be found. From the total strength of Germany and Austria combined, andin viow of the rains and the coming winter, forces were available which, if not enough to change the situation on the main fronts, might hope with their veterans to "defeat the inexperienced if fresh armies of Germany's latest enemy." Theory also, Colonel Repington adds, had something to say.' The almost pure defensive to which Germany had been reduced on the main fronts was exercising a detrimental moral and material effect not only upon Germany, but upon the world's opinion of her. It was necessary to pass from a negative to a positive attitude at the first opportunity, and hero the opportunity came, and with it the chance of postponing for a time a shortening of German fronts and a retreat, an alternative too galling to German pride to be admitted except under compulsion, bold and effective though retreat might he if it were successfully carried out.

This is very probably a reasonably accurate summary of the motives and considerations which induced the enemy to embark upon his Rumanian adventure, and it must be obvious that from the outset the adventure did not promise particularly well. Tho biggest fact in sight is not that von Falkenhayn's armies have made some headway into Wallachia, but that the Austro-Germans are expending force in a secondary theatre, for which there is an everincreasing and clamant demand in the main theatres. So far as the Western and Italian theatres are concerned, the enemy is wholly to the bad as regards the transfer of force involved in his Rumanian offensive. The attack upon Rumania does not tend in the slightest degree to relieve the pressure bearing upon the enemy on the Western front and on tho Italian front. It is true that the invasion' of Rumania has drawn a considerable force of Russian troops to that country, but it is unlikely that this has seriously affected the position in the Russian main theatre. If it had, we might feel tolerably confident that von Falkenhayn would presontly be sent reeling back in dei'leat. At all events it is plain that things are going from bad to worse with the enemy in the main theatres, while his Rumanian enterprise is developing at a much, slower pace than he had hoped to attain. « . * *

Germany is visibly paying a heavy price, and is likely to pay a heavier price as time goes on, for the privilege of pursuing _ in a_ secondary theatre the offensive she is no longer capable of attempting in the main theatres, and the fact that Rumania is in some present danger should not be allowed to obscure this patent 'fact. The truth may best be realised by considering what the result would bo if von Falkenhayn carried his offensive to a point of success which there is much reason to hope it will never attain, and overran Rumania. This, in itself, would be in the last degree deplorable, but it would not confer any such decisive advantage upon the enemy as would repay and justify his diversion of strength from the main theatres, where tho fate of the war will bo decided. Nothing that the ■ enemy can do now will hinder the steady development of the Allied offensive in West and East and in Italy, and from the standpoint of the war on one front the attack upon Rumania is_ manifestly, a blunder to be classed with the colossal German failure at Verdun and the Austrian attempt to mvado Venetia. It is not even likely that the elimination of Rumania would secure the enemy's hold upon the Balkan corridor for any length of time. At all events, with his southern line already breached at one vital point, he cannot hope to make head against General Sakrail's offensive without throwing considerable reinforcements into Macedonia, and this implies a continued and indefinite call upon German and Austrian resources which would accentuate tho menacing aspect of affairs, from the enemy viewpoint, in the main theatres. '

The elimination of Rumania in any case is an extrcmo possibility not likely to be realised. In actual fact wo havo Rumania offering a brave and stubborn resistance to tho invading armies, accorded increasing support by her nearest ally, and deriving indirect assistance from the powerful and effective blows lately struck at tho enemy in Macedonia and in more distant theatres. It would bo a gloomy estimate of the position to suppose that Rumania is in any immediate danger of being overwhelmed. On tho other hand there is no room for doubt as to the extent to which the enemy is outclassed in other theatres. How matters stand in the Western theatre has been made plain in the shattering defeats lately inflicted upon the Germans by the French and British armies on the Somme. On the Italian offensive front the onemy is probably in no better case than in the Western theatre. In Southern Russia, and Galicia 'the Austro-Ger-mans have for some time contrived to make a stand against tHc Russian offensive, but on a line where defeat would be likely to entail disasters not less serious than they suffered in these regions during the summei'. Adding to this that the penetration of his line in Macedonia confronts the enemy in that theatre with problems of serious gravity, it must be concluded that his outlook generally is dark and unpromising * * * *

According to'the Petrograd correspondent of the Daily Chronicle, M ; Milukoff, the lea.do'r of the Constitutional Democratic party in the Duma, has exposed a plot of serious proportions in Russia aiming at tho conclusion of a separate peace. There does not seem any reason to doubt that the essential facts are accurately stated, and the plot assumes a somewhat formidable character in view of the fact that a'num.

bor of Ministers, as well as pro-1 German members of tbo Court; and wealthy financiers aro implicated, lb is, of course, common knowledge that there is a pro-German party in Russia, largely identified with thp bureaucrats, and powerful rather by reason of position, influence, and wealth than on account of numbers, which has from the outset beon opposed to the war and in favour of coming to terms, with Germany, lb was hoped that the treasonable projects of the bureaucrats had been finally defeated when the. Tsar firmly rejected advantageous terms offered by Germany in the autumn of 1915, and took his claco at the head of his armies. Tho hope, it now seems, was premature, bub_ there is much to encourage a belief that Russia will weather tho presenb storm as she has weathered others of tho kind, in the past. According to the Chronicle's correspondent the Ministry has split, but the War and Naval Ministers and the members of the Progressive bloc in tho Duma who with them stand opposed to tho designs of the plotters nave tho support of Generals Alexeieff, Brtjsiloff, and Russky, and so in effect are backed by four million bayonets. Into the same scale is no doubt to be thrown the powerful influence of the Tbar, who has pledged hisword never to desist in the war until the last invader has been driven from Russian soil.