PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2928, 14 November 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some extracts appear to-day from a review of the war situation by Mr. J. L. Garvin, editor of the Observer. 'It consists in great part of predictions and speculative assumptions which must be taken for what they arc worth. Mr. Garvin's remark that von Hindenburg is likely to make a crowning effort on the East front before next spring may deserve to bo singled out as conceivably -a shrewd penetration of the enemy designs, but at the same time the suggestion seems to be inspired by a rather narrow outlook on possibilities. Conceding, for the sake of argument, that von Hindenburg may bo able to mass such a force on some selected portion of the East front during the winter as would enable him to launch a vigorous offensive, does not this imply that the Allies, with their greater resources, will be able to anticipate or counter Hindenburg's predicted enterprise by action on a greater scale? It is not possible to argue that winter will hold up the Allied offensive and set the enemy free to organise and launch an offensive of which he is now incapable. If Hindenburg is able to strike a powerful blow on the East front during the winter, "then the Allies should be able to strike much more powerfully in the other main theatre. Two very important considerations support this view of the matter. One is that Hindenburg would presumably draw the additional force needed for his Eastern offensive from the Western theatre, and the other that while winter conditions everywhere hamper transport and the movement of armies generally, they do so io a, somewhat less serious extent in the Western theatre, where railways and good roads are numerous, than in the Eastern theatre, where both are rare.

Except in one particular, Mr. Garvin seems to be, on sure ground in his references to the position m the Balkans. The exception, which is important, is his statement that the Rumanians were mistaken in not crushing' Bulgaria first. It is quite true that the subjugation of Bulgaria would have severed the connection between Berlin and Constantinople and enabled the Allies to settle their enemies in turn, but to suggest that Rumania's default has spoiled this programme is to take a great deal for granted, and, indeed, to run counter to available evidence. The actual march of events goes far to warrant, a belief that if Rumania on entering the war had thrown the bulk of her strength into an attack on Bulgaria, she would have laid herself open to a disastrous invasion by way of her north and north-western frontiers. We know' now ihat the high hopes which were entertained of the Rumanian invas'on of Transylvania were founded upon a misconception of the position. There is no evidence that the Rumanians shared these hopes. It is at least an alternative that their advance into Transylvania was undertaken with a view to capturing enemy supplies, destroying depots, and damaging railways and other means of communication, and that it was part and parcel of the defensive campaign which is still absorbing a largo part of their military resources, though a share of the burden has been taken over by Russia.

Information is so far incomplete that it is still possible to argue that Rumania might have been able, by a sudden attack on Bulgaria, to alter tho whole aspect of the Balkan' campaign, but the validity of this still fascinating theory is at best extremely doubtful. A much more probable explanation of the failure thus far to make the most of opportunities in the Balkans is to be found in that paralysis of the Allied operations in Greece to which Mr. Garvin himself alludes in justifiably strong terms. We know definitely, and not as a matter of theory, that while the Rumanians and their Russian allies still held the Cernavoda bridge, and so were in a position to effectively turn the obstacle of the Danube,, General Sarrail was unable to take that action in Macedonia for which the moment seemed to call. He would presumably have been «o freer to move at an earlier date. We must, therefore, suppose that if Rumania had made it her first and principal business to attack Bulgaria, she would probably have found herself hopelessly involved in a campaign in the central part of the Balkans when von Falkenhayn opened his offensive on the Moldavian and Wallachian frontiers. With matters in that state Rumania might easily have shared the fate of Serbia. Mr. Garvin's statement that Rumania made a mistake is not warranted unless he 'is possessed of information which runs counter to visible evidence and throws an entirely new light on the situation.

On the other hand, there does not seem to be any answer to a contention that the Allied operations in the. Balkans have been marred by blunders, and particularly by an inept handling of King- Constantine of Greece. Nothing warranting any departure from this opinion has appeared in the considerable budget of news concerning affairs in Greece which has come through during tho last few days. The other day, for instance, we had the report of a speech by Mr'. Asqvjith, in which he stated that: "Whatever drastic measures were taken (in Greece), and which the Allies dictated, solely necessary to.prevent Athens continuing a centre for pro-German, propaganda and .intrigue." The Imperial Prime Minister went on to stress the fact that tho great Greek patriot, _ M. VeniZEtos, with whom the Allies were in hearty sympathy, had assured them that his effort*! cad no anti-dynastic Ipurpose. This can only be taken "to. mean that the Allies, or some of them, feel an anxious solicitudc_ for the welfare and security of a minor monarch, who has notoriously, and I by Me. Asquith's own showing in

the speech quoted, made his capital a centre and hotbed of German conspiracy, and done his utmost to thwart and wreck the Allied plans. It is plain enough that to the policy which Mis. Asquith. quite frankly laid bare must be attributed tho one big failure of the Allied 1916 campaign. Without going into all the detail aspects of the question, it is obvious that the conquest of the Balkan corridor this year, now hardly to be hoped for, would have opened brilliant prospects. It would not only have eliminated Bulgaria and gone far to eliminate.Turkey, but would haVe enabled the Allies to concentrate upon Austria in a fashion sho is ill awe to bear. As it is, Germany is likely to remain in communication with tho Near and Middle East throughout the, winter, and this not only implies some temporary relief to Austria, but may carry other advantages. While Turkey and Bulgaria'continue to keep considerable Allied forces occupied, however, and may supply some further reinforcements in the main theatres, it is to be set down on the opposite side of tho account that the war in Turkey and Bulgaria imposes a perceptible drain upon German resources, not in men, but in munitions and other material, which is likely to be more and more severely felt as time goes on. Indeed, according to the military correspondent of the Westminster Gazette, it was recently suggested by a neutral military critic of some authority that tho Germans are not unlikely, as pressure grows, to leave Turkey and Bulgaria to shift for themselves. However, there is no doubt that up to the present the enemy has profited by his continued possession of the Balkan corridor. Failure to take it from his hands mars the generally good record of the year from the 'Allied point of view 1 and for' the failure the futile* policy which the Allies have pursued in_ Greece, and which was neatly epitomised by Mk. Asquith in his recent speech, must be held chiefly responsible.

The Athens report which professes to disclose the contents of the Entente Note to Greece in unofficial, and carries meantime no particular authority. If it is true that tho Allies have merely required King Constantine to permit public officials and military officers who desire to do so to join the Provisional Government, • other recent reports regarding the Note have been investing it with'an importance to which, it has no claim. The 'suggestion conveyed in to-day's message is that Constantine is still to be left comparatively free to hatch new schemes against the Allies, and that the drastic measures which the case demands have not yet even been originated . ■ • .

A notable event in the • Western theatre reported to-day is the capture by the French of practically the whole of that portion of the village of Saillisel, east of the Ba-paume-Peronne road, which was recently recovered by the Germans in a counter-attack. Tho enemy defended this village very stubbornly, and suffered correspondingly. A staff order captured by the French shows that the- defending troops were ordered to hold Saillisel at all costs. The circumstances of tho struggle for this village demonstrate how little elastic the enemy's defence is, and indicate his continued anxiety for the security of his line. It may be added that, with some other recent events, the contest for Saillisel makes distinctly against the theory advanced in one message today that the Battle of the Sommo practically ceased a few weeks back.

Further accounts are given _of very heavy fighting on the Russian main front, but in its details the position remains obscure. On the Transylvanian front a general improvement is in evidence. The Rumanians have advanced at a number of points both in Moldavia and Wallacliia, and the only exception . (at time of writing) to this ruling state of affairs is that thoy have made a 6hort retreat in the Jiul valley, in Western Wallachia.

An uncertain report which arrived yesterday regarding events in the vicinity of Cernavoda, in the Dobrudja, is now to some extent cleared up. Some righting did occur west of Cernavoda. Enemy detaohrments, it is now stated, crossed the Danube, but were thrown back by the Russians. On what scale the, attempt was made does not appear, but apparently it was not repeated. The news suggests that the RussoRumanians are endeavouring to preserve some portion of the great structure which crosses the Danube and the neighbouring marshlands at Cernavoda. This may be possible in spite of the fact that von MackenSEN_ has for some time been in. a position to establish artillery on the eastern bank of the Danube in the immediate neighbourhood of the bridge. Authorities differ to some extent regarding the total length of the structure, but it is in the vicinity of eleven or.: twelvo miles. According to one'account it cdnsists of an iron bridge, about 1000 yards in length, over the Bortcha a.rm, of a dam with several viaducts eight miles long and 18 feet high, over the marshy land, and of a, second bridge, about one mile long, oyer the Danube arm at Cernavoda. Very probably it_ is the eastern bridge that has chiefly suffered up to the present, and it is likely that the enemy detachments which crossed the river were intent upon extending the destruction. Reports that the enemy has burned Cernavoda and Constanza in the course of retreat are unconfirmed at time of writing, but the Rumanians officially report reaching a line between the Danubo and the Black Sea at a distance of about 15 miles north of Cernavoda.