PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2911, 25 October 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Along the Transylvanian frontier the Rumanians seem to be more than holding their own, but on their southern front, in the Dobrudja, they have suffered a set-back. The significance of to-day's messages will be readily grasped if it is remembered that sixty miles beyond the frontier of Bulgaria and Rumania, the space of about thirty miles between the Danube and the Black Sea coast is traversed by a railway of which the terminus is the. port of Constanza. This railway, which runs direct to Bucharest after passing the Danube at Cernavoda, has hitherto represented one line of communication between Russia and Rumania, though not the best nor the most important, Constanza is a useful port, but the Rumanians are in touch with Russia by the trunk railway through Moldavia, and there is also a Russian railway to Reni, _on the Danube, further east, which comes into near touch with the Rumanian system. Nevertheless the loss of Constanza, which the enemy is reported to have occupied, is in itself a matter of som.e seriousness. At an earlier stage of the oampaign the Russo-Rumanian forces in tho Dobrudja retired to prepared positions ten miles south of the Constanza railway, but from this line they subsequently advanced. The enemy now claims a more pronounced success, and though the news of the occupation of Constanza is as yet unconfirmed, the Rumanians admit retiring to positions immediately south of the railway, and it is quite possiblo that they have taken the further step of retiring beyond Constanza.

The significance of tho news as it stands is that the Rumanians have apparently found it impossible to defend a useful port and line of railway. It cannot be supposed that their retirement has been in any sense voluntary, and tho position therefore gives some ground for uneasiness. As matters stand we must needs turn a doubtful eye upon such reports as that which recently stated that oight or ten Russian divisions had been sent to the Dobrudja. A force of that size, adequately equipped with artillery, snould in itself havo been almost sufficient to stem the enemy offensive which has reached the Constanza railway. We are thus practically forced to the conclusion that the Russian force, in the strength mentioned, either exists only on paper or has_ not yet reached tho scene of operations. The spt-back is the more disappointing since in the earlier operations in tho Dobrudja the Russo-Rumanians appeared to derive considerable advantage ftom the co-operation of the Russian fleet. It is -possible that the Russian bombarding ships have for the time been compelled to retire before the German submarines which were recently stated to bo operating in the Black Sea. The more promising features of the situation aro that Rumania has not yet- suffered any vital damage, and that the enemy is distinctly short of decisive success either in the Dobrudja or on the Transylvaninn front. The enemy advance in the Dobrudja would only assume a really dangerous aspect if he succeeded in forcing the Danube, and this he does not seepi as yet to have even attempted. The Dobrudja territory, apart "from Constanza and its railway, is not of great importance. Much of its extent is marshy, and it is thinly populated. * * * *

An enemy account of the Transylvanian campaign at its present stage of development is given by the German correspondent, Karl von Weigand. General von Falkenhayx, who, by the way, does not seem to have resigned his command, as was alleged a few days ago, is developing his main attack against the passes of the Wallachian frontier, south of Brasso, and about eighty miles north of Bucharest. The most important of these passes is the Pre deal, through which a railway from Brasso runs to Bucharest, and it is being powerfully attacked. Other Austro-Gorman columns are at the same time attacking the passes! east and'west of the Predeal. In another sector of the enemy operations the object aimed at is to cut the main line of communication between Russia and Rumania by driving across the trunk railway running north through Moldavia The latest report in nand relating to this enterprise declares that the enemy is retiring in the Trotus valley (about 65 miles north of Brasso), which he recently invaded by way of the Gyimes Pass. The Rumanians have fought successful actions also in passes and defile 3 further south. As to the turn of events on. tho mountain frontier north of Bucharest, reports are less definite. The Rumanians speak of a heavy bombardment at tho Predial Pass, which perhaps justifies an inference that the struggle at this critical point is stationary.

Suggestions lately rwde that the Russians arc on the eve of another big forward movement on the southern section of their main front have not yet been verified by events, and the principal item of news from the Eastern theatro at the moment is a'n unofficial report telling of a g/eat defensive stand by the Russixns against powerful efforts fcy the enemy to break and turn their flank iti Southern Bukowina. in tho vicinity of the RumaLian frontier and further north. In this region the enemy at most points still holds the passes through tho Carpathians, though at Dorna Vatra, near the]

southern extremity of Bukowina, the Russians are established on the crest of tho main range. In the heavy attacks described tho enemy aims at penetrating the Russian line along the Bystritza,. north of Dorna Vatra, and at pushing forward from the mountains further north. Tho importance of tho issues at stake is obvious. If the Russians were outflanked and defeated in Bukowina, the security of their lino to the north would be thieatened, and Rumania would be further and dangerously laid open to attack. In fact the enemy offensive in Southern Bukowina probably represents a more serious effort to interpose between Russia and Rumania than tho attack further south, in the region of the Gyimes Pass. Up to the present, however, it does not seem to have made any headway.

At an immediate view it is remarkable that the enemy, in the present state of his fortunes, should venture to concentrate so heavily against Rumania and upon his effort to cut off that country from effective contact with Russia. The fact that this policy involves some present danger to Rumania is all but overshadowed by the much more important fact that the enemy is expending in a secondary campaign a, body of strength for which there is an obvious and pressing demand in the main theatres. Aooording to Colonel Repington, Hindenbukg has assembled between twenty and thirty divisions, out of which to constitute new "anti-Rumanian" armies, by the perilous expedient of cutting down the strength of existing formations. This is perhaps a theoretical explanation, but it looks reasonable. Available information relating to the enemy's man-power certainly suggests that there is no other way in which he can have obtained tho Austro-Qerman forces now acting against Rumania in the Dobrudja and in Transylvania, and the additional troops operating against the Russians ia Southern Bukowina ; than by drawing upon his already burdened armies in the main theatres.

Colonel Repington thinks that the reinforcements which have enabled Von Maokensen to press.forward in the Dobrudja are possißly Turks, but in all the number of AiißtroGerman troops acting against Euroania must bo considerable. By this concentration, and profiting no doubt by the way in which the Allied offensive from Greece is hanging fire, the enemy is reaping some local advantage. But even if he improves on the present measure of his success against Rumania, it is not easy to see how he can reap any advantage in that quarter which will repay him for the weakening of his armies in the main theatres, whore the fate of the war must ultimately bo decided. It is reported that a collective programme in reference to the Eastern front was drawn up at the conference of Entente representatives which sat in Paris at tho end of last week, but there is a good deal to support an opinion that the enemy policy in its later developments, and particularly as regards tho attack on Rumania, is playing directly into the hands of the Entente. The desire to take vengeanoe on Rumania will hardly account for tho enemy's diversion of strength from the main t.heatres, and the only valid explanation of his policy seems to be that he feels it necessary at *'11 costs to counter the Allied p'ans in the south-eastern theatre, ana more particularly to afford relief to the Dual Monarchy. This last consideration possibly touches the root of the matter. At a long view the enemy can hardly regard his costly attacks on tho Transylvanian frontier and in the Dobrudja as a promising enterprise, but he very probably dreads an extended invasion of Hungary, not only, perhaps not mainly, on account of its purely military importance, but because of the effect it would have in aggravating tho already grave internal conditions of the Dual Monarchy.