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The Dominion TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1916. A DIVIDED GERMANY

When Mr. Asquith declared that one essential condition of peace was that the military domination of Prussia must be wholly and finally destroyed, be expressed with exactitude and felicity of language the central problem by which the Allies are faced iu the war. Tho problems bearing upon the future fortunes of mankind which thb v war has brought into the forefront are much more numeroiiß than its campaigns, but tbo greatest problem of all is that of subduing the evil of Prussian militarism, not only in this war, but in such fashion that it will not reappear. in tho years to come. Nothing less than this will repay the Allies for the sacrifices they are making in tho war, and no such result will be .secured, at all events no such result will be guaranteed, if Germany, on being defeated, is subjected only to such penalties and obligations as have commonly been imposed on defeated nations in tho past history, of Europe Germany and . her Allies may be heavily mulcted both in territory and wealth, France may regain her lost provinces, Italy and Kumania may satisfy their irredentist ambitions, Poland may be reconstituted, and Belgium and Serbia may be as fa* as possible restored.at the expense of tho Central Powers. But if the Allies on winning the war stop Bhort at measures of this kind tho military domination of Prussia will not havo been wholly and finally destroyed, and the victory won will bq imperfect, in the sense that it will give.no real security for the future peace of Europe. In tho ordinary way expectations of victory are best deferred until it is won, but the problem of devising conditions' upon whioh it will bo possible to found a stable peace is one which makes as clear a demand upon prudent foresight as do questions immediately connected with the prosecution of the war. It seems desirable, too, that Entente Ministers should define more clearly than they have yet done the attitude that will ultimately bo assumed towards Gormany, though they are, of course, under the necessity of abstaining from any utterance which the enemy and neutrals might interpret as a peace feeler. As yet wo have little more to go upon, in looking into the future, than Mk. Asqtjith's generalisation, which admirably states the problem to be solved, but does not even hint at a solution. It is common glround with practically all who have considered the subject that the complete and final destruction of the military domination of Prussia is an essentiail conditiion to a satisfactory peace, but this is as far as possible from meaning that tho overthrow of Prussian militarism will follow naturally and inevitably "upon the decisive victory of the Entente in the • war. While Mk. Asquith has confined himself to a general, though forcible, declaration of determination to accomplish the destruction of Prussian domination, ono of his colleagues, Viscount Geey, has gone somewhat further in attempting to propound a solution of the_ problem raised. Meeting an assertion by the German Imperial Chancellor that Great Britain seeks to destroy united and free Germany,. Viscount Grey said:

We want nothing of the sort. Wo believe that the German people—when once the dreams of World Empire, cherished by Pan-Germanism, are brought to nought—will insist upon the control of its government; and in this lies the hopo of secure freedom and national independence in Europe. For a German democracy will not plot and plan wars, as Prussian militarism plotted ware, to take place at a chosen date in future. '

This, of course, is little more than the expression of a pious hope, resting upon a series of theoretical assumptions, which are not susceptible of proof, and are not oven particularly convincing. Viscount- Gkey apparently suggests that the salvation of Germany must como from within. We have no possible warrant for believing that Gernunv, if she is left, licking hor wounds unci with clipped wings, but otherwise free as ever to shape her own future policy, will make any radical departure from the course sho has pur-..

sued during the last half century. Her history may be searched in vain for facts supporting the theory that she is capable of passing, by a process of self-regeneration, from ihe 'condition of a military Empire, slavishly obedient to a soulless autocracy, to that of a peaceably-inclinsd democracy. The German Empire as it exists to-day has been welded together under the operation of the law of brute forcb, and very largely in stress of actual war. She theory that defeat in the greatest war of' history will transform tr.p oharacter of an empire so moulded, overthrow Prussian autocracy, and usher in a reign of democracy, needs to be supported by some better evidence than has yet been advanced to that end boforo it will be worthy of serious consideration.

Possibly, events may ultimately prove that the problem of so dealing with Germany as to safeguard the future peace of Europe—vid this in its essence .is the problem of destroying Prussian domination of the German Empire—lends itself to bolder handling than Viscount Geey's rather tiimid review of the facts would imply. There arc cortain possibilities, admittedly not easy to weigh, of an internal reform of the German Imperial organisation being enforced by external pressure. A practical proposal of this naturo is advanced by M. Yves Gtjvot, an eminent French publicist and ex-Minister of the Republio, in an article in the Nineteenth Century. His proposal, in a word, is that tho Allies, when they are in a position to dictate terms to Germany, should decline to negotiate with the German Empire, and insist upon negotiating with tho German States to tho exclusion of Prussia. It will bo for the Allies, M. Guyot contends, to settle ao far as is possible, in agreement with them, tho relations of the various German States to one anothor and to other nations. More space than is available hero would be needed to set out M. Guyot's proposals in all their details, but he contemplates tho roducton of Prussia to the narrow limits which its autocratic rulers expanded by successive acts of spoliation until they camo to dominate the German States now welded in the Empire. For tho stability of the new arrangement, witli Prussia reduced to comparative insignificance, ho looks to tho free play of the particularist tendencies of the various German States which have been crushed by conquest and by the iron Prussian regime. The underlying idea of his theory of a reconstructed Germany, with Prussian domination arbitrarily destroyed, is that what has been set up by forco may be overthrown by force. This seems logical, and before dismissing M., Guyot's proposal as wholly impracticable it will bo well to consider that an overwhelming body of evi'denco attests tho fact that tho prcsont constitution of tho Gorman Empire is one of tho most arbitrary and unnatural arrangements known to history. Many writers have dwelt upon the paradox involved in the_ total surrender of the German majority to the Prussian minority. It is a surrender all the stranger since the Prussian minority is reputed to be markedly inferior in intellectual gifts and - attainments to the majority over whom its members exercise their sway. For the time being, of course, we have to deal only with a united German Empire, and while the war lasts the distinction between Prussia and the rest of Germany is a matter of small importance. But the unity of Germany is a unity almost of masters and slaves, and granted a decisive military victory by the Entente, it is possible that the interests of all Europe may be served by- freeing the German majority from the Prussian yoke. The yoke was not taken on willingly, but was imposed by successive acts of piratical conquest. There is the more reason for believing that if the yoke were once lifted Prussia would be unlikely to recover her lost ascendancy. Only when possibilities in this direction have been submitted to a definite test shall we know -whether Mr. Asquith's famous declaration is merely a rhetorical phrase or the condensed statement of a practical and practicable programme.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19161024.2.15

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2910, 24 October 1916, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,367

The Dominion TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1916. A DIVIDED GERMANY Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2910, 24 October 1916, Page 4

The Dominion TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1916. A DIVIDED GERMANY Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2910, 24 October 1916, Page 4

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