PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2909, 23 October 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Thews is news of a rather mixed complexion regarding the Rumanian campaigns. So far as the struggle : on the Transylvanian frontier is concerned the position has somewhat improved, but it is admitted that the enemy has gained some ground in an oifensive movement in the Dobrudja. The Trofcus valley, in which the Rumanians have repulsed attacks, practically coincides with the railway running south-east from the Gyimes Pass. The Uzu valley is a defile cutting the frontier about midway between the Gyimes Pass and the Oitoz Pass. It is not quite clear whether the statement that the Rumanians drove the enemy back to the frontier in this locality relates only to the U7.11 defile, or to the more important Trotus valley and Gyimes Pass as well, but at,all events something has been done to restore the position which was endangered when the enemy broke through the Gyimes Pass and advanced ten miles from the frontier down the Trotus,valley. The news of the Dobrudja operations is not so good. Both sides reportheavy fighting, and both aver that they inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. The Eumanians at first repulsed attacks, but the latest Bucharest communique in hand admits that they were forced back on their right flank and centre, that is to say in the vicinity of the Danube and in' the middle area between the Danube and the Black Sea coast. The present line of contact in the Dobrudja is generally indicated in the news. The Germans claim that they gained positions south of Rasova; so that the Rumanians in this region are not now very far beyond the defensive line which ' they constructed some time ago, covering the Constanza railway at a, distance of about 'ten miles._ To the eastward, however, the line probably trends a good deal to the south. It was recently reported that the enemy had withdrawn in this region towards Dobrich.

In its total effect the news leaves the situation somewhat open, but tho enemy, ,as reports stand, is making no headway in his attack on the Transylvanian frontier, and in the Dobrudja the Rumanians should have a considerable margin to come and go upon. Significance possibly attaches to tho report, which comes by way of Switzerland, that General von Falkenhayn has been wounded, in tho leg and has relinquished the Transylvanian command. It does not seem likely that anything but a very serious wound would induceVon Faleenhayn to Jay down his command, and if ho has in fact retired it is probably for some other reason than the ono stated. It is conceivable that a hitch may have arisen in regard to finding the force which he deems necessary to carry on thcN offensive. This, of course, is mere guesswork, but in view of the | heavy and increasing dema-ds of the

main and Italian theatres it would bestrangeif the Central Powers did not experience difficulty in finding an adequate force to act against Rumania.

Events up to the present can hardly be taken as affording any real indication of Rumania's fighting power. When she entered the war, in the closing days of August, it was estimated by competent authorities that she would need six weeks or two months to bring her full strength to bear. Having not far short of a million men to draw upon, she is capable of ultimately throwing a very large force into the field, but as yet her armies are probably still in process of being built up to the maximum strength aimed at. Late English files have brought a certain amount of information as to the manner tin which Rumania was enabled to prepare for the campaigns in which Bhe is now engaged, and on the whole it suggests that she is better provided than might have been supposed, in view of her apparently limited facilities for importation. For instance, in regard to Rumania's small arms and artillery equipment, Coloned Repington t6marked recently that the fact that she has Mannlicher (Austrian) rifles and Krupp field guns and howitzers naturally causes disquiet, but that there are plenty of rifles in the country and the supply of small-arm ammunition is r ample for many months of war. "Thero is also enough artillery ammunition at present," he added, "and although Krupp is not available for future supplies, i« can bo taken for granted that such a vital question as shells has not been overlooked. In fact, a steady supply is available from other sources, while the mountain and heavy artillery of the field army comes from Greusot (France), and can be replenished from the same ■firm. 'The fortress artillery armament is also fairly largo and good, and should be able to provide an adequate proportion of neavy guns. No army in these days has enough guns and shells, for none can have enough,_ but for the effectives vnich 'Rumania can place in the field she is fairly well found in guns of nil descriptions." Those who are best informed on tie subject have naturally spoken in guarded terms about Rumania's effective strength and material equipment for war, but grounds are not wanting for a belief that when her mobilisation has teen in all respects completed she will be an even more formidable factor than she has proved up to the present

On the Macedonian front tho Serbians have fought a successful action, capturing guns and taking Bome prisoners, in the region cast-south-east of Monastir. They now hold 'a line some miles beyond the bend of the-River Cerna, where it runs opposite, and north of,, the Serbo-Greek frontier. ■ Nothing is said at time of writing about events on other sections of the Macedonian front, except that bad weather prevails on the Struma. Tho news as far as it goes is good, but there is no hint yet of any such general attack as the Allies must make in order to drive the Bulgarians north through the Balkans, and this must be regarded a« somewhat disappointAction on a big seal© in Macedonia would lend valuable aid to Rumania, and it would lead up to a campaign beyond the Danube which would.add enormously to the strain already brought to hear upon the Central Powers. Ample motives exist for a vigorous offensive in Macedonia, but it must be confessed that current reports relating to tho campaign and to events in Greece generally hold out no immediate promise of action on these lines, it is true that the news in tho main is of a favourable cast, but reading it in light of the fact that' the remaining weeks of good weather are slipping away, some doubts must be felt as to whether the Allies are likely to drive home their attack on Bulgaria this year. ■

The Allies, it is true, have as much time at disposal as sufficed Von Mackensen to launch and complete his invasion of Serbia a year ago, but in more than one message to-day there arc suggestions that difficulties still exist in connection with transport. Mr. Ward Price, for instance, states that the attack on the strong Bulgarian defences in the Monastir region has been impeded by a scarcity of shells, resulting from transport difficulties, and from another message it appears that tbo Allies are only now transferring needed rolling stock from the southern Greek railways .to Macedonia. The internal situation in Greece seems to resolve itself into a gradual transfer of the powers of government from CONSTANTINE.to M. Venizelos. The cruisers and light craft of the Greek fleet have-now been organised for service under the authority of the Provisional Government, and the military forces of the Provisional Government are said to be receiving constant accessions of strength from tbe regular army. There does not seem to be any doubt that Constantine's power is rapidly, melting away, but -whether full control of Greek railways and other resources will be obtained by the ■ Entente and the Provisional Government in time to admit of an unhampered offensive against the Bulgars within the ,nexf week or two 'is a somewhat open question.

Messages relating to the- Somme battle are largely in the nature of comment, and call for little remark, though some of them tend in a valuable degree to elucidate the position reached. Some difference of opinion obtains as to the actual condition to which the enemy is reduced, and a Morning Post correspondent at Headquarters, in particular, seems to consider that the enemy is capable of maintaining his resistance for some time to come on or near his present line. . According to this correspondent, the enemy will not voluntarily Bhi>rten his line, and insists upon being "blown homeward.'- In view of the continuous progress the Allies have made and the advantageous position thcy_ now hold tho point is ono upon which some doubt may bo supposed to exist, but in any case If the Germans are committed to a policy of clinging to their present line at all costs the reason must probably bo sought, not so much in their dogged disinclination to give ground as in a well-founded fear of tho consequences that would attend an extended movement to'the rear. It is difficult to believe that the German commanders, if they were confident of tho ability of their armies to give a good account of themselves in manoeuvre battle, would be content to passively await on their'present long and unwieldy line the full development of tho offensive in which the Allies have so plainly demonstrated their superiority.

The considerations which warrant full confidence.in the ultimate success of the Allied offensive are not in dispute. A breach has been burst through _ the strongest German defences; it is being steadily widened and extended, and it points into the heart of the German main communications. The Allied infantry has proved itself very greatly superior to that of _ the enemy, and as to artillery a dispatch from Sik Douglas Haig at the end of last week contained the sence: "Assisted by the aeroplanes, our artillery has established and maintained a clear superiority over the enemy." • In addition to this, we have the fact that the Germans are now fighting in ground in which they enjoy no such advantage as in the fortified hills from which they have been dislodged. Their utmost efforts have failed to stem the continued progress of the Allies, but it is no doubt true that as long as they are able to throw enough men and guns into the path of the offensive they will postpone complete disaster. Considering the balance of strength in the war, however, their tactics in desperately clinging to their shattered line-must be considered little better than suicidal. Wo are told that they are busily constructing new defonces, including deep subterranean tunnels on a scale hitherto ucqualled. • But it is not to be supposed that, placed as' they now aro., and under the bombardment of the" Allied guns, they, will succeed in extemporising stronger defences than piose through which the Allies have blasted their way. Their prospects must be measured accordingly, and with the fact in mind ihat the longer they spin but a hopeless struggle on their present line the greater will bo their ultimate disaster.