PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2890, 30 September 1916, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It is ono of tho big facts of the war. that the Gormans havo sunk so much labour and material in the fortified line which covers a distance of more than five hundred miles in the Western theatre that they cannot retire from it without an enormous loss of fighting power._ The place that this permanent investment takes in the German war jolan is perhaps not as clearly recognised as .it ought to be,' considering the body of ovidence on the subject that has been made public. The latest addition to this evidence is the description of tho Thiepval position, which was pubished as later news yesterday. The fortified system of Thiepval, we are told, covered one square mile. As in many of the other villages captured, the attackers_ found underground galleries which had resisted the bombardment of tho heaviest guns and howitzers. Each cellar haa been strengthened by steel armour and concrete until it was a small fortress, and many galleries were fitted with lifts, intended to hoist machine guns quickly into position. Before this war, fortresses like Thiepval existed only "here and there along frontiers or at other points of strategic importance. In this war Thiepval is, or rather was, a comparatively commonplace feature in the German Western line. That it is a typical examplo of the enemy defences cannot be doubted, since obviously the .Germans must havo been labouring to convert it into an impregnable long before they knew that the Allies would strike their main offensive blow in the Somme region. On some sections of the enemy line even more elaborate strongholds have 1 been constructed, and village "fortresses of the Thiepval typo abound except on an inconsiderably portion of its length. • * P It must be obvious to anyone that the construction of defensive lines of this character is subject to as definite limitations as the.construction of Dreadnoughts or of the gigantic guns and howitzers upon which so much depends in modern war. Something has been heard lately about alternative lines which the Germans have prepared against the eventuality of a retreat, but tho character of their present linetrench systems extending over a depth of miles, provided with innumerable deep dug-outs, and thickly sprinkled with flush redoubts and fortified villages like Thiepval—affords ample justification for a belief that it is the only obstacle of its kind which separates the Allies from the German frontier.

That Germany should have staked ier whole fortunes upon the strength and stability of her Western line looks now like almost incredible 'folly. The folly consisted, however, in 'her failure to foresee the conditions that have now arisen. Germany believed in her ability to carry a war of conquest to a triumphant conclusion, and thiß implied an assumption that the war would end on or beyond the lines of invasion reached by her armies. When it was formed, tne assumption was perhaps less.absurd than it seems now. The Western Allies, were established in no such elaborate defences as Germany has since constructed when they stemmed the invasion of France and Flanders, and it has taken the events of the offensive to demonstrate that the front on which the Germans laboured for two years is not in fact impregnable. It must beremembered also that until their disastrous failure at Verdun became manifest, the Germans .hoped to paralyse offensive action by the French, and unquestionably they failed, to realise and make due allowance for the fighting power of the British Army. • # • * Some warnings are issued in the iiows_ to-day _ anent the wisdom ''of keeping a rein on expectations. Experts point out, it is stated, that it is a mistake to regard the Germans as routed._ This is quite true—so true that it need hardly have been stated—but it is equally true that visible and undisputed facts tend distinctly to show that the Germans are toppling on the brink of- disaster. The outstanding feature of the situation at the moment is that the line from which they hoped so much is shattered and all but penetrated. One correspondent remarks that we must wait for what is behind the immediate feebleness of the enemy resistance. This is reasonable enough in a general way, but it must be recognised that the position has already changed to an extent which admits neither doubt nor dispute. Whether or not the immediate feebleness of the enemy's resistance.means that he is about to seek relief by retreat, the outlook is equally , promising from the point of view of the * * * * If the enemy retreats he must abandon without fighting a great extent of fortified front as strong, in places much stronger, than the section through which it has taken the Allies three months to blast their way to the present point of penetration. The declining vigour of his resistance certainly carries a strong suggestion that he is on the eve of retreat, but if appearances on this point are deceptive an. excellent prospect, remains that the Allies may break through his line ■ and _ gain scope and freedom to assail him in flank and attack his communications. If preparations for retreat aro under way, the weakness lately betrayed by_ the enemy means that he is. reserving his strength, as far as his circumstances will permit, for the terrible struggle which will open when the retreat is visibly in progress. The only alternatve is to suppose that his failing defence on the Somme front represents the maximum effort of which ho is now capable, for every forward step 1 taken by the Allies carries them nearer to the ultimate achievement of driving through an opon breach. *** * I Considering the nature of the positions from which the Germans have been dislodged, not much importance can be attached to the statement that they are frantically digging in on_a new line, and that the position is still doubtful. If this means anything, it presumably amounts to a suggestion that if the Germans are industrious enough in their digging they may construct 1 positions strong enough to bring the Allies to a halt. The suggestion, to say tho least, ia unconvincing. Ordinary trencheß will present no very formidable obstacle to tho power of artillery tho Allies are able to bring to bear, and, as has been pointed out, it is one of the_ most promising features of the existing situation that the Germans are unlikely to have anything better than "hastily organised works to rely upon for a considerahls distance behind the front on which they are so gravely menaced.

Oot item of lata news yesterdaj( stated that since the offensive opened the Allied had "gruelled" 61 en* emy divisions, cach of which had lost about 3000 men. This certainly errs heavily on the side of moderation. It would mean that in nearly ninety days, many of them devoted to the heaviest fighting the war has witnessed, the enemy casualties under all heads totalled only a little over 180,000. Unwounded prisoners in tho hands of the Allies would cut down this total by one-third, so that I we are asked to believe that thg enemy's losses, otherwiso than in prisoners, have averaged only about 1300 per day during the period of the offensive. Such an estimate may safely bo set aside as a long way below the mark. • It is hardly necessary to go further into the matter, but' it may be pointed out that a division, at full strength, Buffering casualties to the number of three thousand, would lose only about one-quarter of its infantry. Spreading the casualties in duo proportion over other divisional units/the reduction of the infantry strength would be correspondingly less. It is not to be believed tlTat tEe Germans are now in a position to withdraw divisions which have lost no more th'an three thousand of their effectives. *»* ■ * An unofficial message which" states that the Italians are four miles from Trieste contains remarkably good news if it_ is true, but the last-re-ceived official reports indicated that they were separated by something like twice that distance from their ■ goal.