PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2874, 12 September 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

From a statement attributed to the Russian Chief of Staff'(General Alexieff), it appears that he thinks it not impossible that the enemy may attempt to mend his collapsing fortunes by another Eastern offensive. This may seen a somewhat extraordinary .admission at the stage which has been reached 1 in tho war, bus no doubt the very fact that the enemy is visibly on the road to defeat raises the possibility that he may embark upon a line of action from which he would shrink if he were more fortunately placed. Extreme desperation is implied in the apparent determination of the enemy to fight to tho last possible moment' on the long and widely extended fronts in East and West which he gained by maximum efforts while he still held the initiative. Tho Austro-Germans. are now in the grip of suporior forces in the main theatres, and their position is further and dangerously threatened in the Balkans. Yet there is no sign that they contemplate, either in East or West, a voluntary retirement which would shorten their fighting fronts and lines of communication. Possibly they believo that retreat on a big scale is impossible without military disaster, or such a moral collapse as would make it impossible to continue tho war. At all events they are committed, on visible evidence, to a policy of obstinately defending the lines gained by invasion, and, in the main, giving ground only under | pressure of irresistible attack. * * * * This policy is calculated to hasten and magnify the ultimate catastrophe, but its adoption suggests also that the enemy may go to almost any lengths in attempting to avert the fate to which he is plainly doomed. General Alexieff thinks it not impossible that the- enemy may attempt another Eastern offensive, and at the,same time is confident that the Russians can defeat the attempt if it is made. This confidence seems well warranted, in viow of the tremendous alteration in relative fighting strength which has been effected since last year, but it docs not necessarily follow that the enemy will shrink from attempting another offensive. Assuming that tho alternative of retreat' is excluded, his choice lies between another offensive and being battered to death on his present lines. It is to be considered also that the enemy, may hope by venturing another attack on Eussia to hamper or even paralyse Eussian action in the BalKans. It has all along seemed unlikely that the Austro-Gcrmaus would seek to neutralise tho effect o? Rumania's intervention by direct action against that country on any .considerable scale. At best (from the enemy standpoint) this would mean purchasing success in a secondary, theatre by sacrificing strength for which a desperate need

exists in the main theatres. But it is conceivable that Von HindenBURrt may hope to kill two birds with one stone by engaging the Russians so heavily in their main theatre as to make it impossible for them to second Rumania with any large force iu the campaign against Bulgaria. All things considered, such an enterprise would have por prospects of approaching succor, but while definite developments avo awaited, it is to be borne in mind "that the enemy is in a condition which makes desperate action his only visible alternative to fatal inaction. It is likely also that ho attaches supreme importance to entering the winter campaign retaining as much as possible of the territery he has invaded, and that he won'/.! make substantial sacrifices to* - (he sake of retaining as far as possible unimpaired that position on the map to which the German Imperial Chancellor has more than once directed attention. Probably it will not be far wrong to assume chat Germany is intent not so much upon prudently husbanding her remaining resources and making them spin out _ as long as possible, as upon maintaining at all costs an apparently advantageous position from which to intrigue or negotiate for peace during the coming winter. At timo of writing there is no confirmation of yesterday's report that the Russian forces in Rumania had crossed tho Danube into north-eastern Serbia, at Negotin, and were threatening a similar invasion of north-western Bulgaria, at Vidin, 24 miles further south. Some uncertainty therefore still obtains as to the lines on which the Allied plans will develop in the Balkans. Tho Russians have yet to show their hand as regards action against Bulgaria—it is mentioned that they have detained the Austrian Ambassador to Rumania and other Austrian, in order to prevent information of their military measures reaching the'encmy—and at tho moment tho only campaign visibly in active progress in the Balkans is the Bulgarian offensive in the Do- ■ bruja. Even this campaign is not very clearly defined, but availablo reports are consistent in regard to at least one important fact. It is that the Bulgarians, whatever the oxtcnt of their invasion of Rumanian territory may be, arc still advancing south of the Danube and have not yet attempted a crossing. This means in a word that tho offensive has yet to take shape as a serious threat against Rumania or as a movement calculated to hamper or paralyse the activities of the Russian army which is believed to bo making ready for an invasion of Bulgaria. It is beyond the Danube, if anythat the Bulgara must expect to achieve results. They are within about forty miles of Bucharest, but in order to lessen this distance they must first of all cross the Danube, a waterway half a mile across, and until theyat least essay this formidable task it is permissible to believe that they are wasting timo and strength in an enterprise ill-calcu-lated to improve their general situation. Apart from the essential fact that tho Bulgars have not yet attempted to pass the Danube, tho developments of the campaign are doubtfully reported. No full account of tho battle recently fought at Turtukai is yet available, but tho Bulgarian and German reports which claimed that 20,000 Rumanians had been taken prisoner at that place, already exposed as gross exaggerations, aro further discredited by the statement of a correspondent at_ Bucharest that the enemy only gained the town at the cost of extremely heavy losses. It seems likoly that tho loss of Turtukai, instead of being a Rumanian disaster, was a normal incident in a defensivo and holding campaign.' How far the Bulgarians have advanced into the Dobruja is not clear. Their claim to have reached Silistria, thirty miles along the south bank of tho Danube from Turtukai, is not admitted in Allied reports in hand at time of writing. They have undoubtedly made some headway along tho Black Sea coast, but it-is an element in their situation that their flank, where it touches the coast, is weakened by tho fact that Russia holds command, of the sea. Russian, .warships have already bombarded some of tho p6rts occupied by tho Bulgars, and indeed it is reported to-day that the latter are evacuating their own port of Varna. If tho Russians and Rumanians aro simply intent upon holding the Bulgars in play in tho Dobruja, and contemplate offensive action further west, thcro is no reason why they should not retire considerably beyond tho lino which the Bulgara, oven on their own showing, have reached. The Danube constitutes a good defensive lino on tho northern flank of the Bulgarian /advance, and, within limits, by retiring eastward in the area south of the river, "the Russo-Rumanian troops will gain a shorter and more easily defended line. About forty miles cast of Silistria (and it is not established that the Bulgars havo got even as far as Silistria), the Danube is bridged and crossed by a railway running to the Rumanian port of Constanta. Established at a reasonable distance west and south of this railway, the Allies would be admirably placed to make head against tho Bulgar offensive. The position in general is that the Bulgarians aro still far from having directed an effective blow against Rumania, and are as much exposed as ever to converging Allied attacks from north and south. The capture by British troops of the remaining portion of the village oE Ginchy and of ground further south-east, towards Combles, is a big event in the development of the Somme offensive. Its importance is very tar from being measured by tho mero extent of tho ground gained. This success does a crcat deal to clear the way for an attack on the German third dine, or rather third system, of defences, which the Allies have reached or closely approached, on the front between Ginchy and the Somme, and north-west of Ginchy to Martinpuich. Along the whole of this front the German second system of- defences has been completely mastered but in places they still hold intermediate works between the second system and the third. The third system represents the hnal range of'the highly organised defences in which the Germans were established when the, Allies opened their offensive on the Somme. Tho reduction of the enemy third line may be delayed' by the necessity of extending the attack in north and south; and when it is effected it' will not necessarily mean tnat tne encm y' s fronf; has been completely ponotrated, since ho is no doubt constructing supplementary defences in rear. But

there is no reason to believe that these supplementary defences will compare in resisting power with the laboriously constructed works into which tho Allies have now penetrated so deeply, and the outlook is to bo estimated accordingly. Fighting over ground which the Germans hoped they had made impregnable, tho British troops during last week gained from 300 to 3000 yards on a front of 0000 yards. Against difficulties only less formidable, the French made even greater progress. These- arc facts which bring into definite prospect the time when the Germans will fight for life in much less advantageous circumstances than at. present. Predictions must bo accepted with a certain amount of reserve even when they arc made by the most distinguished authorities, but a great deal of weight will justly (reattached to General Brusiloff's expressed belief that the war is already won and that peace will come in August next year. Prooably lew men are better entitled to speak confidently about the larger aspects of the war than the commander of the Russian southern armies. General Brusiloff commanded the Russian army in the Carpathians when the Germans launched their gicat drive of last year which thrust the Russians back through Galicia and out of Poland. Since he succeeded early in this year to the chief command 'of the southern armies ho has. earned fame as the master-mind directing the great offensive which has done so much to undermine the position of the Austro-Germans in the Eastern theatre and pave the way for their ultimate overthrow. After experiencing such extremes of fortune in tho very heart of the Eastern war, General Brusiloff is not likely to formulate or give expression to rash conclusions. His prediction is particularly interesting since this is the first recorded occasion on which one of the higher military commanders of the Allies has committed himself to a definite opinion as to the duration of the war. While the opinion of General Brusiloff is an encouraging evidence of the strength of the Allies' position,, it should not he taken too literally. As Mr. Winston Churchill has sagely remarked, the true motto is to look after the war and then "after the war" will look after itself.