The Dominion. TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1916. THE TRIUMPH OF THE NAVY

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2862, 29 August 1916, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1916. THE TRIUMPH OF THE NAVY

It is .'stirring indeed ;to read the full text of the dispatches from Axvhikals Jellicoe ■ and] Beatty regarding tho Jutland' Battle to bo found in tho papers which came to hand by yesterday's mail. Read together, with tho explanatory comments of naval writers, they convey the impression that even with tho very, full particulars; supplied our cable news. I we navo to adequately appreciate the tremendous importance of tho issues at stake in the battle and the magnitude of tho results achieved. Tho outstanding features of the battle as now disclosed tho complete and convincing evidence afforded of the soundness and accuracy of the anticipations of the British Admiralty as to the vital factors in .the decision of a modern sea battle, and .tho success with which our Naval forces had been organised and trained to meet the conditions x anticipated. Every possible contingency would seem.to have been foreseen and provided against—the enemy with all t-ho advantages of choosing his own conditions failed to spring a singla surprise on the British commanders or to scoro a single tactical advantage that . could bo. attributed to superior judgment or seamanship. Tho confidence that every man or woman of .British birth has always felt in the superiority of the British ships and British sailors was fully justified _by the results achieved under disadvantageous conditions Which almost entirely favoured tho enemy. The idea at one' timo prevailed that tho Germans laid a.trapinto wliioh a section of the British Fleet nearly fell, and escapcd only With serious .losses. Npthing could bo further from the truth. The German Admiral laid his trap, but it' did not deceive Admiral Beatty. 0n the contrary, he not only saw the .trap but he "entered it, and it was because of his daring and skill in appearing to play into tbo hands of the enemy and thus -inducing them to bring the wnole weight of their fleet into the battle to crush him that enabled Admiral 'Jellicoe ■with his great battleships to,.participate in the struggle and make tho test for which the whole world has waited. The; German plan did not tako_ full account of the skill of British seamen 'and their superior discipline, which enabled Admiral Beatty's far weaker force to engage the wholo_ German fleet, outmanoeuvre it, and not only escape the annihilation which theoretically should havo been its lot, but turn the tables on tho enemy. Every test applied proved tho superiority of tho British Fleet—its Admirals and Captains displayed greater skill than the 'enemy; British gunnery Was proved better than German gunnery; and British discipline and morale immeasurably superior .to German._ It is an old story now that the coming of and the mist which in tho closing stages of tho battle, obscured the German fleet enabled it to escape by ignominious flight from tho trap into .which it in turn had | In no single particular did tho German vessels, either as units or as a fleet-, show superiority over tho British. That is a point which should not. be lightly passed over. As to tho final outcome of tho battle, there is no room left for doubt. Tho facts which have gradually como to light disclose it as a British victory from whatever point of view it is regarded. A competent Naval authority, writing in the London Momivr/ Post, sums up tho position vory clearly and emphatically.

It was, ho remarks, a beaten am! ii broken (.Gorman] fleet that escaped tlm trap, It had lost many units, its gunnery had gone to pieces. and Tin one citn blame its discretion if it fairly ran for home and loft tho British Fleet onco more in undisputed command of ths Kortl\ Sea. For that, in a word, was thn result of the battle, What it was the enemy hoped to achieve ive cannot tell. Whatever their effort meant, it failed to shake our hold upon the eea, and Hint is what really matters. We haw fought many indecisive actions, but few in vhioh tbo 6trate«fioa.l result was so indisputable, few which mora fully freed 11.1 of all fear of what the enemy's fleet could dp, It is by such stnndnnls that history judges viotories, and by such standards tho country cherishes thn memory of the men that, prepared and won tlieni. Current opinion will always prefer the test of comparative losses, tiol this he applied, and it will he found that tiio battle off .Tutland will well hold its own against all but n few of our most famous victories—llollo of which we obtained on a first attempt. The samo writer claims that from

another aspect the battle can rank beside any in history. In the fringes of the, fight, in tho work, i thaut is, of cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers, officers and men had chances such as their ancestors never I knew, and they seized them with all the daring, the skill; and tho devoj tion that the greatest of their predecessors could have hoped. From the vigorous offensive against the enemy's cruisers which cost Admiral Arbuthnot his life, to the least conspicuous of tho destroyor exploits, all was of the same pattern. It is impossible to read of what they did and what they failed to do without feeling there'is one thifig at least which the battle has given us, and that is the assuranco that tho old spirit is still alive and vigorous. It is able'and willing to do all.tho old Navy could do, and in tho battle off Jutland, as we" now know, it hnfl dono it. The Naval correspondent, of the London Times writes in a very similar strain. The lessons of tho dispatches, he suggests, are. tho value of heavy guns and discipline.

Tlie more olosely Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch ift examined, ho comments, tho more clearly it demonstrates tliat to the inherited qualities of our 6eamen and their influence was due the course of the battle and its successful issue. . . . It is not disputed that ,in tho very early stages of the.battlo tho Ge»mans reached a high standard, both in tho precision of their movements' and in tho aoeuraoy of their fire. But when the bjg Bhella of the British guns fell on their ships there was a falling- off in technique which can be explained only by loss of nerve and morale. They could not tako their hammering calmly. It is only a force capable of individual sacrifice and unselfish devotion that will desvolop hardihood and confidence, under any conditions. Tho German seamen in til? battle fleet,; as well as those in the battlecruisers, can ■ scarcely cultivate ■ these qualities when their only experience has been to run from tho foe.., . . There is ample ovidence' that the battle was fought and decided with the gun. ... It was the heavy ordnance throughout which got in the effective work, and the superior gun-power and higher technique on the British side 'proved their value.

Tho Lords of the Admiralty—that is to say, tho highest Naval experts of Britain—after examining tho full reports of the Admirals and officers concerned in tho battle, concluded their congratulatory Jettor to Sir John Jellicoe and his Fleet with these remarks The results of the action prove that tho officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study tho new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of tho country were high; they have been well fulfilled. My Lords desire mo to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on- this occasion. Tho words may appear cold and formal—it is not the way of the .Navy to become enthusiastic over its exploits—but perhaps higher praise coul'd not be found coming from such a quarter, than is expressed in tho sentence: "Tho expectations of the country wero high; they have been well fulfilled." What higher tribute could bc_ paid the British Navy than "that it had lived up to its reputation?