PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2859, 25 August 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The, Balkan situation is beginning to take shape, by no,means on the ■ lines forecasted in some recent messages dealing with the Bulgarian offensive. Up to the 'present this so-called offensive has stopped considerably short\of 'effective action. The Bulgarians have extended their invasion of Eastern Mate-. donia, meeting slight opposition. Iheyhave also made ineffective attacks upon the Allied line which faces the Serbian and Bulgarian f von tiers as far east as the Struma valley. _. This epitomises' the activities of the Bulgarians to date, and. it- is clear that they have' accomplished nothing calculated to hinder the Allies; setting their offen-sive-ill motion at the appointed hour. In recent operations the enemy has lost some ground, both east-and west of the Vardar, and lias been repulsed in an' attack on the Allied flank, on the Struma. '.Events disclose no reason for doubtLing the accuracy of statements made m. a. Salonika message to-day, that the Allies have hover intended to conduct operations further east than the Struma valley—which is the most convenient avenue by which to invade Bulgaria—and that tho Bulgarians do not possess a force sufficient to achieve a- real military purpose anywhere. The dominating fact at present visible is that the. Allies have moved out from their compact and 'easily defended Salonika lines and taken up" a much longer front on which thoy immediately threaten an. invasion of Ser-' bia, or Bulgaria, or both. Though they are in position for it, the Al-. lies have not yet definitely opened their offensive, but neither Jiavc their dispositions on this advanced front been' disturbed by. the enemy activities to which so much prominence has recently been given in tlie news.

Crediting fcho Bulgarians with a serious military purpose in their present movement into Greece, it must bo assumed that they hope to embarrass the Allies by menacing the right flank of their advance from Salonika. At present the throat does not look serious. The Allied flank is covered by the line of the Struma, and the formidable obstacle of Lako Ttikhiuo, which is twenty miles long and about two miles wide., Tho Bulgarians could only undertake an attack.on the Allied flank if'thoy were able at thesame time to mako adequate provision for the defence of the long frontier opposite* which General Sahkail has established his forces. The Bulgarians would hardly be in a position _to undertako an aggressive campaign against the Allies unless the strength of their own army— which is probably under 400,000-7 ll.ad boon noarly doubled by outside reinforcement. Even this measure of,reinforcement would fall considerably, short of requirements if Rumania entered tho war on the side of the Allies.

Speculation as to, the probable strength of tho enemy in the Balkans is almost futile, more especially as tho situation promises to develop very rapidly. But it is plain that the probabilities are all against Bulgaria being heavily, reinforced at this stage, cither by the Central Empires or by Turkey. Germany and Austria have never been iii worso case to. send reinforcements

to the Balkans than they arc at the present hour. But for the vital importance of tho issues at stake in the Near Eastern theatre, the possibility of either Austrian or German being devoted in any numbers to assisting Bulgaria could hardly be admitted. That Turkey is able to take any very important part in the Balkan campaign is most' unlikely. According to a Russian estimate, as many Turkish divisions as would represent at full strength about half a million men are distributed between tho Caucasus and Mesopotamia, most of in tho former'region. If.this is anywhero near the mark, Turkey cannot have any troops at disposal for a fresh campaign, more especially as sho has at all times heavy garrisons' to maintain, on the Asia Minor coast and elsewhere. Recently- tho Turks inflicted a not unimportant set-back upon the Russians in Southern Armenia, but the tido seems to have again turned definitely against them in that re-' gion, and it is on all grounds reasonable to believe that they are very fully occupied and in no condition to lend effectual aid to their allies in tho Balkans. German newspapers are said to bo responsible for the ■statement that there are fifty thousand Gormans in Macedonia—riot an impressive addition to Bulgaria's strength—and at time of writing there is not a vestige of ■ cvidenco that Turks arc operating in the Balkans.

Evidence that tho Allies are on the.eve of a drive through the Balkans is not yet absolutely conclusive, though it is in the highest degree suggestive. Sotting aside all the doubtful details which tend to engross attention at the moment, it may be said that abstention by tho Allies from a forward movement in the Balkans would imply an extraordinary limitation of their offensive plans. In the Balkans the enemv is supremely vulnerable. This is truo uoth_ as.regards purely military considerations and tho factor of moral effect. . Taking tho last point first, to tho German pcoplo possession of tho ■ Balkan corridor represents the- visible realisation to an advanced stage •of the Drang nach Ostcn policy, which looks to a. German overlordship of-Central Europe, a throttling grip upon Russia at the Bosphorus, and an assured \gatcway into Asia. An Allied drive to tho Danubo and beyond it would shatter these dreams, and probably would do more to undermine German confidence and fortitude than any event the war has yet witnessed.

The "purely military importance of tho Balkan campaign is best realised by_ considering- that tho Allies are in a position to revive, by an fihvougb. the Balkans, the danger which tho complete domination of tho Italian frontier, scoured to Austria under the Treaty of Prague, -was intended to provide against. Dealing with 'this question some time ago, : the military correspondent of the 'Morning Post remarked that tho policy of Bismarck and Moltke' aimed, as' one object at securing tho prospective Germanic alliance against attack from tho si do of Italy. The danger which might threaten from that quarter if, in a European-war, Italy should be ranged on the sido of Frahce_ was sufficiently obvious. Tho question had been discussed fifty years before by Clausewitz, who pointed out that such an attack would have a decisive effect on operations on the French frontier, because it would strike directly at tho centre of the Austrian Empire. The Germanic Powers would bo obliged to desist from tho. invasion of France, as had actually happened in the campaign of 1797. _ On that occasion, as now, the principal forces were operating in France. The Akchduke Obtables, with about 150,000 men, had defeated the Frcnqh armies pf approximately equal strength, and driven them across tho Rhine; but Napoleon, advancing from Vcnetia towards Vienna with,not more than 60,000 men, put a stop to tho invasion v of France, and dictated conditions_ of peace at Leoben. To provide against this. danger' the complete domination of tho Italian frontier was secured to tho Austriahs under tho terms of tho Trea.ty of Prague..

If was hardly necessary to observe, tho correspondent continued, that Clausewitz's. argument applied equally to the Balkan front, assuming that offensive operations could be undertaken from that quarter. Existing circumstances in tho Balkans give full point to these observations. Assuming elways that the Allies are in the requisite strength—and if they are not it is difficult to understand why they have_ advanced to their present positions—thero is a prospect hot only of the conquest of the Balkan corridor, _ but of a drive into Austria, which might be expected to heavily influon.ee the trend of tho war. One provision tho Germans are said to have made 'against this looming danger is tho elaborate fortification of the SaveDanube front (the northern frontier of Serbia). A formidable barrier no doubt exists at this point, "but a very strong force in men and guns would be required to make it good. Here, as, in regard to the general outlook in the Balkans, ac--ernint must be taken of the extent to which the Central Powers' are involved in the main theatres. Tho 'entry of Rumania would, as one result, dispose of the possibility of an Austro-Gcrman" stand on the SavoDanubo line, since her geographical situation onables her to take this line in flank.

Fhom the Sommo front there is news of another advance towards Thicpval,, one of the most important positions in which tho Germans arc resisting the British thrust northward towards Bapaumc. Sie Douglas Haig's statement that the German artillory was silenced in three different areas by the British heavy guns is all the moro notable since ho reported recently that the Germans/ had materially increased their artillery concentration on the Sommo. British predominance in another vital factor is satisfactorily attested in tho news .that four enemy arcoplancs were destroyed on Tuesday, and numerous others damaged. There is good news also from Verdun, where the Trench have effected another advance bofcween Fleury and' Thiaumont.. This is a detail indication of tho fact that the enemy is compelled to draw increasingly upon other sections of his front in his effort to make good his crumbling front on tho Somme.

A German official statement, admitting that tho Wcstfalen, a Dreadnought of the Nassau class, was torpedoed, but claiming that

she escaped vital damage, conveys disappointing news if it is true. But on its own confession the German Admiralty is quite unreliable in .matters of this kind. The fate of the torpedoed battleship is still an open question.