PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2858, 24 August 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

There does not seem to be much doubt about the fate of tho German Dreadnought of the Nassau class which was twice torpedoed by the British submarine E23, and is believed to have been sunk. The ship was torpedoed a second time after she had been onco torpedoed and damaged, and was making for port under the escort of destroyers. Na-. turally E23 would not linger to observe the final effect of her second blow. It was, in any case, an act of great daring to attack a second time, with the enemy destroyers on her trail, and she would, of course, bo under the necessity of speedily submerging and beating a retreat. A damaged ship torpedoed a second time, would, however, stand a very poor chanco of making port, and there is at least a strong 'likelihood that the enemy fleet has been weakened by tho loss of another capital unit. Tho Nassau class consisted of four ships, Dreadnoughts of 18,600 tons displacement, with a speed of something over twenty knots, and each armed with twelve 11-inch and as_ many 5.9-inch guns. All four ships were commissioned in 1910.

Nothing is said at present about tho _ locality of tho British submarine's exploit, but it was on Saturday that she torpedoed hot enemy, the day on which the "High Canal Fleet," as it is called in ono message to-day, ventured upon a brief excursion into tho North Sea. It therefore seems probable that E23 was operating in the North Sea, and there is a strong likelihood that the balance of losses in Saturday's' affair, instead of being favourable to the enemy, as tho first reports indicated, turned heavily against him. Tho loss of two British light cruisers was in itself serious enough, but five such cruisers could be constructed for less than the capital cost of the Dreadnought Germany is believed to have lost. It is of more practical importance that tho loss of ono Dreadnought by Germany means a- greater reduction of her effective naval strength than Great Britain would suffer in losing two capital ships. Tho possibility appears that on this occasion, as on the much more important occasion of the Jutland battle, tho first Admiralty reports told only part of tho story, and that not tho best part. E23 may, of course, have continued her cruise for a day or two beforo returning to her base.

. Asa'UiiiNo for the timo being that £23 was operating in the North Sea, her exploit raises interesting possibilities, and in particular suggests that the German fleet may henceforth find it necessary to stick even moro closely to its ports, or, at all events, to its mine-defended waters, than it has dono in the past. In spite of their experience in tho Jutland battle, the Germans possibly hope to achieve some advantage in a naval war of attrition. They can hardly hope to achieve in this way results approaching decisive importance, but with tho British Fleet constantly seeking engagement thcro aro certain possibilities of trapping its advanced units or overwhelming them with superior force. Pursuing theso aims, tho High Seas Fleet is bound at times to leavo tho shelter of its minefields, though always, of course, with an eye to a safe retreat, and the E23 incident suggests that such a retreat may not bo easily secured. With its Zeppelins scouting ahead, the enemy fleet is almost able to defy surpriso by surface 6hips, but the danger from submarines is not so easily guarded against. Tho submarine, of course, has !its limitations, but'it is capablo of playing a very effective part in the kind of naval warfaro to which tho Germans arc addicted in the North Sea and tho possession of numerous submarines to some extent reduces the handicap under which the British Fleet labours in its efforts to bring an elusive etiemy to battle. * » # *

A srEECH by Mr. Winston Churchill reviewing tho war situation is in some respects open to criticism. No exception can be. taken to his statement that tho i situation docs not warrant belief in a speedy end of tho war, but tho remark that the Germans were never more numerous or better equipped than they are to"day is certainly wide of the facts. It conflicts with. Mr. Churchill's own statement that tho diminution of German reserves in relation to the growing power of the Allies constitutes a secure foundation for victory. Apparently what he means is that tho German armies in the field were never moro numerous than they are to-day, but even this calls for the remark that if Germany has undiminished numbers in the field, they cannot compare in quality with the armies with which she entered tho war. Germany has sacrificed the flower of her manhood, and there is definite evidence that' she is making increasing use of elderly men and boys. As regards depletion of reserves, she is worse off than France—apart . from the fact that France is now drawing reinforcements from Russia—and infinitely worse off than Russia, 'Britain, and Italy. That she has considerable numbers still at command is obvious. Without accepting the impossible story that she has massed a million and a- half men on tho Somme, it is evident that she Jia's concentrated very powerfully in face of the Allied offensive, and that sho has in part at.least maintained Tier, concentration in tho Verdun region. At the same time there is evidence of a heavy German concentration in Southern Russia. But it remains true that Germany's position to-day is measured not only by the fact that, her reserves have been largely depleted, but by a marked deterioration in tho quality of her armies in the field.•

Much that is contained in" Mr-' Churchill's speech, and in an accompanying speech by Mr. Lloyd George, may be accepted as a graphic presentation of the essential tacts of the war in its present stage. There is no easy triumph in sight, and the further duration of the struggle is uncertain. But Germany has hopelessly lost the tremendous advantages she possessed 5 two years ago. In the grim struggle now in progress the Allies hold the initiative on all fronts. It is no doubt in tho i Eastern theatre that the most rapid movement will be witnessed for Some time to come, but the tremendous power of the "Western Allies is operating to defeat the enemy in a fashion and at a rate which cannot be measured on "the' map.

Available reports from Greece go far to warrant an opinion that tub Bulgarians are ongaged in a dcsperateeffort to hamper and delay an Allied offensive against which they cannot hope to make effective head. A late development, or rather a recent development only now revealed, is the arrival of Eussian and Italian troops at Salonika. This is one more indication that the contemplate an enterprise of magnitude in the Balkans, and probably all doubts on the question will soon be resolved. The condition of Greece is pitiable, but so far as the military outlook is concerned Greece has long ceased to bo a factor of importance except as a possible obstacle, to the free development of the Allied plans. Some Greek troops, in defiance of orders, have gallantly resisted the invaders, but the policy of the Greek Government is one of non-resistance, and the Allies apparently feci justified in limiting the scope of their ' operations purely with an eye to military exigencies and without regard to the Greek interests which the.rulers of Greece have elected not to defend. Bome fighting in Eastern Macedonia is reported to-day, but evidently it is no part of the Allied plan to resist the invasion of that territory. No chango of importance is reported on the line facing the Serbian and Bulgarian frontiers, and it is no doubt an Allied movement in this.quartcr—a movement contingent possibly on Kumanian co-operation —which will dispel the present cloudy uncertainty of the Balkan situation.