PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2856, 22 August 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

How many of the capital units of the German High Seas Fleet are in fit state to put to sea is unknown, and the naval sortie by the enemy reported to-day was not carried far enough to furnish information on the subject. But although the enemy in this latest naval venture kept his heavy ships carefully out of harm's way, the lighter units of the fleets came into touch, with some loss to either side. Two British light cruisers were sent to tho bottom—apparently torpedoed by submarines—and as reports stand there is nothing better to set against tho loss than the coitain destruction of one enemy submarine and the probable destruction of another. A redeeming featuro of the affair is that the British loss of life was not heavy. With tho exoeption of 38 members of the crew of the Nottingham, tho complements of both cruisers were saved. From tho brief reports available it would seem that the enemy, whatever his strength, did not venture very far from his base, and that the British scouts, working ahead of their main fleet, pushed well forward into German home waters. This is implied in tho part played by tho German submarines. It is highly probable that these craft accounted for the Nottingham and Falmouth, but in any ease they were in action with the British scouts, and their participation makes it practically certain that the German excursion was of limited scope. Sub-

marines lack tho speed which would enablo them to co-operato with a battle fleet in an extended cruise.

The lost cruiscrs wore both fine ships of recent construction. The Falmouth was completed in 1911 and was a ship of 5250 tons, armed with eight 6-inch guns. She had a speed of 27 knots. The Nottingham, completed in 19M, was a slightly larger ship, of the Birmingham class,' armed with nine 6-inch gttus, and with a designed speed of about 25 knots, which was probably exceeded in practice. Light cruisers of this typo are well fitted to copc with submarines, but it is probable that the Nottingham and Falmouth were operating in a section of the North Sea where the underwater craft were concentrated in numbers which made them exceptionally formidable. The circumstances as far as Elicy arc disclosed indicate that a bold attempt wt.s made to draw the enemy fleet cut from the shelter of its mine-fields, and the risks of such an enterpriso aro, of course, bound to fall most heavily upon the scouts whose duty *b is to feel the way for the heavier ships. ,In its policy of lurking within a protected zone of mine and submarine defences or only emerging to a distance from which 'a "safo retreat is possible, tho German fleet derives material advantage from the possession of aerial scouts which arc admittedly superior to those of the British Navy. !No doubt the scouts which warned the cnomy of tho near approach of considerable British forecs wore Zeppelins. Inglorious as their reputation is where other activities aro concerned,, tho giant airships hold an unchallenged place as naval scouts. Airship development is being pushed ahead in Great Britain, though exactly what types havo been produced is not known. A recent report spoke of British "Zeppelins," but theso are now said, on the_ authority of the London Daily News, to be really coastal airships, speedy and useful, Tout only half the sizo of tho German Zoppelin, _ and presumably inferior in cruising range. ; In any case, so long as it is served by Zeppelin scouts the enemy fleet is not likely to bo surprised and cut off in 'its occasional excursions into the North Sea. Served by its Zeppelins, it would still bo able to beat a timely retreat oven if the British Navy possessed scouts of equal range and power. Reports frdm Grccce bear witness to an increasing stir of action along the Serbian and Bulgarian - frontiers, but the Allies nave not yet embarked upon a serious invasion of either Bulgaria or Serbia. Recent fighting at various points is evidently incidental to the occupation by the Allies of a lino threatening all tlio main avenues through tEo Balkans, and preliminary to much more important developments. The Bulgarians somewhat grandiloquently announco that they have been forced to take the offensive in order to _forcstall an offensive by the Allies, but it seems unlikely that tliey will attempt to push much further into_ Greece. Tneir best hope, such as it is, must lie in the defonco of their own and the' Serbian frontier, and their prospects in a defensive campaign on the frontier lines are made dubious by the fact that they are liable to be powerfully attacked at any one of several widely-separated' points. No very pronounced development is disclosed in tho Eastern, theatre, but reports of stubborn fighting in the Pripct marshes,; along the lower course of tho Stochod, indicate that the Russians are developing a serious attack upon the northern flank of the Kovel defences. The Aus-tro-Gcrraans have recently laid claim to important successes in tho hill country of south-western Bukowina, but these claims are discounted by tho Russian official statement .that enemy attacks in this region have been repulsed. An optimistic view of prospects' in the Italian offensive is taken by Colonel Repington, who predicts the speedy capture of tho heights feast of Gorizia. These heights protect for the time being the northern flank of the Carso plateau,' between Gorizia and tho Adriatic, across which the Italians havo recently made notable headway. Even , now, with Gorizia captured and the Italians firmly established on the westCm section of the Carso plateau, tile Austrians have a very great adVantage of position, but Colonel Repington apparently believes that •their defences are not as formidably organised on the heights east of Gorizia as tliey were on the heights west and north of that place so long withstood assault. _ Several messages to-day cast additional light upon thonaturo and extent of tho latest Allied successes on tho Somme' front. In themselves they amounted to a considerable invasion of the front north of the river which the Germans are defending with such desperate tenacity, but they-aro still more important as paving tho way for a further advance and bringing perceptibly nearer tho time when the enemy will have to fight in weaker, positions and in country less adapted to defence. As regards a great part of the line north of tho Somme the Germans havo already lost the advantage of position they enjoyed in the earlier stages of tho battle. Tho wedgo which extends east-south-east from Thiepval and covers the approaches to Bapaumo was a particularly valuable asset to the enemy, since it enabled him to regulate his artillery fire by direct observation, while the Allied guns were entirely dependent upon indirect observation. Most of this ridge is now in British hands, and tho enemy's remaining foothold is precarious. It has not been expressly stated that ho has everywhere lost tho summit of the ridge, but this appears to be the case. At all events tho British now hold positions dominating both Thiepval and Martinpuich, the principal strongholds still remaining to the enemy on this section of his line. There is equally good promise in developments on the front extending north from tho Somme and facing east towards Combles. In tho great battlo at the end of last week, and in a further attack reported to-day, the Allies ma do notable progress towards oncireling Gu'illemont and Maurepas, fortified villages covering tho immediate approaches to Combles, and tho conquest of both strongholds seems likely to be achieved very shortly. In the continued progress of the Allies and the methods they have adopted there is a good deal to support tho idea lately advanced that they have solved the problem of compelling the enemy to fight at a disadvan-

tage. It certainly seems to bo fully established by this tlrno that thero G is tho greatest possiblo contrast be- 0 tween tho tactics of the Germans on !: tho Somme and those of tho French j 1 in their defensive battle at Verdun. Whatever the comparative rate of j losses may bo in tho present battle, tho Germans havo only succeeded by j, a prodigal expenditure of lives in j ( restricting the rate of Allied pro- f gress. So long as their reserves i hold out they may bo able to main- t tain an unbroken line even in the ii increasingly unfavourable circum- i> stances in which they aro now fighting. This in any case is problemati- I cal, considering that on sections of a their front the Allies are in close h touch with the enemy's third-lino * positions, and have apparently good j' prospects of cutting disastrously into his communications. It is also a question whether tho enemy can much longer continuo his present 0 tactics on tho Somme without draw- j, ing so heavily upon other sections s of his front as to lay them perilous- s ly open to attack. 1: