PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2847, 11 August 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

|. By the capture of Gorizia and neighbouring positions, the Italians ] lav .° earned the congratulations of their Allies, and dono much- to improve) their prospects of passing from siege operations against hill and mountain strongholds to an offensive undormore open conditions, in which their numbers will tell. The true dimensions of tho Italian victory are now made manifest in official messages, which call in themselves _ for little comment. Fighting with everything in their favour, except, perhaps, that they have lately been compelled to transfer some troops and artillery from the Italian front to' Galicia, the Austrians have suffered tlioir worst disaster of tho campaign. Whatever the immediate effect may be, the capture of Gorizia itself and vital hill positions on tho north, west, and south, along with more than ten thousand prisoners, is an achievement of which the Italians have every right to be proud.

i Just how far tho Italians have removed tho obstacles to an advance eastward, and south towards Istria, will not at once appear. It is clear enough that tho fall of Gorizia does not mean 'that a gap has beon broken in tho Isonzo line, and that the Italians will be ablo to pour through the gap to an invasion of the country beyond. The Isonzo line is not yet completely breached, and a message averring that the Austrians havo abandoned their principal positions on the Isonzo and Carso fronts must bo set aside as an .exaggeration of tho truth. It is in fact contradicted by tho specific details of the official reports. On the other hand the importance and I probable effect of the Italian victory are not to bo measured only by progress on the map. Tho demoralising effect upon tho enemy of nis defeat and the material losses he has suffered in an area where ho had staked very heavily upon an unbroken defence, is bound to exgrt a more or less pronounced influence upon future operations.

Bearing this in mind it is still interesting to consider in its broad features the position which has now been reached. The natural lino of advanco from Gorizia, which stands 4>n low ground, though it is all but surrounded by mountains and hills, is along a valley which extends to the south-east. Through the valley runs a railway to. Trieste, in the northern part of tho Istrian sula. t But it is unlikely that much" progress will bo made along this valley until further strong positions on north and south have been reduced. For instance, opposite, Mount Sabotino, the towering height, which the Italians now hold on tho west bank of the Isonzo, three and a half miles north of Gdrizia, stands the superior elevation of Monto Santo.' Rising just east the river, Monte Santo is nearly six hundred feet higher than Monte Sabotino, and it is a commanding position on tho northern Hank or the valley in which the Italians' arc now established at 'Gorizia.. On the south, also, though 1 the capture of tho Monte San Michelc summits means a notable advance, the Carso plateau still presents an extended range of formidable positions. The Italians, in a word, are in, but not through, the gateway, and it may bo mentioned also that they are separated by •something like 30 milos of difficult Country rrom the railway junction of St. Peter, which tney must reach in order to cut off Istria and other Austrian territory along the Adriatic from railway communication with the interior of the Dual Monarchy. A mere enumeration of the difficulties the Italians have still to surmount will not, however, convoy a just idea of the position reached in tho campaign. Though the Austrians have still a great advantago of ground, it is likely that they will never again fight at such extreme advantage as in the positions from which they have now been expelled. A trausfer of force to Galicia may have contributed to their heavy defeat on the Isonzo, but this loss of strength is not likely to be mado good. As events are moving it is more likely that further Austrian forces may have to be transferred from the Italian to the Russian theatre as tiino goes on. There is no doubt that the Italian victory, in addition to its immediate effect, opens up good prospccts.

In Southern Galicia tho Russians are making splendid headway. Yesterday they reported the capture of Tlumacz, 15 miles east of Stanislau. At time of writing they aro shown to bo nearly a dozen miles further on and separated by no more than four miles from Stanislau, which is one of the most important railway centres south of tho Dniester. A considerable advance has also been mado north of the Dniester, one result of which is to givo tho Russians a.n important section of railway and a bridge across the river. It is not stated that tho bridge was destroyed, but it probably would bo. Oenorally speaking, rapid headway Is being mado in operations which

tend to compel a hasty retreat of the enemy forccs in Eastern Galicia as an alternative to envelopment. The XlistHans claim tho capture of some heights on the southern flank of the lighting front, apparently on the 'fringe of tho main Carpathians range, and in the same report give some account of very heavy fighting on tho Stochod line in Southeri Russia. It need not be doubted that a grim struggle is being waged opposite Ivovel and further south, and apparently the armies ongaged are for tho time being stationaryl or nearly so. But a stationary battle in Southern Russia which leaves the Russians free to make rapid htadway in Galicia certainly affords the enemy no cause for congratulation.

« * « » m The great developments in tho oomme battle which were predicted yesterday have not taken at time of writing, but tho process of breaking into the enemy front at selocted points continues. Tho Anzacs have gained another considerable strotch of ground on the plateau north-west of Pozieres, and therefore towards the flarilc of the fortified village of Thiepval, which is still held by tho enemy, and constitutes rather an awkward corner in the Allied line. Tho French also gained further ground just north of the Sommc.

A P.EPOUT that the Russians in Armenia have evacuated positions north of tho region of Mush and Bitlis implies rather a serious state of affairs if it is literally true. It would mean that very important positions on tho approach to the Bagdad railway have been lost. Possibly, however, only a limited retirement has been made, without sacrifice of any material advantage in position. In its original form the message may have reported a retirement north, "in the region of Mush and Bitlis," a very different thing from a retirement north of that region. « « » • Although no decisivo development is yet reported in the Balkans, tho messages of tho last day or two relating to this theatre are highly suggestive, and indicate that at any hour tho_ Allies may take tho offensive against tho Bulgarians and such Austro-Gorman forces as remain in tho Balkans. A dispatoh from Mn. Wakd Price which w.aa rcceiyed yesterday shows that the Allies _ have moved out from their Salonika lines, and now occupy a front which extends along tho wholo southern frontier of Serbia and onward along tho southern frontier of Bulgaria as far . as the Struma Valley, 40 miles oast of tho Valvar, tho great military avenuo of tho Balkans whioh strikes north from Salonika. Thoro scorns to be no doubt that tho Allied army is now in position along the northern frontier of Greecc, and ready to tako tho offensive. Only local engagements and bombardments havo been reported up to tho present, but at any moment now fighting may open on a much greater scale. Very httlo has beon mado known officially in recent months about tho preparations of tho Allies in tho Balkans, but enough is known to make it likely that this famous land of battles will presently witness events with a not unimportant bearing upon the main trend of tho war. Aocording to somo American correspondents who are possibly wellinformed, it was at first intended that tho offensive from Salonika should precede offensive action in the main theatres, bo as to compel the enemy to dispatoh reinforcements to the Balkans, and weaken his main armies. This project, it is stated, fell through as a result of tho ft mo taken to reorganise tho Sorbian army. Tho task was ono of sbme magnitude in any case, and it was hindered and delayed by an outbreak of cholera amongst tho gallant troops which suffered so terribly in tho retreat _ through _ Albania. Ultimately, it was decided to postpone, action from Salonika until tho progress of events in tho main theatres had compelled a withdrawal of enemy divisions from the Balkans. This statement of _ the position must stand for what it is worth meantime, but it seems plausible.

* « * • The immediate task confronting the Allies is that of forcing a strong frontier which has not many practicable gateways. From the southwestern extremity of Serbia to tho Struma Valley, which affords an avenue into Western Bulgaria, is a distance of about 120 miles. In addition to this front tlio Allies must be holding a line EOjiith along the course of tho' Struma to tho sea, in order to guard their flank against attack by the Bulgarians who have occupied the eastern part of Greek Macedonia. A great part of tho flank, however, is covered by an extensive lake. Whether or not they intend to extend their operations further cast, the Allies, on tho line they are reported to have occupied, are already in touch with tho principal military routes leading into Serbia and Bulgaria. These are the Vardar Valley, which runs up through Eastern Serbia, the Struma Valley (40 miles east of tho Vardar) which provides a routo running north through Western Bulgaria towards Sofia, and the lino of, the Monastir railway, which crosses tho. Scrbo-Grcek frontier 60 miles east of the Vardar. Which of theso lines tho Allies are likely to select for their main advance there are no present means of knowing, and no light will bo cast upon the matter until the offensive has taken definite shape.

It falls to tho enemy to maintain tho avenues named against r direct attack or indirect attack fro::; somo intervening section of the frontier. -Tho Vardar is the ouly one of the thrco avenues which is traversed by a continuous lino of railway. There is no railway in tho Struma Valley and Monastir, the terminus of tho railway to which it gives its name, is only about ten miles bijyond tho Cheek frontier. There arc, however, fairly good roads extending north from Monastir, and oxcellent road systems radiate both from tho Vardar and Struma Valleys. On the whole tho transport conditions in Macedonia are by no means so bad as was at ono time supposed, <ind an important of the Allied preparation at Salonika has been tho organisation of a transport system adapted to Balkan conditions. As to the numbers at disposal there is much reason to beliovo that tho odds will be heavily against tho enemy. Tho Bulgarians may havo a total forco of something between thrco and four hundred thousand men, but somo of these, possibly a considerable number, will bo employed in watching llumania. As reports go, Austro-Gcrman forces in the Balkans havo been rcduccd to 'a minimum. American reports

have placed tho strength of tho Allied army in Greecc at well over 600,000, the total including 130,000 Serbians.