PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2828, 20 July 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A KEi'OET transmitted by way of .Rome that a- general retreat of the Austro-German armies in the Eastern theatre has already begun lacks confirmation at time oi writing, but it is more than likely that it only anticipates events. Apart from this unconfirmed report of a retreat in actual progress, various aspects of the proulem by which the. enemy is faced under the increasing pressure of the Russian armies are interestingly touched upon in the news today, and these items deserve attention. Sweeping successes by the Allies in both main theatres have of lato tended to arrest and monopolise attention in their immediate aspect, but tho larger prospects which are being opened up should not be overlooked, and one of these unquestionably is that of an extended enemy retreat in the Eastern theatre. The recent achievements of tho Allies, following upon tho German failure at Verdun, and the failure of the Austrians in the offensive against Italy, are significant in a degree much exceeding the immediate loss and damage suffered by the enemy. As a German newspaper remarks in an article quoted to-day, the present, for Germany and her Allies, is black. The plan of overwhelming hor enemies in detail with which Germany opened the war has

definitely and hopelessly broken clown, and the German and AustroGerman armies are now meeting one disastrous defeat after another oil the lines of invasion which represent the high-water mark readied in the development of that policy. These facts should spell disaster for the Central Empires in any ease. Ccutainly tliey imply that unless Germany and her partners are content to approach clecisivc defeat by rapid stages they must completely reverse their past policy, and as a corollary contract their operations to the utmost possible extent, with a view to making their diminishing resources last out as long as possible.

A decision by the Germanic Powers at this stage to fall back everywhere upon the defensive and sacrifice much of the territory they have invaded would not necessarily be identified with a policy of despair. It would rather represent an attempt to lengthen out the war in the hope of tiring the Allies and inducing them to grant bettor terms than the Central Empires could otherwise obtain. Hopes of this kind are probably unlikely to bo realised, but they may nevertheless bo expected to give direction to the War policy of the Central Empires in the immediate'future, unless, indeed, popular revolt should deprive the Kaiser and his associates of the despotic power they at present wield. The resources of Germany and Austria are manifestly unequal to maintaining tho conflict on the widely-extended lines on which their armies are now established, and they must speedily contract their operations or rim the risk of becoming involved in an unequal conflict to an extent which would preclude tho possibility of successful retreat. Political as well as military considerations, of course, beaiAipon the enemy's choice of a policy in continuing tho war, and while a contraction of operations is the obvious method of lightening the military load it is an open question whether it could he effected without provoking a widespread anti-war agitaton in tho populations which nave hitherto been deluded with tales of decisive victory and conqucst. Tho moral effect upon tho enemy armies and civilian populations of falling back upon tho defensive would in any case bo grave. In the dark days of last year Eussia was upheld by the knowledge that her armies were retreating to conquer. There will be no such consolation for Germany and Austria. When tho Teutonic armies tall back they will not be retreating to conquer, but only to postpone, and if possible limit, the consequences of defeat.

The necessity the Austro-Gcrmans !>aro under of contracting their operations must bo manifest to all who have followed the leading events of the spring and tho summer as far as it has gone. But it is equally plain that the task which lies ahead of them in attempting to satisfy this necessity is one of extreme complexity and vast difficulty. Wc are told to-day that Marshal von Hindknburg is to direct the operations involved in shortening tho enemy's Eastern front. ' Looking at the map, the shortening of this front would seem to bp a sheer impossibility, more particularly as plans of the Germans are said to contemplate retention of the elaborate defences they have constructed 011 their northem flank, along tho JJwina line, south-east from Riga, Before the present Russian offensive opened the enemy front struck generally- south from the Baltic Provinces to Czcrnowitz, opposite tho frontier of Rumania. This was practically the shortest front the enemy could hope to gain in the Eastern theatre, unless by retiring from the Baltic Provinces to the East Prussian frontier. It is an additional advantage frop the. enemy standpoint that this lino is divided by the Pripet marshes, a hundred miles or more of comparatively dead ground. Recently the Austriaus have been driven back seventy miles in Southern Galicia, and the enemy front further north has been deeply indented by Russian attacks. It remains true, however, that so long as tho enemy retains his present positions in the Baltic Provinces he cannot effect any extended retirement in tho Eastern theatre without greatly lengthening' instead of shortening his front.

Making such a retreat, he would have to look for advantage in tho first place to accentuating tlio Russian problems of transport and supply, while at the same time greatly lightening his own. If he can leave such a trail of destruction and devastation behind him as the Russians did last year, tho Russian advance will be greatly hampered; while on the other hand his own armies will reap material advantage from each approach to their own system of strategic railways, and the Hues which have been extended from this system into Russian territory. The river lines which the Russians defended so stoutly year are also N an asset to the enemy, but they will not afford him a shorter'front than that upon which his armies are now meeting a succession of defeats. In spite of this, the Austro-Gernian armies would no doubt be betteV placed to resist attack and prolong tho war if they occupied lines much nearer to the German eastern frontier, and along the Carpathians on the south, but whether they can effect such a retirement without disaster is another question. By laying tho country waste behind them they can very materially hamper the advance of the Russian main armies, but they havo to reckon also with tho powerful and mobile Russian cavalry which has played a notable part in the offensive as far as it has gone, and may play a still greater part when the enemy is in the throes of a general retreat.

From the point of view of lengthening out the war, the enemy would gain moro obvious advantages by a retreat in France and Flanders than in the other main theatre. There are, of course, the inevitable disadvantages. Such a retreat would havo a disastrous moral effect upon German and foreign public opinion and would entail the resignation of important coal and iron areas and manufacturing districts included in tho invaded territory; but- a ment to a line extending south from tho Dutch frontier would reduce tho length of the enemy's front in tho Western theatre by about one-fifth. If it is to bo tho policy of Germany to fight tho war to the last ditch, a retreat to this line will no doubt bo attempted sooner or later. Meantime, however, tho enemy shows no inclination to retreat, save under irresistible, assault, in tho Western theatre, and as indications go it /is in Russia and Galieia that the first

great step by the enemy in the way of lightening his burdens at the price of retreat is likely to be witnessed.

All the news in hand relating to the Sonune battle may be called good, though it includes the announcement that the Germans have opened a heavy attack upon the now British positions in the vicinity of, Longueval— where the enemy's line has thus far been most deeply penetrated. It is possible—reports as yet are brief—that this attack represents the most powerful effort yet made, by the Germans to stem the Allied offensive, but it has been so long delayed as to suggest that it is now undertaken more from imperative necessity than choice. Apart from this new development, the British) have added to their gains in the Ovillers locality, and further reduced the danger of a damaging counter-at-tack upon the flank of the wedge driven into the enemy line. The French have again occupied the village of Biaches, directly opposite Poronnc, which was recently recaptured by the Germans.

Political contention is raging in Great Britain on, the subject of the Mesopotamian campaign, but the issues as yet are only in part illuminated. The rather damaging admission is made by Me. Asquith that transport arrangements were overtaxed as a result of seven divisions instead of two being employed in an effort to relieve General Toavnshend's division at Kut-el-Amara. This rather suggests that one mistake was piled on another, sinco the seven divisions outside Kut were more important than the one besieged in that place. Mero numerical strength must b-avo been of little use in the absonco of adequate transport organisation, and a force hampered in this way is necessarily to some extent ondangered. The mistake made in saddling General Townshend with an impossible task was not rectified bv ill-concertcd measures for his relief. More light may be cast upon these matters in the impending Parliamentary debate. Meantime the Prime Minister's statement indicates that-every-thing possible is being clone to remedy defects in the transport organisation and medical arrangements.