PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2809, 29 June 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

At time of writing _no more definite evidence is furnished than was available yesterday that this Allies are about to launch an offensive in the Western theatre. The | negative character of the news is the less conclusive, however, siuce the story .of rcccnt ovents, particularly on the British front, is evidently only partly told. There aro further references, from different sources, to'an intense bombardment of various soctions of the German lines, but at the moment no mention is made of any infantry activities subsequent to, the successful raids of Saturday night. It is improbable that the policy of extended raiding has been suddenly dropped, and it is possible that fuller information might show that the pressure brought to bear upon the enemy has not only been maintained but materially increased. It is certain at least that conditions of extreme tension exist, and it seems much more that _ the outcome of these conditions will bo an explosion of battle than that a return will bo made' to what passes for calm on tho fighting,front. In France, judging by some newspaper comments cabled, the same state of mingled uncertainty and expectancy exists as has been created by tho fragmentary but suggestive news allowed to pass over the wires to this end of the world.

A lull continues at Verdun, and reports toll of a slackened bombardment and of an unchanged situation at Floury, where the Germans have thrust a wedge into the French dcfcnccs cast of tho Mouse. It would fcom that no powerful counter-attack is contemplated by tho French. If tit had been the effort would presumably have been put forth before now, so that the fullest advantago might be taken of the more or less exhausted condition to which the enemy was reduced at tho end of his last great attack. The French aro standing fast in what remains of their defences,' and it must bo assumed that they either intend to fight the battle to a finish under the conditions which have hitherto ruled or look to Allied action elsewhere on tho Western front to compcl a halt in the German attack. _ The ierms in which the situation is "touchpd upon in a- French semi-offi-cial statement are not particularly hopeful, as they bear upon tho probable retention or loss of Verdun. It remarks that the oncmy broke into tho Thiauraont-Flcury sector at a cost of sanguinary and completely disproportionate losses. No, more is claimed than that tho Germans aro momentarily exhausted. But for tho fact that the British Army is threateningly astir, this, in the circumstances, would almost be equivalent to a- forecast of the intention of the French to allow Verdun to pass to the enemy—at a price.

Tee significance of the existing situation—the French standing on the defensive and making no attempt to counter tho enemy blow, and an expectation evidently entertained that tho enemy will presently renow his attack, and attempt to drive it home—is all the greater since there is really no definite reason for assuming that a British offensive will synchronise with a culminating 'threat to Verdun. The British Army, if it is about to strike, is jiist as likely to strike after the enemy has entered the town of Vcr'dun as'before. The whole underlying idea of the French defensive battle is that the enemy is incurring a colossal sacrifice' of lives, and winning no commcnsurato advantage, cither by cutting down French manpower to anything like the same extent or in bis limited gain of ground. It is reasonable to suppose i that the Germans have hardly over suffered heavier losses in comparison to those of the French than in tho assault which gained them a footing in Floury village. Their troops were swept away in masses in a long series of abortive attacks before the survivors broke through to a limited succcss. It is presumably under' somewhat similar conditions that jtho battle will be resumed,'and it ' Is quite possiblo that the disparity in losses is sufficiently pronounced to make the French willing to con'fcinuo the defonsivo battle instead of taking tho offensive, even to tho point of losing Verdun. AVuilb it cannot be assumed that early events at Verdun, whatever direction they take, will determino British action, it is still not unlikely that the stir of action along the "British front may presently develop into a great battle. Apart from what is known about tho advanced state to which the preparations of tho Western Allies have been carried, and fto extent to which they surpass the enemy in aggregate strength, there is no reason to doubt the truth of reports that German troops to a considerable number "have recently been transferred from the Western theatre to Russia. To tho Allies generally this should spell

[ opportunity, an opportunity which I they will turn to full Account only I by as vigorous action in all theatres .'is the Allies arc already taking in Russia, and in Italy. Permitting the enemy to transfer troops to Russia without subjecting him to the maximum possible strain in the Western [theatre the Allies arc making only | partial use of the opportunities I that lie to their hand. Tho existing I state of affairs is therefore unlikely to last long. While the British Army is restricted to comparatively minor activities, the maximum possible strain in the Western theatro Is far from having been imposed. Belief that an offensive stroke in the West is probably imminent docs not rest upon any assumption that the Allies are on the immediate eve of an attempt to finally and decisively defeat tho enemy, but rather upon the fact that offensive action ii.r the West would naturally round off the activities in progress in other theatres. The extent to which the Germans aro committed at Verdun is a modifying factor, but it is still not ]to be supposed that the British Army will continue loug to play a secondary part, while tho Russians and the Italians are extended in attack. i

Late reports, while they disclose no change of major importance in tho Western theatre, demonstrate that increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon tho enemy along tho British front. Sir Douglas Haig reports that all along the line British patrols are actively raiding the enemy's trenches, and detailed accounts of the earlier raids, including those in which Anzac troops were engaged, show that tho Germans are passing through a nightmare experience. Botween raiding and bombardment they can hardly be in very good heart for battle. Both on the British front and at Verdun small German attacks are reported, which did not succeed.

Tdeeb is no doubt that the Austriansi aro boing driven back upon .the Trentino frontier, from which they emerged a month ago to a limitod invasion of Italy, but as to tho progress and nature of events in this region it is still necessary to make a selection between Austrian and Italian reports. The Austrians deny the truth of Italian reports, and_ advance sweeping claims regarding a deliberate and unhampered retreat made without loss of men or material. The Italians tell a still more circumstantial story of rapid progress in victorious fighting, Dut it must be 'admitted that tho particulars they have thus far .given arc largely geographical. Tho Austrians undoubtedly protest too much—their story, at its full face value, is incredible—but it is possible that the Italians have in places been less heavily opposed than the goneral tenor of their reports would 'indicate. Their account of progress made at all events stands uncontradictedj and it indicates that tho Austrians have lost _ already onehalf, if not two-thirds, of the Italian territory thoy had occupied. Arsiero, as well as Asiago, has been recovered, and tho details in an Kalian communique show that tho Austrians now hold, at most, a narrow strip of Italian territory little more than twenty miles in lengthj along the south-eastern frontier of the Trentino. At' its widest the strip is about six miles across, and in places it is much narrower.

While tho Austrian retreat is a plain and unmistakable confession of failure in the immediate enterprise to which it sets a period, one of its effects will bo to release a considerable body of Austrian troops for service elsewhere. It is hardly to bo expected that tho Italians will penotrate far into tho Trentino in the near future. As a place of refuge for army this great tangle of mountains coulcl not well bo bettered, and tho Austrians will need no such force to fight a holding battle in mountain positions as they employed in their unsuccessful offensive. It is stated that something like 16 divisions, including many first-lino troops, and drawn from Galicia and tho Balkans, were assembled in the Trentino in readiness for the offensive. Now that it has failed, some part of what remains of these 16 divisions may be needed to stiffen the defonce of tho Konzo line and other sections of the Austro-Italian front, but some of them will no doubt be transferred to Russia. This .may heighten the need for such action by tho Western Allies as would tend to compel a maximum German concentration in France and Flanders.

Meantime there are much more promising reports from Russia'than were available yesterday. The critical area of lato has been that which lies north .and south of tho Lusk-Kovel_ railway, a line running about 40 miles north of the Galician frontier. General BrusiliOitf reports that - numerous attempts by German infantry to toko tho offensive in this region have been easily repulsed, and his reference to tho Eiver Stocbod indicates that tho Russians remain in,or very near to, the most advanced positions reached in their offensive. This means that they are Within about twenty miles of Kovel junction. For the timo they aro stationary and fighting hard—tho character of the front and of the operations would hardly permit anything in the nature of a lull —but tho official report implies that they arc easily holding their own. A report that tho Germans have 100,000 men at work, prisoners and others, .throwing up a ramge of defences at Kovelt.en miles long, suggests that they have no great conndeuce. in their ability to > hold the Russians on tho present lino of contact.

An unofficial report tells of developments further south, in Galicia and Bukowina. The Cossacks, it is said, have crossed the Dniester, south-west of Buczaez, and arc threatening the junction of Kolomea, in north-western Bukowina. Tho Russians are already approaching Kolomea in a westward advance across Northern Bukowina. Tho suggestion now is that the Cossacks, striking south, will outflank the lino of tho Cherniava. This river is a tributary of the Pruth (on which IColomca stands), and enters it east of Kolomea, The Cherniava would constitute a good defensive line covering-Kolomea on the cast, but'for the fact that tho Cossacks aro moving so as to get behind it from tho north.