PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2800, 19 June 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Speculation on the subject of a general Allied offensive this year is necessarily to a large extent in the air. The Allies naturally keep a strict guard upon tho secret of their intended policy in the immediate future, and though many signs point, to the imminence of a great concerted attack upon the enemy an element of uncertainty , remains as to what the Allies will attempt this year towards bringing him to defeat. That the year will witness fighting upon an unprecedented scale, both in the main theatres and in a number of minor theatres, may be taken for granted, but, in spite of a clear and general recognition that development on these lines is inevitable, there is a sharp division of opinion amongst experts who have discussed the conditions and prospects of the grand offensive to wnich the plans of the Allies ultimately tend. It is considered by one school that the Allies may find it necessary, to light a delaying war for another year, or even two years, in order to fully uichieve their end, while the other; holds that the way to win the war.is to adopt more immediately aggressive tactics. There is a good deal to be i said on cither side, but an attempt to definitely weigh the merits of these conflicting opinions would only bo possible if much fuller, information wero available in regard to tho dotail facts upon which tho

I opinions are respectively based. Since many vital facts are withheld from public knowledge tho i layman is confronted by two greatpossibilities with no- certain means of judging which of them, is most likely to be realised. The coming months may be devoted to an attempt to completely overwhelm tho enemy or, on tho other hand, the Allies even now may contemplate covering this year only a portion of the ground that separates them from their goal.

With matters in this state it is interesting to find a military writer of the standing of Colonel RepingTON taking such an optimistic view of tho prospects opened by tho Russian offensive. Tho military correspondent of The Times is one of those who" have taken a very cautious and almost dubious view of the prospect of an early Allied offensive. in all theatres, and particularly in regard to offensive action by the Western Allies.- Writing in the middle of April, with the cnomy on the British front as his immediate topic, ho expressly refrained from stating an opinion as to whethor tho British Army had been raised to such a strength as would warrant an offensive in the near future, and his accompanying remarks seemed to indicate a 'measure of doubt as to whether the . requisite' pitch of strength had been achieved. Again, at the end of April, in a similar articlo on the Russian front, Col. Repington wrote much as in tho cabled summary which appears today about the depletion of von Hindenburg's reserves, but his concluding passago ran:—

Germany, in effect, has reached, and from military, pride lias overstepped, the culminating point of victory. Now it is our turn, but we must not imperil our success by premature attacks before wo possess the superiority of numbers and armament necessary for a crushing victory, and for a continuous offensive. Whether 1916, 1917, or 1918 will give ua this superiority it is for tlio Allied staffs to decide, but. history will never forgive us if, out of sheer-' impatience and war-weariness, we hazard a hjrilliant future and an assured victory by engaging upon a general offensivo before our hour.

Judging by his cabled remarks, Col. Repington has now cast his doubt-s behind him or perhaps it would be fairer and nearer the facts to say that he now feels free to speak openly and without reserve about matters to which, because of his special knowledge and resultant sens© of responsibility, he has hitherto . felt bound to refer only in strictly guarded terms.

_ Colonel Repington, at all events; ia ono of those who consider that the Russian thunderstroke has given tho signal for a general Allied onset. The Allies, ho says, are moving at last, and vre must look far if we/wish to embrace the horizon which will soon be aflame. There is certainly nothing in Hie news;as it stands to invalidate this estimate of the position reached and prediction of impending events. The signs are propitious for, the Allies whatever their immediate intent as regards the major affairs of the war niay be. The Russians' are pressing forward victoriously, and adding daily to their haul of prison: crs and material. The original speed of their onslaught has certainly slowed, but all accounts agree that ,they are ' driving _ irresistibly forward in the several piercing and flanking movements which they have set in motion botween the Pripet Marshes and Rumania. Detailed news of _ the position reached' at Ozernowitz is lacking at tithe of writing. One report states that the Aijstrians have evacuated tho city. There .are other suggestions; . which go to show that the success of the Russian efforts in this region,' if not yet fully attained, is-not likely to be long delayed. The Austrians, it is stated, have only delayed equating Ozernowitz because 1 they are engaged in removing valuable material. Wonders were "accomplished by the Russians during their, great retreat last year ,in fighting rearguard and delaying actions to cover the removal ■. of material— notably in the defence of; the Przemysl salient for twelve" days, when the whole weight of Mackensen's forces was thrown against the armies holding the San—but the ["Austrians seem to be in no condition to emulate these heroic feats of their adversaries, and the attempt they are making at Ozernowitz may very possibly culminate in disaster. '

_ Particular interest is given to tho present aspect of the. Italian campaign by a message from Home, which again raises the idea that" the Austrians are taking big risks. in the hope of gaining a in the Italian theatre as an alternative to slowing down and transferring some .of the troops engaged there to Galicia. The idea is not new. It has been -raised before, and has been somewhat discounted by conflicting reports that the Austrians are in fact transferring reserve divisions from the Trentino "' to Galicia, where they are certainly badly needed. But the idea that the enemy, in spite of the .debacle 'in Galicia,_ is ,taking risks in the hope of gaining a decision : against Italy gains colour from the latest reported fapts of the Italian campaign. There is no need to review the news iii its details here, for no particularly noteworthy alteration of the front is recorded. The essential fact is that the Austrians are attacking in powerful force along practically the whole front on which they have, emerged from' the Trentino or approached its confines. A series of heavy battles is being fought in _ which, according, to Italian official reports, the, enemy has nowhere gained any permanent advantage in recent fighting. , i? V . * ti

At one point, . south-west of Asiago, ho temporarily gained possession'of a height, only to be dislodged by a counter-attack, and olsewhere the Italians have gained a number of positions. The persistence with which ,the Austrians are attacking, in spite of their illsuccess, goes far to justify' an opinion that tlicy aro in fact striving desperately for a decision against Italy. The discovery of such an intention by the enemy would, of course, fully warrant the Italians electing to fight generally on the defensive for the time being. This not because the scope of their resources is likely to reduce them without alternative to such a course, but because thoy aro bound to prefer a comparatively open conflict on existing lines t9 launching an offonsive, - which, if it were crowned with the fullest success, would bring them presently to a resumption of tho slow and costly undertaking of forcing their wa,y once more into the fortified mountain line from which they were lately ejccted. As news stands, tho Austrian ontorpripc looks like a particularly desperate kind

of forlorn hope, with exceedingly poor prospects of success, apd Italy meantime is doing much more for hor own cause and that of the Allies at large than if her soldiers were retracing their steps into the mountain passes and over tlfe high altitudes of the Trentino. •

At time of writing no event of outstanding importance is reported n i the Western theatre—a stato of affairs which obviously will not continue very long unless expectations now entertained are ill-founded. If a general Allied offensive is imminent then it is in the Westorn theatre that the enemy will be most powerfully attacked. The idea is gaining ground that the enemy is sacnnping prospects and taking risks in the Eastern theatre for the sake of continuing the attack on Verdun and generally maintaining a powerful body of strength in opposition to tho Western Allies, apd that he is retaining the bulk of his ayailalo reserves for service, in the West. That these arc broadly the conditions existing need not be doubted, and though the mere expectation of an Allied offensive is to affect the enemy's dispositions it would seem that at least powerful action by the Western Allies is needed to prevent any material departure from a distribution ot tho German forces which will afford reasonable scope to Russia. ''

■ Meantime there is the usual story ot heavy bombardment at various points,_and tho French. success at Mort Homme, reported at tho end ot last week, is confirmed. The i-'rench also report a highly success-, iul raid in Alsace. A party penetratecl to tho Gorman second-lino liefences and returned with prisonors and with its own numbers undiminished. It is an incident suggest™at;tho Germans have perhaps effected their concentration at Vordun at some cost in security on other sections of their line. Striking testimony to the power of the British, artillery is borne in a message relating to tho recovery of the ground on the eastern face of the Ypi'es salient, in which tho enemy recently gained a. temporary footing. Though tho occupation by the Germans lasted for days, so effective and deadly an artillery fire was maintained upon them during that period that they were unable to consolidate the position, or even to remove tho British stores and ammunition which the trenches contained, and these, last were, recovered when the Canadians drove homo their counter-attack. Convincing evidenco is thus supplied of a mighty power, held comparatively in leash. ■

As time goes on it bccomcs no easier to fathom tho motives inspiring the Germans in continuing their costly, and most unpromising attack upon the Verdun salient. It has been claimed by some German publicists that this enterprise is exhausting the powers of the French Army, and dislocating the Allied plans for' an offensive, but there is no reason to believe that it is serving these purposes; and on present indications cogent evidence should soon be provided to the contrary. Already, indeed, the extent to which the Germans are engaged in tho West is of visible 'aid and service 'to Russia, and we have very strong grounds for believing that the theory, that the Verdun assault is serving to upset the Allied offensive plans is a delusion which may comfort the people of the Central Empires until they are undeceived, but is not likely 1 to serve any other purpose. The theory is founded upon an initial assumption, perilously like an absurdity, that _an ! inferior army can profit by fighting at a disadvantage against a suporior '.army. It was estimated some tame ago that the Allied superiority l in numerical strength in the Western theatre was at least fifty per cent. The estimate was conservative, and with the introduction- of Russian troops and late important additions r to the British strength, it is tolerably certain that the Allied superiority is now materially greater. It is in the light of this Allied superiority that the bearing of the Verdun battle—in which the Germans havo lost much .more heavily than the defending arm}'—must be considered. The weight: of. the Verdun assault, for what it is worth to the enemy, falls immediately upon the French, but it is not only with the French that .he has to reckon, but with the whole of the Allied armies in the West, directed and controlled by a single will. Late news intimates that the Germans are developing another t violent offensive against, the Verdun front on the eastern side of the Meuse. It is perhaps worth while repeating, at this juncture, a statement which has been made beand carries conviction. The best proof that the German attack on Verdun is not an impediment, but an assistance, to the plans of the Allies, is that they have allowed the battle- to continue for months on its present Hues, though they possess, at the lowest computation, a fifty per cent, superiority of force and could at any time have opened an offensive which would'have compelled an immediate dispersion of the -German effort.

Any consideration o£ the prospects of an Allied must take account of the possibilities of action through, the Balkans. If matters go as well with the Allies in Turkey and the Balkans as they promise to at present, tho prospect is opened up of- a powerful thrust, at' tho Central Empires where'they are weakest, by a movement through the Balkans into Hungary. To an early realisation of this possibility the co-operation of Kumania is.perhaps essential, and in this connection tho eager interest ; manifested in that country in the progress of the Russian offensive, and particularly' in the 'movement against Ozernowitz, is suggestivo and tends to support a belief that Rumania is in fact biding her time and_ awaiting l,hc favourable moment which is now at hand. News from Greece is a little complex at tlio momont._ It is stated that complete demobilisation of the army has been ordered, and at the same time that a conflict between Greeks and Bulgars has occurred in Eastern Macedonia. Pos-. sibly the Greeks were irregulars. The attitude of the Greek Government,is unsatisfactory, but the Allies seem to be acting with decision by pressure of blockade and otherwise, to clear their skirts so far aa, Greece is concerned. On the whole the outlook in. the Near East; as elsewhere, is promising. Very probably a desire to hinder Italy - from participating in concerted Allied action in and beyond the Balkans supplies one motive for the continued Austrian offensive on the Trcntino front.