PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2799, 17 June 1916, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

News from Russia ,is as good as ever..- 'While the communiques tell of a continuous tid& of success against. the sady demoralised Aus-tro-German armies, thefe are unoffi-. cial statements that-the Russians are across the Pruth at Ozemowitz, and are rapidly closing in on the junction 1 of Kovel, south of'the Pripet marshes. Lemberg also is regarded as imminently threatened. The Russians, in fine, are in a fair way to recover many" hundreds' of square miles of theii? own and the enemy's territory, out of which they 'were driven last year, and it would seem tha,t the .enemy's present activities orti' the 'fouthcrn-Ufroht. ars the nature'of a., desperate effort'to.-or: ganise an." orderly retreat.' The extent and nature of the demoralisation into which' .the were thrown-by- the initial shock' of the Russian offensive is exemplified in some figures given in a message published as; ...'late' news- yesterday. During the first week of the' offensive l'ipiOOO Austrians and Germans were taken prisoner,- 'while'the' coincident losses in killed and .wounded totalled .only 25,000. The normal proportion in-; the Austrian Army— and the proportion- is high when a comparison is instituted with other armies—is four killed and wounded to one prisoner. On this occasion there were five prisoners for each man killed-or wounded. No better proof 'could' b& desired than theso figures afford that: the Austro-Ger-man defence _ collapsed in ruin before the Russian onset, and- that soldiers who might have put. lip.a good fight if they had been well led and directed were captured in droves. The: state, of affairs that existed may be in 'part.explained by ;the incom< petence and cowardice' of the Austrian officers, of -which reports -tell, but we must assume, in addition, gross incompetence on the part' of the enemy's high command. It promises well for the; future that such a debacle should be possible in the ease of Austrian armies with a ten per cent, stiffening . of. Germans in. the ranks, and a twenty per cent, stiffening of German officers. Now that the enemy is offering something in the nature of an organised resistance to the Russian advance, the ratio of 'killed and wounded to prisoners will no doubt be.altered, The latest report in hand at time of writing states that Geneiiai. Bkusilofi' now holds over 150,000 prisoners,'. and while gathering in the. last 25,000 the Russians have probably placed a much larger proportion of the enemy lion de. combat than in the earlier stages of the offensive. On the other hand, if full success should be .attained in the encircling movement against Czernowitz, which now promises so well, the total of prisoners would be at once very considerably augmented.

Though unofficial neivs runs somewhat ahead of the communiques >in regard to the movement against Czernowitz and other sections of the offensive,, there is "no particular reason to doubt its accuracy; Russian official reports are very, frequently withheld or restricted to the' barest summary until a particular operation has been carricd to a point of

definite succcss. To-day unofficial news states that .the Russians ha'., captured the bridge-head on C Pruth at Czernowitz and .entered ! north-eastern suburbs of the to v. which stands on the south bank... tho rivor. As to tho turning movement from the north, it is reported that the -Cossacks' advance, guards have..; reached ..Wachkorits,.. so.uth of Sniatyn. ' This, if true, means that the Russians are astride the Pruth, and tho main railway supplying Czernowitz twenty miles west of tho town, .and.- have- ponetrated n few miles into the: country'to the south. A report-that the fall of Kovel, a railway junction south, of the Pripet marshes, is imminent, speaks for itself. The Russians are advancing, on Kovel along the railway from Lusk, and are' also rapidly clearing the country to the' south. # # ■# *

Some fighting is reported on tho northern half of the Russian: front, but m itv is described at the moment, it cannot be classed as a German counter-stroke, or even counterdemonstration, to the llussian stroke in the south. South-west of Lako Narotch (east of Vilna), the Russian trenches were'bombarded, but, subsequent attempts by the Germans to attack were crushed at their incepFurther south, at .Barano-vitehi,-which is the first main railway junction north of the Pripet marshes, the Russians took the initiative. They captured some of the enemy trenches, bub afterwards retreated, to. their . former positions.' Their action presumably was on the lines.of the 'raiding, which has become a standing feature of the warfare on the Western front, and in which" our soldiers arc very much more enterprising and successful than- the enemy. N ... With every day .that the, Germans remain inactive on the northern front, an opinion seems better justified that they are incapable of delivering there any •such powerful stroke as the case demands, .and that the Russians have not attacked in the south without making-full and adequate provision for'the defence of the 1 northern section of their? front,-.-..- •.-■■■• ,

. As much,' indeed; might almost be taken " for granted, and if some information lately'made public by tho ■Times's military, correspondent is reliable, burden- imposed on tho Russians in securing their.northern front may.,not. be.so great as.at one time..it promised" 'to ', be. Colonel .Repington states that in tho spring the.Germans' werO holding the' front of 450 miles from Riga, to the Pripet marshes south of Pinsk, with 48 divisions of infantry, and ten of cavalry, to which he allows in the aggregate a strength ~of .about 1,200,000, and a combatant strength in rifles of a little over half this number. Thus, in combatants, ho adds, the German armies in Russia have but 1300 men per mile over tho front as a whole, and it is remarkable that eight of the cavalry divisions are in . the trenches, and that, cxcept a, couple of cavalry divisions and one infantry brigade, there is n'o reserve in the ha-nds of either the .army commanders or of Marshal ■von 'Hindendorg, whose control extends over the whole front. Though tho bulk of the German forces arc, of were, in the . spring, in the trenches, . were not, of course, even during' the winter and spring dispersed along the'front at tho rate .0$ .considerably less than a man a yard! -! vTheir'.ljn.a'Jonsis'ts of a'series of fortified .posts, with, the intervening spaces thinly held. Colonel Repington thinks it may be open to von Hindenburg to'draw a fe'w ,divisions o.ut .of Jus line, and use them' • for' some offensive or .defensive-,pur-pose,..but-obviously .-.possibilities in this direction are strictly limited. The Germans are riot established on any natural line of resistance, ajid apart from a certain advantage of railways their ability to hold their line depends on the fighting power of the armies with such assistance as is derived from a free use of barbed wire and a heavy concentration of artillery and machine-guns.

, As' their dispositions on this front are described the Germans seem not only to Jack the ,body "of force essentialto a powerful offensive, ■ butto be ill-placed to themselves withstand'attack when the Russian of-fensive,-at its appointed time, ex-, tends to the north. . There can he littledoubt_ that von llinde;nbukg's prdjecW,^'ayc..'Jj!fieja'^,r^k4dy'ly !? tTie' prodigal 'expenditure o'Oives'in the' ■Western- theatre, which has robbed : him of reserves.; It is unlikely that the - position' has' 'been changed for the better, from the German standpoint, during the last month or jtwo. yerdun. continues, to'demand its'toll,' and may be expected to do so for some time'to come, and if there had -been:-.good German reserves available -in: the {interior • de*' !;pots they.'-would presumably • have made their'appearance before now on the northern Russian front. On visible evidence .von Hindenbubg is at a standstill for lack of reinforcements. That the enemy armies in the south are not better off ; than those in the north has been very .convincingly demonstrated, of late, and here also, of course, the factor of reserves is supremely important. According to one message to-day, Austria has Ordered a third, revision of the lists of men- of 18 ; to 50 years of age. Thus it. is proposed now to enrol, men-who..hayc. twice been rejected as unfit- for service, including some- who are -in any case incapacitated'by age from becoming really useful soldiers.' The' avowed aim-is not to use these men in -the field, but to retain them in the interior., 'depots, thus releasing others for service.. ' But ' the process in any case is one of winnowing over rejected material, and it is likely that tlie' men obtained will be a source of weakness rathei- than of. strength. # ' # ' 9 ft

An element of conjccturp is involved in attempting to 'estimate the depiction of the enemy's reserves, but the. inaction of ?tke 'Germans oil the .northern Russian front, the plight of the Austro-Gcr-inans in the south, and the recruiting measures, now taken in Austria arc striking additions to an-'accu-mulating body of:evidcncc that his effective reserves are at a low ebb. He needs, in all theatres and. particularly in Russia, an nmple supply of men of a high physical'stan'clard,. able to endure the utmost rigours of battle, to withstand the fatigue of forced marchcs, to get along on scanty food, and, in fact, to boar up under the hardships and eircumstanccs of the severest campaigning. Old men, boys, and weaklings will not do for the work that lies ahead, and already we have 1 good.ground, for assuming that the samand in the Central Empires for men of the stamp, required has ma'tcrially outrun' the supply. ■ It has been observed, by Germans themselves that the-age to which physical efficiency, on the average,- endures is dccidcdly- lower'in Germany than it

(is, for instancc)Jn Great Britain, i'he same applies'.to some at least of ■•is States comprised in the Dual . unarchy, and these facts impose -net limitations' upon the possible ~gqi)o, of .recruiting in tho Central I -Umpires, and, as a corollary, brighten the prospects of the Allies in the waiv

■Tub vitality of . the French defence at Verdun is demonstrated in the capture of a German trench on the southern slopes of Mort' Homine, west of the Mouse. The exact position in this -locality is not . quite clear. With the Germans actually on the southern slopes of this famous hill, it is not easy to seo how the French havo remained established oil their neighbouring line, but evidently the line is for the time being, substantially intact. There are predictions of another great assault on the positions east 1 of the Mcuse, where the Germans are striving to reach the Fleury ravine from cm • aux ' 1G e > and by way or ihiaumont farm on the north. Though in- each of these 'localities they have' penetrated the' French ! ine , l -° an extent, .they are still' w? 6 i' ■ y formidable defences. \\ nether they are likely in the promised assault to extend their foothold on the heights of the Meuse must depend very largely upon the plans laid by the defenders. It is .tolerably certain that the French can hold their ground if they care to make the sacrifice involved, but it is possible that they are on the eve of another limited retirement in pursuance of the strategic plan to which they are methodically working. ' **'* ' * ' There are signs of. promise in the Italian campaign." Besides heavily punishing the .enemy on the Trentino front,, the Italians have effected an advance and a capture, ofprisoners east of Monfalcone, that is to say, at the southern extremity of the Isonzo front, .which has throughout been the sccne of their main offensive. The local success east of Monfalcone, not unimportant in itself, is encouraging, >as at least a tentative indication , that the Italians are by no means crippled or paralysed as a result, of the Austrian blow from the Trentino. .<

Splendid news is contained-in an Admiralty announcement'-that the latest unofficial evidence • makes it, highly probable that the Germans in tho North Sea battle 'lost,'six Dieadnoughts, seven cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and at least three submarines. Since the Admiralty is invariably'cautious in statements of this kind, \vc may take it for grantcd, that this estimate' is , certainly not oyer the mark, and quite possibly below it. When Admiral Jellicoe's report is published, there will be more definite evidence to'go upon. Meantime; tho position tentatively established is that in essentials Germany's losses in. the battle were in the ratio of nearly two to one to those sustained by Great Britain. The effect is brought home when it is remembered that a comparison unduly favourable, to Germany is made when it is said' that the loss of one capital" ship means as much to her as the: -loss- of two such, ships would irieari to Great Bri- ; tain. .-'■■■ ''