PROGRESS OP THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2793, 10 June 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OP THE WAR

How far the Russians arcs capable of going in the offensive they have opened on their southern front it is impossible to judge meantime, but manifestly they have already struck a staggering blow at tlie enemy, and one that brightens the general dutlook in the war. The capture of Lusk, a railway town of some importance in Southern llussia, may mark a stage in the enterprise, but there is certainly no present indication of any*tendency call-a halt.Definite hews lias' still'"to'come ' of events along the front which extends south from the Galici.an frontier to Rumania. Particularly in its southern section, on the left flank of the enemy army, this front is liable to witness decisive events. Defeat in this southern area would i)'e even more damaging to the Aus-. tro-Germans than the collapse of their defences further north which has given the Russians tusk and an e'xtended foothold to the west of the River Styr. While it is in the south, that really decisive "results of the enterprise the Russians have.set in motion must be first looked for, the success they have so far attained is considerable. In Southern Russia the enemy has been' bombarded and driven out of defences in which, judging by their elaborate and substantial character, ho meant to make atii indefinito stay, and the progress of the attacking army is already to be measured in miles.

Since, the-Russians are now possessed of a body of artillery which has enabled them, according to one correspondent, to treat the enemy as the enemy treated''them last year, there is no cause for astonishment at their present success. It has long been known that the factor governing Russia's military effort is the supply of war material, and that, given an adequate supply, her weight is bound to tell with tremendous effect. Even now wo do not know how far Russia is equipped for a summer campaign which is bound to make enormous demands upon resources, but all tho facts in sight are encouraging. In the first 'place she has contrived to force a conflict in the region where it pays her best to fisrht, and whore enemy interests would bo best served by a policy of inaction and delay. The character of the Russian offensive as it has thus far becOmo-visible must also be taken into account. That it is being pressed in immense strength goes without saying, and we may be quite certain that this strength has not been assembled without making ample provision also for a sound defence on . the long northern front, reaching • to the Baltic, where, if any where, ; the enemy may be expected to strike for a further gain of territory or with the idea of creating a diversion and crippling Russian action in the south.

What reply the enemy intends to make to the Russian stroke, has yet to appear, but ono thing tolerably ,certain is that mere delaying or defensive tactics will not serve his turn. No such delaying defensive battle is possible in the Eastern theatre as the French are fighting at Verdun, because the ruling conditions are totally- different. The elaborate field fortifications which are the distinguishing characteristic of the Western battleground and lend themselves so well to such a battle as the French are fighting can bo copied only to a very limited extent in the other main theatre, and an unbroken line of sucli works on the long Eastern front.; "is, of course, .impossible. Fortifications hail very little to do with bringing the Aus-tro-Gcrmans to aiialt in their drive through Russia and Galicia last year! The enemy was. stopped by the remaining fighting power of the Russian armies when his efforts weakened as a result, largely, of increasing transport difficulties complicated and intensified by the approach of winter. These facts, hearing as they do upon standing conditions in the Russian theatre, take on a new, .interest'now that the cnemy is being set a"problem in -de-

fencc. Generally speaking, ho can maintain hisposition only by meeting the Russians on even terms and beating them in pitched battles as long as they are able to continue the attack In the present and prospective circumstances of the Central Empires this should prove to be a task well beyond their power. It is true that at some points of strategic importance, of which-Czer-nowitz is a notable example, the enemy has resorted to field fortifications. The defences covering the capital of Bukowina are said to rival the best on the Western front. But though defences of this kind are locally formidable, thev will not enable the enemy to make head against the Russian offensive and- hold down his general line. That is to be done only by bringing a more powerful force to bear upon the front as a whole. Failing a sustained defence of intervening areas the strongest positions can be turned, and already there is rather more than a hint of developments in this direction whore Czernowitz is concerned. A Berlin newspaper, quoted to-day, admits a Russian success in the region of Okna. This place is only about 13 miles north of the main railway approaching Czernowitz-from the west, and a direct southward advance from Olcna would bring the Russians to tliis railway 30 miles west of Czernowitz. This points to operations which may presently have the effect of turning the enemy out of Czernowitz by a less costly, method than that of a direct. assault. / Russian communiques, though they tell now of the crossing of the Styr and Ikwa in Southern Russia and a continuation of the offensive here and in portion of Galicia, make no mention, at time of writing, of Okna. There is no reason, however, to doubt the accuracy of the enemy news in its indication of an imminent threat to Czernowitz. ...

Some of the later news from Russia indicates the possibility of an extended enemy, retreat. It certainly seems unlikely that the enemy can meet such an offensive as the Russians' developing, without seriously prejudicing his operations in other theatres. If it is a case of obtaining relief at all' costs, the enemy's natural plan would be to retreat by stages towards, or-even to, the Vistula line, trusting to the transport difficulties of the.Russians, which must increase, as they , advance, to give him a certain breathing space. The situation at all events is one that does not'seem to admit of half-measures. Petrograd messages are not more definite-, than those of enemy origin in attesting tne power and vigour bf the Russian onslaught. e -s » e •

_ 4-Nxious perhaps to divert attention from their misfortunes- in Russia and Galicia, the Austrians declare that they are continuing their offensive from the Trentino, and havo wrested another position from the Italians. Tho latter report a totally different state of affairs—a great battlo raging on the Asiago plateau, in which the Austrians, though persisting in attacks, ■ have suffered ■ defeat and heavy loss.

* , * . * • ■ Not before time , was ripe for it, the Allies have laid a heavy hand upon Greece.. So at least we may judge from Salonika and Athens, messages which declare, that they have instituted a commercial blockade by way of Enforcing a demand for the instant- demobilisation' of the Greek Army." An official message on : the subject; besides intimating that precautions have been taken to withhold supplies from. Greece which might reach the enemy, states that the question of restrictive-measures affecting Greek ports is under con-, sideration. There is thus no possible reason to doubt the truth of the later reports which'assert that theblockadc is an' accomplished fact. Assuming so 'much there will very soon be at end of all doubts and uncertainties where Greeoe is concerned. T,hc effect of a complete blockade upon this little maritime country may be summed up in two words —ruin and starvation. There probably never was a country worse placed to bear up under a blockade. Greek imports include essential food supplies, for lack of which the population would starve, and the. wealth Of the country is very largely concentrated in the seaports and in a mercantile fleet which made Greece in the days before the war the most important competitor with Great Britain for the Mediterranean carrying trade. «. 8

Plainly therefoua tho Allies have resorted to .very strong measuresj and it is likely that tlfty will compel the King ' and anti-national party in Grcecc to bend to their will. Either the mere threat of a blockade or a blockade of very brief duration carried the day when the' Greek Government showed_& disposition to object to the continued tenure of Salonika by the Allies, and it is probable that the blockado now instituted w?ll prove no.less effective. Evidence on the point is contained in a message just received which states that the Greek Cabinet has decidcd upon the immediate demobilisation of the twelve senior classes, a considerable part of the army's total strength. On this occasion Greece- does not seem to havo been offered the alternativeof cooperating with the Allies instead of demobilising, and the reason is not far to seeK. With the whole country' a hotbed of German conspiracy and intrigue and the army penetrated by pro-German influences, Greek 'co-operation would be rather a hindrance 'than a help. Demobilisation and a, fair Parliamentary election, are -no doubt essential preliminaries to the restoration of something like normal conditions. Domestic reform may pave tho Way for ultimate co-operation with the Allies. At all events tho present turn of events should materially simplify the problems of the Allied Army posted on the threshold of the Balkans.

Details concerning Fort Vaux confirm and limit the German success. The enemy has occupied the place after a terrible conflict with the small French garrison which defended the underground defences to the last gasp, but the French line remains closely wrapped about the fort site, and all attempts by tho Germans to emerge and extend their footholcl have been broken. Tho tactical importance of tho event must bo determined by future developments. At the moment fighting on the Verdun front seems to centro in the region of Thiaumont farm immediately west of the Douaiimont plateau. This, following upon the limited success at Vaux, shows that' the Germans aro pursuing their customary tactics. Seeking to pienetratc the French line on either side of what remains of the Douaumont position they are evidently attempting to convert that position into a salient too acute to be held. > .

■ Though they showed some skill irf falsifying the earlier news of the naval battle, the Germans hava blundered badly in their latest efforts in this direction. In the first placc, they admit that thoy deliberately suppressed the material fact that the battle-cruiser Lutzow was lost, allegedly when she was endeavouring to return to port. Haying thus admitted that their reports are worthless, they submit a list of losses which calls for no other remark than that it is manifestly inaccurate, and incomplete. Nows _ from neutral sources that the British Feet is patrolling the North Sea, while the .Germans are nursing their shattered hulks in port, brings no new fact to light, but is welcome as indicating that German lies are being overtaken in neutral countries and displaced by the truth.