WOOLLEN MILL STRIKE

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2786, 2 June 1916, Page 9

WOOLLEN MILL STRIKE

UNION FINED ACTION OF EMPLOYEES UNLAWFUL NOTICE OF APPEAL Mr. W. G. Riddell, S.M., delivered his reserved judgment in the Magistrate's Court yesterday in the civil action, Inspector of Awards (Mr. H. 11. Moston) v. the Petone Woollen Mills Industrial Union of Workers. Plaintiff claimed the sum of £200 as a penalty for an offence under Section 6 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1908, in that defendant during the months of February and March, 1916, did instigate certain workers employed by the Wellington Woollen Manufacturing Company, Ltd., to become parties to. an unlawful strike, the workers being bound at the commencement of tho strike by an award of the Arbitration Court.,

Tho defendant, 6aid tho Magistrate, was a union duly registered under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1908, and its amendments, and as such was, and its members were, bound by an award between it and tho Wellington Woollen Manufacturing Company, limited,, dated August 14, 1914. Tho award commenced on August 1, 1914, and was to continue in force until May 1, 1917. Under Clause 10 of the award, one week's notice in \ writing of the termination of an agreement was required- to be given by either side, except in case of adcident to the mill or machinery.' After reviewing the evidence His Worship decided that there was no reason given in any notice for the action of the employees in ceasing work, and preceding events made it clear, that the notices were given because the employees had failed to obtain the increased wages demanded from the company. By Section 8 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act, 1908, a strike was dofined as "the act of any number of workers wlio are, or had been, employed, whether by the same employer, _or different employers, in discontinuing that employment whether wholly or partially, or in breaking their contracts of service,; etc., the said discontinuance, breach, etc., being due to any combination, agreement or common understanding, whether expressed or implied, made or entered into by the said workers with intent to compel or induce any such employer to agree to terms of employment or comply with any demands made by the said or any other workers." By Section G, Sub-Section (1) "Every person who incites, instigates, aids or abets an_ unlawful strike. or lock-out or the continuance of any such 6trike or lock-out, or who incites, instigates, or assists any,person.• to become a party to any such strike or lock-out, is liable, if an industrial union, etc., or any person other than a worker, to a penalty not exceeding £200."

defendant's counsel, observed Mr. Riddell had argued that as seven days' notico had been given by the Inembers of tho union before leaving the company's employment, as required by Rule 10 of tho award, they legally put an end to Uieir employment, and «> could not bo held to have taken part in a strike and to have violated tne sections of tho Act quoted. But before the passing of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act Amendment Act, 1908, there was no dohmtion of a strike, and in the Canterbury Slaughtermen's case (A r ol VIII Book of Awards, page 118), .Mr. Justice Dim held that the members of a union could take part in a strike even though they committed no breach ot contract with their employers. Now, section 3 of. the Act cited defines a strike and makes it cover something more than acts on the part of employees, which involve a breach of their contract of employment; and if the argument for de-, fondant was sound, mere giving of a le n al notice to termiiiate their employment would be all that was necessary to avoid what otherwise might clearly amount to a stnko, within the meaning of Section 3. But the mere giving of a notice to terminate their employment, and to coniP'y with Clause 10 of the award, was. not sufhcieiit, in His AYorship's opinion, to take, the combined action of tho employees beyond the definition of a strike. The primary object of their simultaneous notices, continued the Magistrate, was to bring more pressure upon the company, in order that tbjeir demands unght be agreed to. The secondary object: of the notices fras to-.avoid 'a breach of contract, which in itself woulld have brought them within the limits of Section .3. It wag clear, however, that the first alternative provided in Section 3, showi that a strike may take place where there is bo breach of contract, provided tho other elements set out in tho section are present. Mr. Riddell hold that the evidence in this case showed that the. acts of the employees in leaving their employment _in a body on the date, and under thp circumstances mentioned, constituted a strike within the meaning of Section 3.

In referring te a point raised bj: Mr. T. M. Wilford, counsel for the'-union, as to the liability of the union, His Worship stated that when a lock-out or strike took place, and the majority of the members of any industrial union or industrial association, -were at any time parties to the strike or look-out, the union should bo deemed to have instigated the strike or lock-out. The facts in tliis case, proceeded.the judgment,,showed that the members of the defendant union wero parties to an existing' award, that the action of 198 members in leaving their employment in a body, in the -manner, described, amounted to a strike, within tho meaning of Section 3, and an unlawful strike within the meaning of Section G. Sub-section 4; and that as a majority of the members of the defendant union were parties to the strike, tlve defendant union must be deemed to have instigated it. His Worship therefore gave judgment for plaintiff for the sum of JSO, and solicitors* fees,' £3 10s. security tor an appeal being fixed at J!8 Bs.

At the hearing of the case, Mr. P. S. K. Macassey appeared for the plaintiff, and Mr. T. M. Wilford for the defen, dant,.