SMUTS'S TASK IN EAST AFRICA

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2762, 4 May 1916, Page 5

SMUTS'S TASK IN EAST AFRICA

PROBLEMS OF THE CAMPAIGN - v Not least among the problems con* fronting General Smuts are those which' arise from the large area and difficult character of the country in whicu :the campaign has to be conducted. Ger--man East Africa is more than threa tunes the size of the United KingdomMuch of it .is mountainous, large districts are covered with dense thorn bush, in which water is scarce and roads non-existent; in other-, districts' grass grows'to such a height-as. completely to hide tbo movements of troops; some regions, are covered with tropical jungle. The tsetse fly infests Eeveral districts, and the South Africans willhave few opportunities for the lepeti- : tionof the'famous'drives which played an important part in the South-We'sti campaign. Moreover, the climate is ia general unhealthy. • ' .... \ German East Africa is well placed geographically for defence. It 'occupies the central part of the East Afrfc can tableland, and is only open to sen" ous attack from the sea'or from'tha north, whero it , adjoins British East Africa. To. attack it from the. west, where it meets the Belgian Congo, or from the south-west, where it borders Northern Rhodesia . and Nyasaland,Would involvo lines of supply over 3000 uiiles long either from the mouth of the Congo or from Cape Town, while the Germans had the -advantage of short interior lilies' and better means of comrminicationa. _As to their .southern frontier, it coincides- with Portuguese East Africa - and the Germans, - when hard pressed, may be able to copy tho example set in the 'Cameroons, and avoid capture by 'fleeing into this neutral territory.

Value of Sea-Power. ..-. ! General Smuts_ relies on the Rhodesians and Belgians io keep the Germans in play on the west and southwest—a task rendered easier by the control now obtained by. the Allies of. Nyasa and Tanganyika, lakes whoso eastern shores are ; in tho German Protectorate. Operations elsewhere General Smuts will himself control. Tha main German strength—the, enemy has some 4000 European troops and about 25,000 natives —is concentrated in. the north-east of the protectorate, .between Kilimanjaro and the port of Tanga, and tho first heavy blow ait the.Germans is expected to fall there, "but before considering that regioii' attention may- be called to the opportunities open .to General Siuut6 of repeating -ihe tactics employed in South-West Africa, where tho main attack wa§'delivered from the sea. ...'-. ; , ! " y . A railway' runs tlirdiiglf the' centre of German East Africa' from Dar-es-Salaam, -on the Indian Ocean, to Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika, . A! column landed at Dar-es-Salaam and advancing along the railway would-isolate, the German forces north and south of the line.Two considerable towns? are on the-rail-way, Kiliinatinde (the "present scat of Government and the : .place where about 100 British are interned) and Tabora, an important junction of caravan routes. The' Anglo-Belgian naval force on Tanganyika might help by seizing? Kigoma.' The advance from Dar : esSalaam -would meet its greatest physical obstacle where, leaving the coast plain, it climbs the steep sides of the , mountains which form the eastern edge .of the tableland—a land forriiation familiar to' South Africans.

For the operations in the Kilimanjaro region and between it and the Indian Ocean, there are two possible lines of advance—one from the sea directed against Tanga, the .other, from a..base on the Uganda Railway. Boats reach; Tanga in a few hours from Zanzibar and 1 Mombasa—the bases for naval opera--tions—nor by land is thero a long line of communication, judged by African standards, • ; ' v

A Desolate Region. .. From Mombasa to the railhead near Kilimanjaro is 170 miles, a branch hav-i ing been newly built from Voi on thd' main line to within 15 miles of the Ger-.] man frontier. The importance of this corner of German East Africa, largely;) occupied by the Usambara Highlands, lies in the fact that it contains the ; chief European settlements and planta-! tions. Not more than 200 square miles in extent, its economic value is great. ) It is traversed by a railway which runs from Tanga to Moshi, a military post f on the son them slopes of Kilimanjaro, 25 miles west of l'aveta, the British frontier post. _ m It was from Moshi that the raids on'' the! Uganda 1! ail way were made. While Usambara is fertile, the frontier region; is an arid, scrub-covered plain, dotted with isolated hills, some of which theGermans have fortified. Around Taveta;> is magnificent forest land, and ' the whole region is dominated hy the tower-'. ing 6iiow-olad summit of Kilimanjaro. No natural feature marks the actual frontier, which runs in a straight line across country. 'Ihe railway from Voi through this desolate region will-lie of great advantage in an advance oil Moshi. Whether an advance from Tanga will also be undertaken remains to be seen. Early in the war a mixed British and Indian forco unsuccessfully made the attempt. North of Kilimanjaro, the. frontier, region, little known and sparsely...lnhabited, is unlikely to be the scene of iserious fighting. Still further north' $he frontier crosses Victoria Nyanza, an 1 inland sea on which British boats have obtained complete mastery. By sending troops up the Uganda Railway and - across the lake a blow might be struck at the Germans from the north-west. It would he, however, a 700-mile jour-' m from Mombasa, and Gen- , erar Smuts will confine himself to sending reinforcements sufficient to give se-. curity to Western Uganda and the ad- : jaccnt Belgian territory, a weird region, active .volcanoes known "as Mfumbiro.-i