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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Tee great question of the war at the moment concerns the plans of the enemy for the immediate future. It must soon be determined whether the Germans are minded _ to stake everything upon an offensive policy or intend instead to accept their failure at Verdun ,and fall back upon the defensive. At the moment the weight'of evidence, or suggestion, is that they are inclined to the more desperate .policy.' There is news of the enemy dispositions both in West arid East,- which, though not official, is interesting. Colonei, Repington 'confirms the statements of other correspondents that the Germans are effecting a great concentration before the British front, and gives details of the enemy dispositions. Exactly what these preparations portend he does not pretend to say. He considers three possibilities—that 'the Germans meditate an attack on the British line, that they apprehend a British 'attack, and that they may propose to attack Holland in order to master the Lower Scheldt and make use of it in furtherance of their naval operations. This leaves matters somewhat open, but the immediate point of interest is that, if Colonei, Repington and others are right in their facts, the Germans are massing so heavily in Northern France and Flanders as to make it quite conceivable that they meditate ari attempt to break through the British front. Considering that the attack on Verdun is Btill far from having been driven home, and that there is a stir of activity on the Russian front, this is not a state of affairs which can be regarded as unpromising from the standpoint _of the Allies; From the point of view of the enemy it musi. be taken to mean that \ the problems of the war on two fronts, the bugbear of wiser Germans than those who now control :the armies of'the Central Empires, are beginning to assume threatening magnitude and ■intractable shape.

. Colonel Kbpington does not take an unduly optimistic view of immediate prospects on the- British front. The point he makes about the enemy holding dominant positions is possibly of great importance, though it should be subject to reservation, at least as regards the short, but critical, section of the front in Northern France between Lens and Arras. Here the British are established on a line which, as a result' of much hard fighting by. the French last year, is thrown' well forward into the low hills overlooking tne plain, south of Lille, .which is traversed by important railways. On this sector at least, and.it is one which the enemy cannot afford to neglect, the British should be at no such disadvantage in the 'matter of ground as' they are_ in Flanders. As regards respective strength, Colonel Repington credits the Germans with having 800,000 men (including 500,000 rifles) ■ north pi' the Somme, which ' marks the southern extremity of the ninety-mile British .front, and. he is of opinion that we have not all the troops in the Western theatre which should be there. He'.states, also that our output of guns and munitions is still below, that of France and Germany. Any attempt to institute a comparison, even with .such new details as Colonel Repington supplies, is very much in the air. It has been said, however, that the British strength in the main theatre is now upwards of a million, and in attempting a comparison with the German 800,000 account must be taken also of the French and Belgian fortes established on the northern "flank of the Western front. The Belgian. Army has a strength of something like 150,000 men. The presence of the neighbouring French force is presumably accounted for by the fact that the Belgian Army was reorganised under French supervision. It is likely that the French forces in Flanders and the Belgian Army are now combined in an army unit. Aa .the facts appear; the Allies should Tfevo a numerical siiperioyifcy in the area north of fcho Somme (most of which is entrusted to the British Army)' of at least fifty >por cent. In the remaining, area of the Western theatre the numerical superiority of the Allies should be still more pronounced.

As regards artillery strength and reserves of munitions, no comparison is possible. If is reasonable, however,- to assume that the position of the British in regard to these vital details approximates to that of the French, and of 'the French position very encouraging accounts are given. A recent dispatch from Mb. Waknek Allen showed that the French production of guns and munitions had enormously increased, and this is supplemented to-day by a message which states that stocks of French light and heavy artillery and of munitions are piling up, in spite of the enormous demands of the Verdun battle. This particular statement is quite unofficial, but there docs not seem to be any reason to doubt its accuracy. The further statement is made, it will be*'noted, that it was largely due to the use of countless machine-guns that the German. onslaught was shattered. This strengthens an impression, montionod yesterday, that the Verdun battle is imposing a, much heavier drain upon German artillerv resources than upon those of the French. A Jft-'CH clearer will bs gained of possibilities in. the West-

[ era theatre' when a practical test has shown in what condition Russia is to meet the strain of renewed conflict on a maximum scale. As information goes, su'ch a test will not be long delayed Correspondents at Petrograd agree in declaring that a great conflict is brewing in the Baltic Provinces,' and-that the fighting which has already taken place has been clone less than justice in the official communiques. There is no need to traverse the statements of' these correspondents in detail. Generally the suggestion is that the Germans are manifesting an intention of resuming the northern offensive which was brought to a halt iii the autumn of last year, while the Russians are showing a disposition to meet them more than half-way. As their official reports stand, the Russians have had decidedly the best of the recent fighting, and the comments of the correspondents give added importance' to the successes which have been gained. Hindendubg is said to be now concentrating forces in readiness for a maximum effort to capture Dvinsk, and the German operations in the lake region further south, east of Vilna, are regarded as subsidiary to this main object.' Dvinsk, from which the Germans are now separated by a distance of about a dozen miles, is an important junction on the Petro-grad-Warsaw railway. It is also theinland flank position of the Dwina line, through which the Germans made desperate but unavailing efforts to break last year, when an advance on Petrograd looked more like a practical possibility than it does now.

Assuming that they have the requisite strength in men and artillery, and that is the point to be put ito the lest, the Eussians will no doubt make it. their policy to. safeguard the line of the Dwina while aiming at offensive action in Southern Russia and Galicia. It is obvious that the Eussians have most to hope from, action in the south.' If they can contrive to lever the enemy's flank away from the Rumanian frontier, the Austro-Ger-mans will probably have to retreat all along the line in Galicia, In its influence upon Rumania, and otherwise, such a .success would be, apt to potently influence the course of the war. The Germans, on tne other hand, have little to hope from advancing their lines in Southern Russia and Galicia, even if that were possible, whereas they' would doubtless set some store by an extension of their area of occupation north of the Dwina, even if it left them considerably short of Petrograd. Such an advance would carry them into the provinces of Livonia and Esthonia, which were formerly colonised by Germans. The main point is, however, that if the Russians were compelled to concentrate chiefly in the north, , the German' southern flank would be so much less seriously threatened. Present and prospective developments . in "the Eastern theatre must, of course, • be considered in relation to the position on the Western front and elsewhere, but at an immediate view the task set the Russians is not only to make head against the Germans in the Baltic Provinces, but to devote only such a proportion of their strength to this object as will leave them free to strike a powerful blow at the other end of their front. If a German offensive in the Baltic Provinces achieved no other result than that of paralysing Russian action in the south, it would,still have to be regarded as in an important degree successful'. Russian prospects in the conflict now taking shapo are, of course, materially improved ' by the extent to which the Germans are involved in the other main theatre.

The point has been, made before that the vigour with which the Russians are pressing the Armenian, campaign is an encouraging indication that they now have a very great effective force at command. Late developments . in Armenia, touched upon at some_ length in the news to-day, make it possible to'emphasise* this contention. The forces engaged in Armenia are no doubt small in comparison with those afoot in the main theatre, but as the operations against the Turks arc. enveloping the Armenian forces cannot be regarded as insignificant nor* such. as would he lightly spared from the main theatre if any serious shortage of.strength.existed there. To an extent this may be taken as applying both to men and artillery. Past operations in the Caucasus and Armenia have largely -been carried out by scattered forces under conditions which permitted only a minimum use of artillery, but these limitations obviously do not apply to the operations which have followed the capture of Erzerum. The Russians are now pressing a divergent advance, north-west, west,' and isouth, in such circumstances that considerable forces must of necessity be employed. They have met and broken powerful Turkish attacks, and evi J dently mean to hold their present area of occupation. It is an open question whether thoy will attompt to advance much further in the immediate future, but as matters stand they are facing a conflict with no small part of Turkey's total available- strength. There is an extreme contrast betweon these conditions and those which obtained in December, 1914, when the Turks came to grief in an attempt to penetrate the Caucasus. Theßussian Commander, on that occasion, made no attempt to follow up his advantage, but stood upon the defensive and dispatched a part of his not very, considerable force to tho main theatre, where, at that time, the demand for reinforcements so far exceeded the' supply. The scale upon which the Russians are now. developing the Armenian campaign must be regarded as a positive indication that they are confident of their ability to meet all demands in the main theatre.

Whether or not the Germans''are planning another offensive stroke in the -Western theatre, they are . evidently impressed by the. necessity of still continuing their efforts at Verdun." A late report tells of another assault in strong force on a fairly wide front east of the Meuse, between the river and Douaumont. At the cost of losses which arc described as very .heavy, the enemy has gained a footing in a small salient. Though this is the only onemy gain reported, the battle has apparently been resumed in something like its .former vigour, and, with the exception mentioned, the French claim that they have thus far shattered the waves of assault.

A French communique, reporting an attack by. a gunplane upon an enemy ship in the North Sea, is dis-' appointingly bare of details. Littlo is definitely known about the size of the guns carried by aeroplanes of the larger type, .but even if tho enemy snip which figured in this incident was' only a small mine-layer the gun carried by the aeroplane must have, been of some size to make

the attack worth while. Not long ago it was reported that a number of the French machines were armed with a three-inch gun, but definite evidence on the ■ subject is lacking. The present official report certainly shows that some -aeroplanes aro carrying a weapon very much more powerful than a machine-gun. It may, however, have been of no great si;>3' as guns go. It is riot stated that the ship attacked was crippled, and she was presumably unarmed, since the aeroplane attacked from a height of only 300 feet. On this subject of the armament' of • aeroplanes the English aviator, Mn. Pejibeeton Billing, who is now a member of the House of Commons, recently declared that the battleplane should be developed at least to the point of carrying a five-inch gun, but it is likely that actual' development is still considerably short of this achievement.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19160419.2.15

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2750, 19 April 1916, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
2,142

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2750, 19 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2750, 19 April 1916, Page 4

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