A GLORIOUS EFFORT

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2745, 14 April 1916, Page 6

A GLORIOUS EFFORT

AND A SPLENDID FAILURE THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETTS REVIEW The story of th© most splendid failure that has'ever happened m the history of British arms was told . by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett in his lecture. "With the Anzacs at the Dardanelles, in the Town Hall last night. The title is scarcely fair to .the story, because t!.« lecturer deals with the whole Dardanelles campaign, from the beginning of the battering of the Dardanelles forts by the Allied Fleets to the failure of the great advance on August 8. It is not an oratorical effort, not a glowing panegyric on the exploits of brave men, but a comprehensive account and commentary on .things as they happened, and it is such an amazing story. Mr. Ashmoad Bartlett saw for himself as many of these events as one man could see; the rest of . his information he gleaned from others who had seen them, and he has collated his information with'conspicuous ability, making his narrative no mere dull lesson in history, but a brilliant recital of heroio deeds —and deeds more heroic have never been related in any epic since the world began._ Mr. -Bartlett does not rely on a spice of funny anecdote, or on appeals to the emotions, to sustain interest. He simply tells the story well enough to compel interest. There was a bift audience, and he held tho people in rapt' attention for more than two hours.

Before going, on to speak of the reasons why British statesmen were inclined to entertain tho project of a dash for Constantinople, Mr. Bartlett sought to dispel tho idea that the campaign in Gallipoli had been without result, although it had ended in failure._ Rather he thought it had, in the ten months of its duration, so exhausted the Turks that the other campaigns against them on their Eastern front, had been made easier. ■. It had compelled them to keep tho main strength of their available forces in Thrace, and it was to this fact that the success of the Grand Duke Nicholas's armies against Erzerum this year was in great part due. That success was a _ very great achievement, for it_was no light task to march armies in winter over frozen roads, and then take a strongly fortified, position almost without artillery, but the weakness of .the I Turkish defending forces must be attri. buted to the pressure of the Dardanelles I campaign. Indeed, he. believed that when events were seen in the perspec-1 tive of history, the ohief credit for his success must be given to the men who fought and died at Gallipoli. ■ Why was the Dardanelles campaign entered upon? This question Mr. Bartlett discussed, and, without putting forward opinions of his own.on the subject, he showed how the Allies must have considered Constantinople such a prize that its capture was worthy of serious, attempt, even at risk of ' serious loss. First of all the idea was to force the Narrows with the Fleet. _ After that Constantinople would be distant only a few hours' steam, an easy prey to tho long guns of the warships. We had an immense superiority in fighting strength at sea. The German Grand Fleet was held'safe, hiding in its harbours, by the Dreadnoughts of tho British Navy. As a reserve ready waiting to make good any possible casualties in Admiral Jellicoo's Fleet were the Dreadnoughts of tho French Navy. And in addition to these ships of the first line there was in both navies a Burplus of pre-Dread-nought ships, for which no particular uso could be found. These were tho ships which were to make the assault on the Dardanelles. So much for tho risks we wore prepared to take. On the other hand there were the strongest reasons.why the Allies should want Constantinople. Bussia'was cut off from touch with the rest of the Allies except by the precarious communication of a port m the White Sea,-liable to be ice-bound for part/of the year. Russia needed munitions, and the Allies needed her wheat, oil, and wood. In addition there wore political considerations. Mr. Churchill, who was probably real author of the campaign, described Constantinople very aptly as "Tho Strategic' Norve Centre of the Near East." If we had taken Constantinoplo in 1915, we should now have had ' Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece fighting on our side. And so the •Lilies entored irooii tho campaign, and onco the venture was made there was no turning hack untilthe utmost had been dona. Tho Fleet hammered the weak outer defences at the. extrance to the strait until tho forces holding them fled, and a party of marines were landed. These marines advanced to fheslopes of Achi Baba without meeting with any resistance, and Achi Baba was the objective of the Capo Holies force, for. all the timo they were on the peninsula. These marines mado one important discovery, a discovery which, as it proved, spelled disaster for the whole venture—that the .forts, in spite of tho terrific bombardment to which' they had l>eßn subjected were practically undamaged. Then it was realised that flat, trajectory high-velocity guns were no use against earthworks, and that forts could not be damaged except by fire from high-angle guns, which warships do not carry. , Nevertheless, the venture, now many times more desperate,, was continued'. Mr. Bartlett described the assault on the fortifications of the Narrows, preparatory to the hazardous rushing of the Narrows, which was to bo the culmination of the operation, the difficulty of sweeping the. strait of mines, and the final abandonment of the assault after the loss of five shipsthree sunk outright, and two seriously • disabled. It was clear then that an attack unsupported by land operations could not succeed.

Then 'it was decided that a forco must be landed on the western and southwestern shores of Gallipoli. Why they wore not landed on the neck of Bulair is a question which, in Mr. Bartlett's opinion, can not he answered until the war is over. Mr. Bartlctt described the conception of the campaign,' giving the general idea with a running commentary which conveyed a highly illuminating view of the whole operations. So desperate was the resistance, that the attack following upon the landing could not be pushed home, and the troops were hard pressed for many days. 'I'hq really serious failure was on May R, when 'it was discovered that even the maximum effort of tho Cape Helios force, reinforced by colonials from Anzac, was not sufficient to bring the coveted Aclii Baba position within our grasp. For long months the positions held were consolidated, a herculean task in the face of appalling difficulties, .until reinforcements came and the landing was made at Suvla Bay early in August. We have heard much of the difficulties and the. horrors of the long night inarch northwards of the Australians and Now Zealanders, l of the awful hand-to-hand' fights with the steel in the dark in dense scrub, but Mr. Ashmead Bartletfc told of. the hosts of other difficulties which made hay of tho Staff plans for' a, converging attack on tho summit of Koja Chcmon Tepc in the north, tho Sari Bair ridge, arid tho Chumik Bair hill, and changed what should have been a converging attack into a disjointed series of isolated 'assaults . by small bodies. That failure, it appeared, really wrote "finis" to tho campaign. To stay on for the winter was unthink.able for reasons auite well known, and

the forces available could not win to the dominating positions held ' along ovary part of .the battle line by tha Turks.

Mr. Bartlett uses superlatives with discretion, but ho has words of unstinted praise for the gallantry, valour, and endurance of the Anzac troops. Few officers or corps does ho mention by name, but lie makes honourable exception of General Birdwood, "the spirit of Anzac," and ono other, Bri-gadier-General Malone, the man who held and consolidated Quinn's Post, a military achievement of stupendous difficulty, and who died in August on Sari Bair, "in the topmost trench, encouraging his men, witli a rifle in his hand." The scores of pictures which the lecturer showed give a far better idea of the difficulties of the campaign, particularly at Anzac, than could any niero words. The pictures tell of the tragedy of the River Clyde, of the horrors of the landing generally, and the later pictures show with what stuhborn endurance the Anzac position was held. Anzac was a small position,., very very much Bmaller than most people realise, but in 'this warren were driven 140 miles of trenches and saps. The country is precipitous, even by our standards, and every yard of it moving sand and arid desert. This made the construction of works a vexatious problem, and the maintenance of them a matter for constant vigilance and much anxiety. But to realise what our men did there one must-see Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's pictures and hear his comments upon them. His concluding words were these: "It is a wonderful tale of gallantry and endurance in which any country can be proud to have participated, and I don't helieve that in the end New Zealand will regret, having sent her men to take part in that glorious effort."