PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2745, 13 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Though Verdun is still the scene i of conflict on a colossal scale, it is ! evident that it is not likely to represent much longer thes, storm- j centre of the war.. The ques- i tion of the moment, is not so 1 much .what is likely to. happen < at Verdun, but rather what' use is < to be made in the near future of tho Allied and enemy forces other than those engaged in the battle which for the time being overshadows all other visible action in the theatres of war. Theories of deadlock and of gradual approach to a decisive struggle have gone overboard of late, and arc no longer tenable so far at least as the immediate future is concerned. The offensive at Verdun has demonstrated that the enemy is com-* mifcted to a policy of action, and puts us upon firm ground in entertaining a belief that if a long struggle, of exhaustion lies ahead it will ;■ jfc be entered upon until all ' possible efforts have been made to reach a decision in the war by quicker methods. Interpreted in any other way than as an effort towards , forcing a decision, the Verdun, onslaught could only be regarded as' a suicidal wasfe of lives and strength. Unttf it has been demonstrated that the German General Staff has been stricken with, madness, we are bound to accept the Verdun offensive as an indication that the enemy is prepared to stake and risk everything upon an offensive policy, subject always, to the reservation that the Germans doubtless hoped to draw a premature counter-stroke by the French and British in the Western theatre before their Allies were ready to cooperate in other theatres. Hopes of this kind are rapidly disappearing. The time is close at hand when the Allies will be free to act with full power in all theatres, and yet the Germans are still spending lives freely in the Western offensive, in which they are far from having scored even alocal decision. - If the hope of drawing a premature offensive by tho Western Allies was one motive inducing the enemy to take the offensive at Verdun, it was obviously not his only motive. He feels it necessary to persevere in the offensive when the prospect -of a localised struggle on tne Western front, with the Allies elsewhere standing relatively inactive, has either disappeared or is on the point ot disappearing. These facts lend a certain air-of plausibility even to the somewhat extreme possibility reviewed by Colonel Repington/ that the enemy may be contemplating a general assault on the Flanders froiit. It mu-st be said that Colonel Hepington's elaboration of this theory'loses forces to Some extent on account of his entertaining as a possible alternative a uerman attempt to invade England. All that we know about the naval and military position suggests that an invasion of England is not now worth considering as a practicable •possibility, and that it is so' considered by Colonel Kepington does not tend to inspire confidence in his speculations on'the subject of a possible offensive stroke by the Germans in 1< landers. As a fact, however, it cannot be assumed as confidently that the Germans will not attempt an offensive in Flanders as that they are most unlikely to -invade England. He have heard a good deal lately, in connection with the anxious stir in Holland and otherwise, tiboufc the probability, of an early conflict in Flanders, but'tho prevailing suggestion has been that the Allies, and not the enemy, are likely to take the offensive. If Colonel Eepington is right in-his facts, the Germans are m such strength on the r landers front—he says they have eight hundred, thousand men ariayed against the British northern ! nc , s 7 L as to make it highly probable that they meditate ah early offensive and to discourage for the time being an Allied attack .in that region.' It teems almost too much to hope that the cnemv will stake his fortunes upon a development of the' Western onensive to the extent indicated, but the fact is to be considered that if he cannot overpower the Western Allies now, he cannot hope to do it in the future. An offensive in Flan- ' ders would ' )0 a logical development of the policy Tvhich has taken actual shape at Verdun,- but at the same time it is a development that would • be gladly welcomed by the Allies I 1 * * *, #

Whether or not tho enemy is committed to the desperate course of exhauating his offensive powers in the .Western theatre instead of upon the resisting power of his de"fensive lines, it is clear that the war has entered a phase in which great and momentous developments must bo expected without warning, or with'little warning. Mighty forces are in conflict at Vordun, but mightier forces are held in leash, and this is a state of affairs which manifestly cannot last. A maximum development of the enemy offensive in the V\ estern theatre would be tho most favourable turn of events, from the standpoint of the Allies, which can at present be regarded as posSible. It would mean that .tho Western Allies would at once'be fighting under the most advantageous conditions for which they can hope, and rendering the maximum possible aid to their Allies in other theatres **m ■ *

Whatever lino of policy he mav pursue on the Western front, it seems impossible that the enemy can henceforth detach any larce forr° from the main theatres for service elsewhere, and this is a consideration with a very hopeful bearing upon tho situation in the Balkans. ' It is possible that if 1 the enemy does not force an early conflict on the major S a C ,,- b , the w «tern theatre, the Allies also may abstain from that course for a time. ■_ This does not nican that their policy is governed and dominated by the action of the enemy, but rather that they have a scope and freedom in planning their j offensive operations which he is no j longer able; to command. If Ru- | mania joins, the Allies, and prospects that she. may ultimately take tlm course seem at present reasonably bright, the Allies will be in a position to progressively undermine and weaken the Austro-German power, even should a decision in the main .theatres remain for a time beyoncl their reach. Should, Rumania continue to hold aloof, possibilities of profitable action in the Near East will admittedly bo much more limited, though even then they will be by no means Unimportant. * * * « •

Obviously, however, much depends 'upon the decision of Rumania, and while it is still awaited, it is interesting to turn to the observations of ;in authority who is entitled to speak with some confidence upon the factors likely to govern Rumanian'policy. Such an authority is Mr. Alfred Stead, formerly Rumanian Consul-General in Lonclon for five year?, Ho lias had a long.and lnti> mate connection with Balkan affairs,

and besides spending nine months in Bucharest last year, he was with the Serbian Army from the fighting on the Danube to the retreat through Montenegro. Writing in Land and Water on the snbjccfc of Rumanian policy, Mr. Stead states'in the first instance that in Rumania power is in the hands of the King and the Government more, perhaps, than in any other country possessing a .Parliamentary system. Public opinion, scarcely formed and incoherent, plays no part ,in the. Government's decisions, and, • according to Me. Stead, little weight Should be attached to tTie talk of leaders of parties in Opposition which at times has attracted a good deal of attention. King Ferdinand is described by Me. Stead as a Rumanian first and last; a monarch who, though of the Hohenzollern family, may be trusted to lend his support to a national policy, solely with an eye to Rumanian interests. The fact is. not minimised that the policy of the I'Pnme Minister _of Rumania, M, Bratiano, must inevitably be affected by the traditions of his father, who guided the country through the stormy times of. the Russ'o-Turkish War and the annexation by Russia .of the Rumanian province of Bessarabia. As Mr. Stead sums up the position, however, this factor seems to have operated with others in impelling the Rumanian Government to a policy of intense caution,but certainly not one of hostility to the Allies. On the- contrary, Rumania gave clear proof of her friendly feeling towards the Allies by blocking the passage of war supplies from the Central Empires into Turkey. An even more striking fact attested by Mr. Stead is, that Rumania has brought temporary ■ ruin upon her chief industries rather than piovide 'the Austro-Germans with supplies.

The few sales at high prices of an odd lot of grain to Germany, in exchange for coal or other commodity, had, he declares, no real influence. Rumania has practically stopped the export of grain, and her petroleum industry is also at a standstill. "Tho production has fallen, all the tanks are full, prices are practically nonexistent. ' Germany . and Austria have not grain or petrol from Rumania, but Rumania .is - ruined." Mr ; - Stead takes the view that the policy pf Rumania, while unmistakably friendly to the Allies, is dominated by a determination to' reserve, her forces until-proportionately they represent a greater, value, and can hope to hasten the' end of the war within a measurable period. "Rumania, '■' he remarks finally, "dreads a Greater Bulgaria, she believes the Allies will win because England is determined to win—let us'"lose no time in being worthy of the confidence placed in us, and, if necessary, let us remove any fear d\at Rumania may be shut in after the ws.r by Russia- at Constantinople, by offering her a way put to the Aegean through the territory .which .was once Bulgaria and' now is eastern Germany. The Rumanians wait on us—the moment has come for the great stroke of the war."

Mr. Stead, it will be observed, takes a position almost as extreme in its way as that of the militarv experts, and others in Great Britain, who .argue that all'other considerations should be subordinated to a maximum concentration of strength on the Western front. Nevertheless, it is plain that the final step in winning Rumania's-friendship, and active co-operation would open up immensely advantageous prospects from the standpoint of the Allies. With her army of something' like 600,000 men, Rumania is posted on the flank of the enemy communications extending" through the Balkans, in a situation which would be worth much -fighting to attain.' -With Rumania in the field and adequately supported by the Russians in the north, Bulgaria would be between the tipper and the nether millstone, and Turkey would be finally cut off from" the allies who havered her to-ruin. It is hardly open to doubt that the Allies have set themselves, after not a few mistakes and blunders' in the Balkans, to win Rumania's active cooperation. Succeeding in'this object, they will recover all that they have lost in the Balkans and more, and be doing something to hasten the enemy's ultimate downfall in the war.

At Verdun, - as reports stand at time of writing, there is a continued blaze of the heaviest fighting, but in the later passages of the battle there has been no noteworthy change of ground. The battle for mine craters continues at St. Eloi with varying fortune. In Armenia the Russians are pressing forward west of Erzerum. Few other events in the land war are reported at the moment. * • * *

In face of protests by the Greek Government the Allies have established a naval base at Argostoli, in the island of • Cephalonia,' off the westorn coast of Greece. The base is presumably to be used by xraft engaged in hunting submarines.' If the Serbians, or some of them, are still at Corfu, the-new base at Argostoli will usefully command the sea route by which they must travel.'