PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2744, 12 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Sir Charles Monro's report upon the evacuation of .Gallipoli is first and foremost a record of fact, but it is also such an indictment as has seldom been framed against the authorities responsible ■ for the conduct of any campaign. It has all along' been known that the attempt to master Gallipoli was a forlorn hope on the grand scale, but the conclusion has been slowly and reluctantly accepted that it was an adventure foredoomed to failure. Doubt on 'the subject is no longer possible or reasonable. No one who reads Sir Charles Monro's report can avoid' the conclusion that in the circumstanes and conditions under which it opened and was developed, the campaign was hopeless from the beginning, and that the heroes of Gallipoli fought and were sacrificed, in vain. It is possible that Gallipoli might have been-attacked with prospects of success at an 'earlier period than was* selected and under a different plan of campaign. The campaign, as it actually took shape, is utterly condemned -by • Sir Charles Monro, and it appears in his report not merely as an enterprise that failed, but as one that should, not have been attempted. Ho found' that the position of the troops on the Peninsula was unique in history, possessing every possible military defect. It is presumably not without reason that he uses the word "defect." The whole effect of his report is to show not only that the position of the invading army was hopelessly bad. but that it was one in which the troopsshould never have been placed. *-Aa he sets out the position a successful issue of the campaign was impossible; further, heavy losses without compensating gain were certain; and the Gallipoli Army was serving no secondary purpose by such pressure as it was able to exert upon the Turks that it could not serve to vastly better purpose elsewhere. It yet remains to assess and apportion responsibility .for blundering that created this deplorable state of affairs, and certainly the matter should not be allowed to stand where it now rests.

As in tho case of some other military adventures that have turned out badly, dark and bright features are straugely mingled' in the story of the> Gallipoli campaign. It could not well have been worse planned, but it afforded scope for an exhibition of valour arid resolution by the members of the land and sea forces engaged which can riover be surpassed. r The failures of leadership laid bare in Sir Charles Monro's report can only intensify appreciation and admiration of the deeds of the Navy, and those of the Army, in which the Australians and New Zealan'ders bore their part so well. The attempt upon Gallipoli was a hopeless adventure, but there never was an adventure in' which British soldiers and sailors bore themselves more valiantly. With, their gallant Allies they achieved the seemingly impossible in maintaining as they did the attack upon the Turkish stronghold, and it_ does not dim their fame that victory was from first to last' beyond their grasp. Nest to the onduriiig valour af the forces engaged, it Ib the redeeming

feature of the Gallipoli campaign that it terminated in one of the most brilliant feats known to military history. In the circumstances that ruled, evacuation without loss of life was all but miraculous, and'it afforded conclusive proof that leadership of the highest standard was brought to bear upon the concluding passage of a campaign which otherwise was so badly conceived that it practically invited disaster. ' •

It is the saving grace of the British character that, with a certain capacity for blundering, it embodies an exceptional readiness to admit and redeem the blunders into which it falls. Britain has no monopoly of such costly failures as were made it Gallipoli, but probably no one of the great countries now at war is better able to rise superior to a failure of the kind. Wherever the British stock is established, the effect of the frank and open exposuro of the facts concerning the ill-conceived attempt upon the Dardanelles will be to/stiffen resolution. The campaign was a disaster which we cannot afford to repeat, but there should be no doubt about our ability to profit in the future conduct of the war by the experience which has been bought at a fearful cost in gallant lives.

The burden of the latest news in hand from Verdun is that the French on their new line have repelled one of the most powerful saults yet attempted by the enemy." As- matters stand, the Germans seem to have little cause for congratulation in the results of their general assault on a front over 12 miles long. In their own report they speak of the capture of 700 unwounded prisoners, but this is no very notable achievement in opera : tions on such a scale of immensity. The sum of their achievement seems to have been the flattening of the Bethincourt salient. That accomplished, they came up_ against a stubborn and unyielding defence against which their assaults have thus far been hurled -in vain, though at terrible cost.

A somewhat unnecessary assurance is given, on the authority of the-Paris Press, that the offensive is not finished. This is quite certain, since- the Germans are still in the position';of squandering lives without any compensating gain of decisive importance, and have no hope of bettering the p.sition except by squandering more'lives. A French military writer r. quoted as stating that there is evury indication that the Germans will continue the offensive until it ;,'s paralysed, which would mean the' commencement of a French offensive elsewhere. It is not clear whether he means that the French will paralyse tho offensive by striking elsewherP*br that they will adhere to ' defensive tactics, so long as tho Germans continue to hurl assaults against Verdun, 'and wait until these assaults have subsided before themselves taking the .offensive. These' at all events are the broad alternatives now before the Allies. The burden,- of course, does not rest upon the French alone. It is for ■ the - Allies 'to, determine whether they will counter the German blow at Verdun or allow the enemy_ full scope to exhaust his offensive force, and the decision of the Allies in this vital matter cannot be anticipated with any 'confidence. To adopt the last-mentioned policy/might be to risk, or even sacrifice, Verdun, and for reasons that have been recently touched upon —notably the moral effect in neutral countries and elsewhere—this is certainly not a .sacrifice to be lightly faced. On the other hand, it would involvs no small sacrifice on the part of the Allies to take up the burden of attack, which they are now permitting tho enemy to fionopolise to his serious loss and the injury of his prospects. » « # . .. At St. Eloi, on the southern flank «f the Ypres aalient, ; the British have captured a mine-crater and some adjacent German trenches. This apparently means the recovery, with an addition, of the whole of the ground won from the enemy towards the end of March, portion of which was subsequently lost. ' i ■ • * * « There are further predictions of an enemy offensive against the Allies in Greece, but they need some better evidence than has yet been presented to make them plausible. As against the drain upon his strength, which would be involved in attacking tho Allies, the enemy has the option of standing unon the defensive in strong positions. He is, therefore, unlikely to take'toe offensive unless in the hope of influencing or intimidating the neutral Balkan States. Obviously an offensive, undertaken with this end in view, which failed to achieve its purpose, wtuld be much worse than useless. And it is, to say the least, somewhat doubtful whether the enemy is able at this stage to' assemble such a force in the Balkans as would enable him to attack the Allies with reasonable prospects" of decisive victory. » ' * »- • The latest attempt to relieve Knt-el-Amara has so far followed precedent as to awaken some uncomfortable doubts and fears. In point of fact, however, the reported check to the British advance seems to be due more to flood conditions than to the resistance of the enemy. After mastering the elaborate Turkish defences at Umm-el-Henna, on the north bank of' the Tigris, about 20 miles below Kut-el-Amara, the British columns swept forward for something like half a dozen miles, but they have been brought to a halt for the time being before the Turkish entrenchments at Sannaiyat. Sir Percy Lake reports that this position was attacke'd at dawn on Sunday, but that the attacking troops did not succeed in penetrating the epemy lines. Prospects of mastering this position looked reasonably bright, since the British troops are in occupation of ground on the south bank of the Tigris, from which the Sannaiyat defences are open to enfilading fire; Floods, however, have opposed serious obstacles to the direct approach on the north bank of the river. It is mentioned in Sir Percy Lake's report that though the weather has improved floods arc still extending, and i'.ave greatly hampered operations. Evidently the Turks at Sannaiyat are in tho position for the time, of having to defend only a narrow passage. In such circumstances the defence is greatly favoured even when account is taken of the flanking fire,which the British arc able to deliver/from the opposite side of tho river. t *' » « Telegrams from Constantinople, it is reported, speak of Turkish confidence in the outlook in Mesopotamia, but such details of these telegrams as are quoted suggest that the Allies aro making their .weight heavily felt. The- Turb are aaicf to

be concentrating over 100,000 men at Mosul, ten miles from Bagdad, and to be feverishly constructing defensive works, which they believe will withstand combined British and Russian assaults. Just exactly what this means is not clear. In the first place, Mosul, unless there are two places so named, -is not ten miles from Bagdad, but 220 miles up the Tigris from that city. If is the Mosul referred to, the suggestion presumably is that the Turks are making it a base frora_ which to dispatch troops against either the Russians or British as occasion may aiise. The Russians in Armenia are at a distance of about 150 miles from Mosul, and their forces in Persia are about as far away to the east. Further south in Persia the Russians arc within about 130 miles of Bagdad, but they are fighting in difficult mountain country,' and between the western vorgo of the mountains and the .Tigris there is a wide belt of desert. It is presumably by a southward movement from Armenia, or from Armenia and Northern Persia, against the Turkish Tigris communications that the Russians are most likely to co-operate effectively with the British forceß In Mesopotamia, and this increases the probability that the Turks are using Mosul as an advanced _ base from which to dispatch reinforcements north or south as they may be required. ■ \

Apart from their details, the telegrams in question are ''■ notable as in-1 Sica-ting that the Turks are appre- ' hensive of effective concerted action I by the Russians and, the British im Mesopotamia, At' ! the moment, however; the essential feature of authentic news is the check sustained by the' British relieving columnß below Kut-el-Amara. It is likely enough, of course, that the check is only temporary, and may not long delay the British advance. The Anglo-Indian' invading army has been reinforced, and if the reinforcement has been upon such a scale as past experience in the campaign has shown to be necessary, the relieving columns on the Tigris should soon be able to resume their forward movement. It is a factor with an important bearing upon this campaign that while the British communications are bad, those of the Turks are by no. means good. The military correspondent of the Morning Post recently,directed attention to a message ' from Mr. Candler, a- British correspondent in Mesopotamia, in which ho told of the difficulties and sufferings which were being experienced by the Turks. The account was based on native information, and,must not, therefore, be'taken too literally: but it serves to call attention to the fact that the situation of the Turkish forces is subject to drawbacks which do not apply to the British. While the latter have open communication with their-base by the river route and are"able to bring up all kinds of supplies and comforts with comparative facility, the Turkish use of the river terminates some distance above Kut-el-Amara, and all supplies have to be forwarded by pack-donkeys and camels the intervening space of some thirty miles, i Their supplies, in the present flooded state of tho country, must, therefore, be scanty' and uncertain,, and it may well be believed, the Morning Post correspondent re-" marks, that they have suffered inordinately from cold and exposure when accompanied by insufficient rations, and that their, moral has correspondingly declined. Their spirits must be further depressed by the defeat of their comrades' in Armenia and the fall of Erzeruri. And their- Arab auxiliaries, never too staunch in allegiance to any ally, may find their ardour flag. -

In its, general suggestion that the Turks are feeling the double strain of Russian and British pressure, |he message based on' Constantinople news is interestingly supplemented by a Petrograd communique, which states' that the Russians are pushing forward and making headway in Armenia, in the mountain region between Lake Van and the Upper Tigris. Diarbekir, for which the Russians are headed, is on the Tigris, some 200 miles, as the crow flies, north and west of Mosul. The Russians are on the move also in Northern Persia. It is not straining the facts to say that they are formidably threatening the communications upon-which the Turks depend in their operations in Mesopotamia.