WHY WE LEFT GALLIPOLI

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2743, 11 April 1916, Page 5

WHY WE LEFT GALLIPOLI

SIR CHARLES MONRO'S DISPATCH

A SITUATION UNIQUE AND

IMPOSSIBLE

By Telegraph—Press Aseociatlon-Oopyri&ht

(Rec. April 11, 0.40 a.m.) London, April 10. General Sir Charles Monro's dispatch dealing with the evacuation of GalliM li sS thai he "as instructed on October 20 last to report upon the miliC ritwtfc£a4vke Aether to evacuate or persevere,, and to state what nurnte of troops would bo required to carry the .peninsula and take Constantinople. m thfi t . ou of t] roops was lmi jn w torv posessing every possible military defect. They were completely subtend tofTurirSlT artillery, fire;-'tne position was without depth; communicaton was iiiecure, depending, on tho weather; there .was no «,sof* coaling the deployment 'of fresh troops for an offensive; further, the Tuiks jessed full powers of observation, and supplemented the natural advantages of their position by all the devices of the field engineer. g Si? C&Mbnro fourxl that the troops were suffer.ng from vanous caused of strain-continuous exposure to shell fire, from.which it was sible to withdraw them, because every corner o the peninsula was exposed to hostile fire; tliev were much enervated by endemic summer diseases; they were gravely under-officered owing to losses in the earlier battles;, also, the makeshift mingling of foot and mounted, necessary for holding- the front, did not tend to efficiency. . , . ' . Other 1 irrefutable arguments convinced him that complete evacuation waß the only, course; namely, tho Turks were - able *o hold Gallipoli with a small force and prosecute their designs on . Egypt and Bacdad, also a British advance from their present positions was improbable, while an advance oil Constantinople was quite oiit of the question—tho troops, therefore, could be more usefully employed elsewhere. . Sir Charles Monro assumed supreme command of tho Mediterranean armies, appointing Sir TV. R. Birdwood to the command- in the Dardanelles, and ordered the evacuation on December 8. - "General Birdwood proceeded with the skill and promptitude which are characteristic of all he undertakes." It had been previously decided that a feint attack-which the text-books regarded as essential to cover evacuation operations-would be worse than' useless, and would certainly arouse Turkish suspicionsi and Sir Chas. Monro thereupon decided that "normal hfo on land and sea should proceed as long as possible. ' Tho dispatch deals briefly with Anzac and Suvla, and adduces several fresh facts about Cape Helles. It mentions that tho evacuation was retarded by the loss of a large horse ship (?)', which was' accidentally sunk by a French battleship. Everything depended on tho weather. When all was ready, on tho night of January 8, a stoTm unexpectedly worked up, washing away the triers A submarine was reported m the evening, quitting the straits., ine hittleshin Prince George, with two (thousand men on board, was sailing towards Mudros when she was torpedoed at midnight. The torpedo did not 6XP The expedition left five hundred animals at, Cape Helles, most of which were destroyed' at the last moment. . .