PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2742, 10 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

P . RO c °l,° f the intensity of the prescnt fighting at Verdun is supplied the fact that the Germans have succeeded at two . points in making some further, headway into the irench defences. On some sections of the front west of the Meuse, against I which the enemy is still chiefly conoentrating, the French have broken and rolled back powerful assaults,' but they, admit the loss of two smal works south of the jrillage of Hancourt, which was captured by the enemy last week, and report also that the enemy has entered, their advanced tienches on a short front a mile or two further east, between Bethincourt and Chattancourt. East of the Meuse the French are still makine some progress in their- counter-at-tacks. The_ situation in that area, therefore, shows no material change, but the position west of the Meuse must be called somewhat critical. It is a state of affairs that commands attention for its own -sake, and still more on account of its general bearing upon the campaign in the Western theatre. Obviously the fact that the French defence at Veidun is feelthe sti'ain of enemy assaults, and giving *way before them oven to- a limited extent, suggests that a time is coming near when the strucd© for supremacy in the Western theatre will no longer centre at Verdun, or, at allevents, will no longer be confined to that area.

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'■r T m T l a £ I devel opments' in' the Battle of Verdun point to a not verv distant termination of the striicrErle on its present lines can hardly be doubted. It .is true that we do not know what margin the defenders still have to work upon; that is to say, we do not know how far the French can still give ground without permitting the Germans to-master the Verdun junction and river-crossing, and the heights of the Meuse., But it is perfectly plain that the' local situation at Verdun is becoming critical. Tho torward movement lately effected by tlic Germans amounts to a very dangerous invasion of the western flank oi the northern Verdun defences, lliis will appear to anyone who looks at a map of tho fighting area. Not the Frenoh front west of the Meuse been deeply penetrated, put it flow presents a narrow project; mg salient which can only be regarded as a weakness. Even 'bofore tho attacked Malancourt, the village of Bcfchincourt, n, few miles west of the river, was situated near the point of a . salient in the French line 'I lie salient, however, was. nroacl. Malancourt. is a mile and a half west, and a little south of Bethincourt, and Haucourt is just about one mile south and a little east of J\ia,lancourt. Capturing Malancourt and Haucourt, and some ground south of the letter place, the Germans have therefore driven in' tho western side of the Bethincourt salient until it is no longer broad but narrow. The German penetration of the French-line south-east of Bethincourt tends to narrow tho salient still further, but here, as reports stand, the enemy's progress has thus far been slight. As the .position is reported, Bethincourt is now the apex of a wedge in the French front, which is not likely to be easily held, though its apparent weakness may be modified by factors of local topography.' The wedge is about two miles deep and three miles wide at its base. Such a projection in .the ordinary way is open to a tremendous concentration of fire, to which a reply in equal power is impossible. The danger, therefore, appears that, short of some new development, the Germans may be able to further deeply penetrate this western flank of the Verdun defences, and this is only another way of saying that the whole position is formidably threatened.

n In tho early days of the present German offensive the possibility was freely canvassed that the Allies might even sacrifice Verdun and the heights of the Meuse rather than be drawn into premature offensivo action. It no longer seems likely that such a heavy sacrifice will be made. Perhaps the best reason for believing that it will not is that the French have fought and al'e fighting at Verdun the greatest defensive, battle of history. Apart from strategical considerations, the moral effect of permitting the enemy now to accomplish his immediate purpose would be extremely serious, in neutral countries and elsewhere, and it may almost be taken for granted that the Allies will exert themselves freely to avert such an untoward ending to a battlo in which the French Army has won immortal glory. It is to he considered also that circumstancos have wholly changed since the German offensive was set. in motion. It is seven weeks since the assault on Verdun opened, and that the Allies felt it necessary seven weeks ago to resort to delaying tactics affords no warrant for believI ing that they are under a similar ! necessity now. On' tho contrary, the time lias been very closely approached when conditions will permit that general and concertcd action on all fronts from which the Allies have everything to-hope, and which the Central limpircs have every reason to fear. The floods reported in Russia, though they oppose a present impediment to operations, herald the advent of conditions which will permit; conflict in full vigour in the Eastern theatre.' Floods in th'e Baltic Provinces mean that even in tho northern' part of the Russian theatre the frosts of wintpr have given placc to thaw, and that the time of tho year is approaching when practicable transport conditions obtain in Russia. Action in the Western theatre will necessarily be governed to some extent by events on the other main front, but this docs not mean, of course, that the Western 'Allies are bound to take the offensive at precisely tho same time as tho Russian*.

The Allies in France and* Flanders are in the position now of knowing that they can take the offensive at any time in the assuranco that they will soon bo aided by concerted action 011 the Russian front, and probably in Italy and the Balkans as well. This being so, it is reasonable to regard the indications \of increasing strain and intensity in fcuo Verdun battle as of much' nioro than local significance. The splendidly determined resistance offered by the French to the' German offensive represents already a magnificat achievement, but it is an achievement that will be effectively founded off only by such action as will-fin-ally and definitely destroy German hopes of even such a local victory as would be represented by the conquest of Verdun and the heights of the Meuse. Such evidence as appears in .the events of the conflict at Verdun does not stand entirely alone as inchoating the probability of early and powerful action by the Allies.. Official reports tell of a pronounced stir of activity on the British front, and of much artillery activity both in Flanders and in Northern France.

, nca F Ypres, is one of the localities in which an abnormal bombardment is reported, but the recent infantry fighting in this- area seems to have died down, leaving the Germans in possession of some of the ground _ which was' won by 4 i e ■ Bl '.^ s ' l . towards the end of April. As a 'possible indica-. tion that exceptional activities are afoot/ this engagement is not to be ignored. The neighbourhood of the xpres salient has witnessed many local battles, but, with the solitary exception'of the present Battle 'of iVerdun, it has witnessed also the heaviest fighting of the war, and at the stage' now reached it is impossible to assign any local or limited motive for action on this section of front. The point is worth emphasising thatrecent eyents, as they are reported in the official messages, bring Flanders into prominence. There is muoh reason to believe that Flanders will again witness conflict on the major scale when the Allies take the offensive 01 a decisive struggle in tho Western theatre is" otherwise precipitated;

The prediction by one correspondent of_a. big battle on the shortly is particularly noteworthy in that he is located in Holland. Unofficial reports of -enemy concentrations of men and g.ins are not in themselves particularly convincing, at all events, as regards, details. Sometimes they have been justified by after-events, but. they have probably'much more often been falsified. But the correspondent in question is amply supported and confirmed in his allusions to an exceptional stir of military preparation in Holland. To the general testimony under this head he adds 'a statement that the Dutch have sent a strong army to the Flanders border, "in case the Allies turn the German right, when Dutch neutrality would be in dat ger of violation by the German retreat." From another source there is a report that a Bill has been 'introduced in the Netherlands Parliament authorising the Government to call up the 1917 olass if necessary. These arc late details added to an already strong body of evidence that Holland is resorting to drastic precautions for the safeguarding of her neutrality. This' is practically equivalent to, saying that the possibility of a German retreat is seriously regarded in Holland, so seriously that it is considered necessary to take immediate precautions against the incidental consequences which would attend such a development. Quite posibly the belief which is reported to obtain in Holland that, the .Allies contemplate an early attempt to turn the German right Hank is not without foundation. It is a factor to be borne in mind that on their northern flank the Allies are in a position to use scapower as an adjunct -to their land forces.' Good service has been done by-a fleet consisting partly of old battleships and partly of monitors in bombarding the German establishments along the Belgian coast. Protected by torpedoers, this feet has been able to defy submarine attack, and there arc .many more unlikely things 'thatf that it may be heard from, as covering a landing or otherwise, when the Allies take the offensive. Wo have had indications recently that the coast-bombarding fleet has been strengthened, and it is, of course, distinct from the British GrandvFlect and other battle fleets upon which the Allies ultimately rely to maintain their command of the sea. »*- * « A circumstantial account, of SubLieutenant Brandon's exploit in attacking a Zeppelin at night- makes it more than ever clear that it was a truly wonderful exhibition of nerve and skill. As our information goes, it was a feat without precedent. Doubt still obtains as to tlie fate of the Zeppelin Sub-Lieutenant Brandon attacked, but it is perfectly plain that if it escaped destruction, the bombs, and not the man who dropped them, were at fault. Whatever the fate of his quarry was, the aviator has set, a standard. It had already been demonstrated that a Zeppelin cannot count upon victory in a contest with a single aeroplane in daylight. Sub-Lieutenant Brandon has shown that the big airship cannot count upon proving superior in such a contest even at nigh 4 t.

Some further progress is reported in Mesopotamia, but stormy weather and floods are hampering tho British columns advancing up the Tigris to the relief of ICut-el-Amara. With the river in flood transport difficulties may be t« some extent reduced, but on the other hand the floods will cover low-lying ground and inereasn the area of the marshes which at many points _ closely approach the banks of the river. Obstacles will also appear from the filling of channels and cuts, some of them normally dry, which approach the river on either hand. A rapid continuation of the advance which has thus far been pressed victoriously is therefore hardly to be looked for until weather conditions improve, but present indications are that the British columns arc pushing forward to some extent, in spite of conditions which decidedly favour the enemy. The Felahio position, which, like that at Umm-el-Henna, filled the space between a marsh and the north bank of tho river, has been captured and passed. The Turks have taken their stand at Sanmuyat, also tin the north bank, some six miles in advance of their main position at Essinn, and a little more than twice that distance from Kut-el-Amara. A very important step towards the redaction of the Sannaiyat position has been taken in the occupation of ground on the south bank of tho rive, from which the enemy entrenchments are open to enfilading fire. So far, the outlook is IHOmistUK, but the extent to which the situation is affected by weather

conditions has yet to be fully disclosed. The Turks at Sannaiyat are said to be posted on ground higher than the neighbouring areas, and stormy weather and floods very probably mean that the ground which must be traversed in an assault upon the entrenchments presents serious obstacles.

The time of floods on the Tigris will not last much longer, but each season in Mesopotamia raises its own problems for an invading army. Along with the more settled weather, which is due presently there will return the enervating heat which was so severely felt last year, particularly by tli® British section of the AngloIncTian force. As regard transport, also, fine weather brings new difficulties in its train. When the river is at its lowest the passage even of small boats is slow and precarious. These conditions of transport will not be encountered at their worst, however, until September, and there are fairly good prospects, at present of the most serious difficulties of the campaign being overcome long before that month is reached.