PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2741, 8 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Moke detailed reports of the fighting in Mesopotamia put it beyond doubt that a determined attempt is being made to relieve Kufc-el-Amara. The Umm-el-Hcnna position, , from which the Turks were dislodged on Wednesday, turns out 1 to have been of considerable strehgth. It consisted of no less than fivo lines 01 entrenchments over a depth of 2500 yards,.and one flank rested on the river and the other on a marsh. The reduction of such a position by direct assault represents a very fine feat of arms by the division engaged. As reports stand, the British forces are shown to have pushed forward on the north bank a distance of about three and a half miles from the front of the, Umm-el-Henna position, while another column has made equal progress on the south bank, where also the enemy has been dislodged from entrenchments. The relieving columns are tcus shown to be within nine miles of_ the main Turkish position at Essinn, seven miles north-east of Kut-el-Amara. Probably the British are by this time well on their way towards Essinn, "if they have not already opened their attack- upon that stronghold. There is mention of another Turkish entrenchment on the north bank three and a half miles beyond the point the British are reported to have reached, but there is no reason to suppose that it will prove a more serious obstacle than the powerfully-de-fended bottle-neck at Umm-el-Hen-na. The decisive battle will be fought at Essinn, and news of it may arrive at any time. ; * , * ■' * A London message dealing with the events of- the Mesopotamia campaign in the recent past' is apparently an imperfect, or at all events incomplete, summary of the newspaper articles upon which it is based. It states that the British attempted to force the Umm-el-Hen-na position on January 21, but that General Ayliier was unable to; hold the ground won. The fact is ignored that General Aylmer renewed the attack in February, ' qpd• not only drove back the Turks at Umm-el-Hcnna, but advanced a dozen miles up river beyond that place. Ho attacked the Essinn position on March 6, but failed to reduce it, and afterwards fcad to reti'cat.

The full strength of the advancing British columns is not disclosed in tho official reports. , Two divisions are mentioned, one on cither bank, but the fact that these divisions have thus far borne the brunt of tho fighting involved in dislodging the Turks from their advanced positions does not mean, of course, that they represent the total British strength. "It is likely, oh tho contrary, that considerable additional forces are in I to take oart in the attack

on Essiun. The relieving columns are commanded, not by the Comman-der-in-Chief (Sir Peiicv Lake); but by General .Gorringe. General Ayuier has been superseded, for what reason is not 6tated. General Gorringe, who is <18 years of ago, has a' record of active service in Egypt, South Africa, and elsewhere. He served upon Lord Kitchener's staff in the last ■ Sudan campaign, and in the Boer War, and commanded a flying column in Capo Colony in 1901. Subsequently he held various staff appointments. He was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1911, and was given command of a brigade in India in the following year. As appeared from General Nixon's dispatch published a couple of days ago, General Gorringe held a command in tho southern part of the Mesopotamian theatre in tho early part of last year. »•* ' * Responsibility for the venturesome attempt to reach Bagdad in November last is fastened by tho Morning Post upon the Imperial Government,! in terms which suggest a peculiar conflict of authority. At the time 1 when the advance on Bagdad was. ordered the Mesopotamian campaign was controlled, or supposed to oe controlled, by "the Indian Government, to whom General, Nixon, the then Commander-in-Ch'ef, was, _ accordingly, directly responsible. Yet, according to the Morning Post, the Imperial Government acted on General Nixon's advice when it ordered the advance in spite of a protest by General Tovnshend, based upon the inadequacy of the force at his disposal. Mr. Chamberlain, on his defence, has stated that the advance was not ordered in defiance of military opinion, but if this means only that the enterprise was endorsed by the late Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia-, and condemned by the Commander immediately concerned! the defence ,is anything but strong. "Whatever may be true as regards responsibility for the advance upon Bagdad, it is now perfectly clear that it was undertaken in face of hopeless odds. At the same time it is possible that the turn given to the campaign by the abortive thrust at Bagdad has been productive of good results.. The Morning Post- suggests that, the risky enterprise was undertaken, chiefly at Mr. Churchill's instigation, in the hope of diverting the Turks from Gallipoli, and thus retrieving "the ghastly blundter of tho Dardanelles." This is not very convincing, considering that the evacuation of Gallipoli must have been at least in sight as a possibility when the advance on Bagdad was ordered; but that the extension of the campaign in Mesopotamia has in fact amounted to a very useful diversion seems hardly to admit of dispute. It may yet appear that the bold threat to Bagdad had the effect of diverting Turkish troops which otherwise would have usei in the .Balkans, or against Egypt. .

A brief lull in the Verdun battle has given place to a renewed outburst of violent fighting on both sides of the. Meuse. Powerful attacks by the Germans are reported against several points on the AvocourtBethincourt front. This is a section of front four miles long from point' to point, extending west and south from a point four miles west of the Meuse. Avocourt is the western flank of the northern Verdun defences. The village of Malancourt, which is in the hands of the Germans, is situated equidistant from Avocourt and Bethincourt, but advanced from a direct line connecting them. At aheavy cost in lives the enemy has gained ground south of Malancourt. The village of Haucourt, which he has entered, is situated about a mile south and a little east of Malancourt. ' This is the most decided forward step the enemy has taken since he captured Malancourt. On the other hand, the French report that they have attacked ancl gained ground north of Avocourt; and in the area east of the Meuse they have penetrated the enemy works, southwest of Fort Douaumont, for a distance of over 200 yards on a front of over 500 yards. An enemy attack at another point east of the Meuse was broken at'its inception, and disaster befell the enemy also in one of two great attacks launched west of the river. * * * * Time only will show the importance of the German advance at Haucourt. It is minimised by the French on the ground that the village is under their fire from dominating positions, but a similar claim was advanced in regard to the egress from Malancourt, when that pl.'ice passed to. the enemy, ancl events have demonstrated that the claim had only temporary value. So far as area is concerned, the French seem to have gained as much p round in the latest fighting as they have lost, and perhaps more, but it cannot be taken for granted from this that the battle is developing on give-and-take lines without advantage to either side. ■ , ♦ » * * The arresting feature of lhe battle in its latest phase is not the change of ground disclosed, but the fact that the French are attacking fieely, as if anxious to retain their present Ijine in its essentials, e>ven at material sacrifice. Possibly in their attack north of Avocourt the Trench seized a favourable opportunity and turned it to account at light cost, but the advance south-west of Fort Douaumont was effected L-y hand-to-hand fighting, and this means that there were heavy losses, not confined to one side. There is here an indication, not conclusive as yet, that the French are departing from the almost purely defensive tactics they have hitherto pursued at Verdun and are setting themselves to arrest the enemy's further advance even at the cost of sacrificing the advantage they have hitherto enjoyed as a result of leaving him an almost total monopoly of attack. This, at an immediate view, would imply a certain narrowing of the margin upon which the Allies are working in resisting the enemy's attempts to_draw_them, prematurely from their point of view, into a decisive conflict. As yet, however, all that we know definitely is that the Verdun battle is again raging furiously, and _ tTiat there have been losses and gains of territory on both sides.

■ In Germany the idea is being popularised that the advanced Verdun, though slow, is sure, and will Eo continued irresistibly. This presumably is the object aimedat by the German semi-official agencics whose comments on the battle are quoted today, and the tributes paid to the strength of'the defences and the excellence of the French organisation may bo regarded as added for effect. That a continuance of the battle on the lines it has followed to the present date would involve a continued German advance is no

doubt truo enough. The experience the war' suggests that any conceivable position is to be mastered in time, at its price in men and maferinl. The qualifying and saving consideration where Verdun is concerned is, of course, that the Germans have no assurance that they will be allowed to persevere in their present tactics. They are attacking tho Verdun lines and squandering men in the knowledge that the Allies have it. in their power at any timo to take counter-action .which would bring the attack on Verdun to a halt, and that they are refraining from this action only because it pays them to fight meantime a delaying instead of a decisive battle.

British official reports tell of an enemy attack on the trenches lately won at St. Eloi, near-Ypres, leading to a, heavy engagement, the result of which has yet to' be made known. This may be the beginning of greater events. It would be no surprising development if the enemy followed up and supplemented his Verdun offensive by a grand assault on the British front. Indeed, his natural course seems to be in this direction in view of his continued failure to draw an Allied counter-stroke, and the rapid approach of tho time when lie must expect to be engaged on all fronts. Staking as he is upon a decisive conflict in the West, to indulge in half-measures would be one way of courting ruin. He cannot hope fo make his _ Western offensive productive otherwise than by intensifying and magnifying its power and an attempt to spread and develop the offensive is therefore reasonably to be expopted.

A report that Bulgaria is concentrating six 'divisions against the southern frontier of Rumania and that necessary defensive measures are beings taken in tho latter country is highly interesting, but of uncertain value. The move is one that mightvverty t naturally be taken by Bulgaria in anticipation of Rumania entering the war. In that event the Central Powers would have to choose between striking an immediate and shattering blow at Rumania or seeing their whole south-eastern campaign upset,' and a vulnerable flank laid open. _ Assuming- an attack upon Rumania to be decided upon, Bulgaria would have every incentive to assist-, and might hope to create, fh the manner indicated, a powerful diversion in favour of her Allies. So many plausible, but unreliable, stories have been tolcl about Rumania and her neighbours, that it is best to regard late additions to the number with a certain amount of doubt. . There are some general reasons for believing that Rumania is likely to enter the war, but direct evidence on the subject is at present lading.