PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2730, 27 March 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Belated news of a naval engagement fought in the North Sea at the end of February shows that though the Moewe contrived to evade the British patrols, her sister ship was .less fortunate. She was stopped and sunk, howeVer, at a cost to the Navy of a fine auxiliary cruiser, the Royal MaSil Steam Packet Company's steamer Alcantara, of over 15,000 tons. From the'reports it would seem that the German ship, the Greif, was outmatched in gun-power. At all events, she was sunk by gunfire, while the Alcantara was torpedoed, apparently by a submarine, and not by the stricken Greif. The British losses totalled 74, including five officers, but 180 Germans lost their lives, and 120 officers and men were picked up and made' prisoner. The action involved still another German violation of tho laws of war. It is stated that the Greif had Norwegian colours painted on her side, ana therefore carried them throughout the action. Usage sanctions the use of a foreign flag by a ship endeavouring to evade the enemy or when approaching an enemy ship, but a warship is required to boist her national nag before opening fiie.

The identity of the Grcif is not cleared up by the statement that she ■was a sister ship to Moewe. ]t is true that a "Greif" and a ■'Moewe" both appear on Lloyd's Register as owned by the same firm in Bremen, but they are not sister ships. In the Ber/ister the Greif appears as a ship of 1165 tons, and the Moewe as of 1251 tons, and there are considerable in the leading dimensions of the two ciaffc. As reports go, it is quite possible that the Greif sunk in the North Sea was of no great size. She carried a crew of 300 officers and men, but may have been intended to transfer men and guns to ships captured on the high seas. The fact that her, destruction was not , announced by the Admiralty until it had been admitted by the Germans suggests that she may_ not have been the only intended raider caught in the net of the British patrols. It is very possible that thc'Moewo was a solitary exception in a list of- raiders which but for that, exception have shared t/Ie fate of the Greif. It is but another instance of the ability of the Admiralty to preserve a masterly silence even under criticism which might' easily bo answered, when silenco is the policy best suited to carve tho cuds for which' the fleets of Britain are striving, Out

naval men are not looking for pubwhich, though it may bring plaudits, Enlightens the .enemy, but (ii'c_ content to rest satisfied with their own knowledge of tho success which is attending their efforts.

In the Baltic Provinces, where vcfy heavy fighting is in progress, the turn of events seems to be still in favour of the Russians. Near Jacobstadt, midway between the port of Riga ancl Dvinsk, they have broken powerful German attacks; opposite Dvinsk itself they have captured enemy positions, and arc advancing. Seventy miles further squth, east of Vilna, the Russians are persevering in an attempt to force a powerfully defended passage between two lakes. Prom tlie terms of the latest communique in hand it is to bo inferred that the success achieved in the Dvinsk region is regarded as of considerable importance. ,

No better proof couid bo desired of the restored power of the Russian army than is to bo found in the vigour with which the offensive in this northern region is being pressed. As one correspondent points out, all the art of German engineers has been devoted during the winter to making the Baltic Provinces front impregable. Though last year's campaign did not give the enemy decisive sncoes, it left him in a position to select his ground with an eye to the future. Yet, although they are favoured as matters stand by both the natural and artificial strength of their positions, the Germans have already given way perceptibly at more than one_ point before tho vigour of the Russian onslaught. The successful, though not rapid, development of the offensive is tlie more significant since it is tolerably certain that operations in the north are second in importance to the conflict which must open presently at the other extremity of the Eastern front. The Russians are not likely to put forth any effort for some time_ to come in the Baltic Provinces which tliey are not capable of considerably exceeding in Southern Russia and Galicia.

News from Salonika is so important that it must await official confirmation. At the end of last week it was reported that German troops had been expelled by the Frenoh from some positions on the Greep frontier. This was not the first incident of its kind, and did not seem to be of any great importance, but it is now reported that fighting between Ghevgeli and Doiran, that is to say, along the Greek frontier east and west of the Vardar River and railway, is tending to develop into a general action on the whole line. This may possibly be tho first news of extremely important developments. It cannot yet be taken for granted that the Allied army at Salonika is leaving its fortified lines to open an offensive campaign, but such a move is, of course, possible now at any time.

Even if the current news overestimates the importance of events on the Greek frontier, it should not be long now before some definite test is applied to the conflicting views of those who approve and maintain the utility of the Near Eastern campaign, and those who stand for the greatest possible concentration of strength in the Western theatre even at the cost of giving the Central Powers undisputed command of the Balkans. The question at issue must no doubt Tie determined ultimately in the main theatres, but the outlook in the Balkans at the moment is by no means unfavourable to the Allies. No other conclusion seems possible than that the Central Powers must be either to lose what they have won in this region or to send strong forces into Bulgaria and Serbia, which they can even less spare from the main theatres than the Allies can spare tho force landed at Salonika. The downfall of Bulgaria might have little direct effect upon the military position of the Central Empires, but it would have an immense political effect. And now that the Allies at Salonika have been, or are being, reinforced by 160,000 Serbs, it is becoming difficult to see how tho Central Empires'can avert or postpone the downfall of Bulgaria except by lending her very powerful aid.

An item' which possibly has a bearing upon the position in the Balkans is the War Office announcement that owing to the satisfactory military position in Egypt there has been a reorganisation of the forces, and that Sir Archibald Murray has assumed sole command, General Maxwell returning to England. "Reorganisation of tne forces," in the circumstances, no doubt means that it has been found possible to transfer some of the troops to another theatre. This may mean a. powerful reinforcement of the Allies in the. Balkans, though it is equally possible, perhaps more likely, that troops withdrawn from Egypt may be transferred to the Western theatre.

Rumania, according to an Athens message, has completed the mobilisation of forty new regiments, making an army of 120 regiments of 3800 men each—an aggregate strength of 456,000 men, though, of course, if enly infantry regiments are in question, the totaT' strength of the army would be much greater. This must stand for what it is worth, but if Rumania has mobilised on tfye scale indicated, she must be contemplating war, and that at no distant date.

A veiw striking statement is credited to M. Venizelos. Affirming, as he has done before, his absolute confidence in the ultimate victory, of the Allies, he expresses a hope that the rulers of Greece may learn wisdom even at the last minute. "Let us pray," he concludes, "that it be not then too late." The fear thus' forcibly expressed is not difficult to understand. Though she has not yet filed a. shot, Greece has much at stake in this war. Attention has been fastened upon her treacherous desertion of Serbia; but in addition to sacrificing her ally she is imperilling,' and has all but sacrificed, her own future. The war brought her an opportunity, not only of taking her stand in powerful company against the enemies of all small States, but of extending_ her national boundaries, certainly in the islands of the Aegean, and possibly 'on the mainland of-Asia Minor as well. Under opportunist and pro-German leadership, she has not only betrayed 'her ally, but allowed these opportunities to slip by. In all eyes to-day, she is feeble as well as forsworn, and the danger by which she is faced is that her world may be recast around her on firm and enduring lines, leavhigher not only dishonoured, but insignificant amongst neighbours with whom she might have ranked as an equal. There is only too much reason for the almost despairing spirit in which M. Venizelos looks to his country's future.

Mn. AusTen Chamberlain's statement on the subject of the Mesopotaraian campaign is a confession, but it brings to light comparatively little that was not already known, except that control of the campaign has now been transferred from tbe Secretary of State for India to the Imperial General Staff. The earlier operations _in Mesopotamia were crowned with brilliant success, but it is not now open to dispute that the advance on Bagdad—thoagh Mr. Chaiiberlain says it wjas n-..t ordered in defiance of military opinion—was undertaken with absolutely' inadequate resources of men and material. The main qucstira now to be determined is wh.uh;r these shortcomings can be made good before disaster overtakes the little force under General Townshend, which has been besieged iii Kut-el-Amara for close upon four'months. In referring to the outlook, Mr. Chamberlain was mildly optimistic. The transfer of authority, he said, had already proved advantageous. Detail news shows no material change in the situation. General Toavnshend's force in Kut-el-Amara was recently subjected to a prolonged la nil and air bombardment, but suffered few casualties. The relieving column, last reported some 23 miles down the river, has captured a small enemy post on the south bank, but there is rio indication that it bas effected any material advance.

A continued lull seems to obtain ac Verdun, and it is perhaps significant that the present time has been selected for the publication of an order of the day in which General Joffre thanks his troops for having, with indomitable courage, barred the road to Verdun. The order speaks of three weeks' fighting, so that it was apparently issued about a fortnight ago. Apart from its note cf confidence, it deserves attention on account'of the emphasis it lays upon the importance of the struggle for Verdun, and the magnitude of the enemy's effort. Nothing that has been said by unofficial commentators goes further in this connection than the considered statement of tho Allied Commander-in-Chief. He calls it the most formidable assault the enemy has ever attempted—ah assault to which, expecting success, he consecrated his best troops and most powerful artillery, hoping that the fall of Verdun would hardin the courage of his Allies, and convince neutrals of Germany's superiority. It has been assumed throughout that the Germans hoped for a decisive victory, but General Joffre's state-' ment makes it possible to hold this belief with double confidence, and supplies a standard by • which ■ to measure the magnitude of the German defeat.