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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Practically no change is reported in the Verdun situation at time of writing, except that the Germans have been ejected from portions of the trench eloments which they mastered in their last attack west of the Mcuse. ' A somewhat novel departure is made by the (French in issuing a semi-official statement which purports _ to anticipate, instead of reviewing, events. Confirming tho view that another great conflict on tho Verdun . front—the third act of the battlo—is begining, it adds that while the Germans aro expected to make every effort to capture Morthomme (Dead Man's Hill), which is the pillar of the French defences west of the_ Mouse, s tho 'attempt to-capture this position will not succeed. The departure from normal procedure involved in issuing a report of this character is somewhat extraordinary. It is to bo considered, however, that in issuing a report of this kind the French may be animated by some ulterior motive. In an area like the Western theatre there is immense scope for a war of wits as well as for.a colossal struggle of armies, and great possibilities of successful deception by one side or the other to their own profit and the disadvantage of opponents. An important element in such a war of wits is to conceal from the enemy the extent to which his designs have been penetrated and his intentions anticipated. For instance, if the French have discovered that a renewal of the Verdun attack is not the only enterprise contemplated bv 1 ho Govmana in tho noay future it might suit their purpose to aretfliul

a belief that the enemy is concentrating undividedly against Verdun This is not necessarily the correct, or even a probable, explanation, but, the past character of French semiofficial statements—they have usually been reviews of past events intend' ed to present tlicm in their trui/ perspective—makes it likely that the latest addition to their number i 3 issued in the form it takes for some reason that docs not appear on tho surfacc. .

It must be added that in the confidence with which it affirms tho strength, and indeed the impregnability of the essential Verdun defences, the semi-official statement is in keeping with other reports on the subject. Yesterday an interesting description of the French lines was contributed by Mr. Frederick Villierk, and he appended to his description an opinion that the chances of ! the Germans breaking through were very remote. To-day further evidence to the same effect is supplied in the report of a visit to Verdun by a, British Parliamentary delegation. While Mr. Villiers dwelt upon the immense resisting power of the French defences, tho later report emphasises the perfection of the French transport organisation, in which chief reliance is placed upon a- highly efficient, motov service. This factor of transport ia quite as important as strength of front. General Petain, who commands at Verdun, is said to havo told the members of the Parliamentary delegation: "I am certain of ov.r final success." Optimistic as it is, this statement is non-com-mittal, and does not preclude the possibility of a further contraction of the French lines stiould it prove necessary in pursuance of tho policy of avoiding needless sacrifice of lire. The .other statement is in a different category. In the event of its not being borne out by events it would give the enemy an opportunity which he would certainly turn to account of exaggerating a tocal succeaa.

An unofficial message avers that there is the best authority for stating that tho French losses at Verdun total less than 12,000, while artillery losses amount only to .84 guins, which were rendered useless ittfore being abandoned. If this were true, it would be a remarkable vindication of tha policy tbe French have pursued, but it is incredible that the French losses since the Germans opened their offensive more than three weeks ago have really been so light. The German losses up to about the end of last week were estimated at 200,000, and even if they have had considerably moro than 12,000 men killed and wounded the Fronch have no reason to bo dissatisfied with the results of tho battle up to its present stage.

Though means are lacking of measuring their exact importance, 'the sensational decline in German exchange at New York and the coincident drop at Copenhagen undoubtedly have -a certain signi; ficarice. The decline is taken by the New York Herald to reveal the world's perception of German's impending financial and military collapse. It has been suggested thai .purely financial stringency is not likely to bring Germany to her knees. Necessarily it injures her credit and puts her at a serious disadvantage in such foreign trade aa shp, is awo to carry on with, and through neighb6uring neutral countries. But a very great part ol what &hc needs to carry on tho wa\ is produced l by Germany'within her own borders, and a despotism had ways and means of overcoming financial problems, while war continues, so "far as internal production is concerned. Possibly this view of the matter takes too little account of the German financial and commercial coterie, whose members did so much to promote the war of aggression. By them the indefinite prolongation oi a paper war, whiea is merely a method of staving off for a time the ruinous collapse which is ultimately inevitable, is likely to b<» viewed with anything but equanimity. _ At all events the view that financial -considerations •vi!) operate as an important factor in compelling 'Germany to relinquish the struggle does not lack exponents of high standing and authority. A very definite statement on the subject _ was made by the Russian Foreign Minister (M. Sazonoff) in an interview given to Petrograd journalists at the end of January last. According to the Morning Post, when ho was asked on that occasion his opinion as to the duration of tho war, M. Sazonokf said that he did not think it would last very much loiiger, since Germany would be for financial reason the first to give in. "Nevertheless,"'be added, "we must continue to make intense preparations for a summer campaign."

, Not a great deal is klded to what was known of the position in Mesopotamia by the official report of an action, fought on Saturday last, in which the British, under Hie Percy Lake, stormed and carricd a Turkish advanced position on the Tigris, but withdrefo with 50 prisoners after killing a considerable number of defending troops. The exact locality of, the action is not mentioned, but apparently the British have withdrawn for a, distance fro.m before the Turkish main position, seven miles easS of Kut-el-Amara, which was .unsuccessfully attacked by General Ayljier about a week ago. On the other hand, the fact that the Commander-in-Chief has taken personal charge of the advanced operations makes it likely that the relreving column, hitherto commanded by General _ Aylmer, has been considerably reinforced. The Turkish position at Essinn, seven miles east of Kut-el-Amara) which constitutes the chief obstacle to the advance of the relieving column, is of very great strength, though 'it was captured by General Townshend in September last in tho_ course of the advance up river, which came to a halt at Otesiphon.

• .» » . • \ As the Essinn positiqn was then described by a correspondent with the British force, it consists of twelve miles of defences across the river at right angles to its general direction at this point, six miles on the right bank and six miles on the left. The works on the right bank (where General Ayljiek made his recent attack) were strengthened by the existence of an old water-cut. The banks of this, ten to twenty 'feet high, towered above the rest of the flat country, and afforded excellent facilities for viewing the deployment of troops advancing to . the attack. A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed a flank attack in that direction. (General Aylmeu, it will be remembered, attempted a flank attack on the extreme right.) On the left bank, the line of defences was cut in two by an impassable mtirsh, two miles broad* so that from tba left bank of

the river there were, first, two miles of trenches, then two miles of marsh, and then again two more miles of defences. Much labour had been expended on these defences, each section consisting of many successive lines of trcnchcs, connected ' by an intricate network of deep communication, trenches, along .vhich a complete system of water suppiypipes had been laid. Not much can have been done by the British to damage these defences prior to the •present Turkish occupation, and it is probable that the Essinn position is, if anything, even stronger litiw thafi when ,it was captured by General Townshend.

Only Dutch reports r.re available as yet of an Allied air raid which, if these reports are to be taken ( on trust, was of exceptional, importance. The aviators, it is said, raided the great ICrupp arsenal at Essen, which place is 35 miles east of the Dutch frontier, - and also Munohon Gladbach, south-cast of Essen. Since it is possible that rumour has fastened upon and exaggerated a reconnoitring flight, or built upon fcome still slighter foundation, the statement that six sheds at Essen were destroyed must await confirmation. If the report is in accord with fact, the achievement is notable. It would fall considerably short of realising the dream of a devastating attack on the Krupp arsenal by a mighty fleet of aeroplanes capable of wiping it out of'existence, but would still be important in itself, ancl an earnest of greater things to follow. If the raid was actually made it will no doubt shortly be the subject of official reports.

Though there has been a considerable stir of aerial activity lately, particularly in the vicinity, of the Verdun front and on related lines of communication, very much greater developments are to be expected as the season opens, and this year may 'be expected to witness aerial offensives on a scale not hitherto approached. The rapid expansion of the British air service, some, features of which were outlined by Mr. Tennant in introducing the Army Estimates, Has teen paralleled in other belligerent countries, and whatever . the undisclosed potentialities of the airship ?.Kly be the aeroplane is undoubtedly destined to play an increasingly important part in the war. In keeping with their other 'measures for improved co-ordination in the cljuduct of the war, the Allies aro now holding a _ monthly conference in .Paris en military aviation. According to Me. H. Massac Buist, this is but one example among many of the measures the Allies are taking to raise'the standard of aerial efficiency. Thus, French airmen go as instructors to Russia, whence in turn Russian airmen go to France to instruct French flying units intended for the Eastern theatre of war ; and so on. What each special section of each nation's aviation service learns from actual'experience in the war is being pooled more and more effectively as month succeeds month.

_ The possibilities of vigorous offensive aerial action c/n a large scale aro lucidly set "forth in. a book, entitled Aircraft Jn Warfare, just published from the pen of Mb. F. W. Lanchester, _an authority of. standing. The importance of the publication may bo gauged from the fact that it is supplied with ah introduction by Major-General Sib David Henderson (Director-Gencral of Military Aeronautics). A really large, fleet of aeroplanes, Mr. Lanchester says, could carry out a continuous and unrelenting attack on each and every point of strategic importance. He adds:

Depots of every kind in the rear of the enemy's lines would ceasc to exist; no bridge would be allowed to stand for twenty-four hours; railway junctions would be subject to continuous bombardment; and the lines of railway and roads themselves broken up by giant bombs to such an extent as to taifie all attempts to maintain or restore "communication. In this manner a virtually impassable zone would be created in rear of the enemy's defences, a zone varying perhaps from 100 to 200 miles in width. Once this condition has been brought about the position of the defending force must be considered as precarious.

* »' v * Dealing in the same volume with the. problem ot the air defence ofLondon, Mr. Lanchester docs not hide_ the fact that it is one of exceeding difficulty:

.So long (hb observes) as the weather conditions are favourable to defence, anything in the nature of a daylight attack on London could be rendered impossible by a sufficient fosce of aeroplanes, b,ut hero even, in the event of an attack in great-force, it is by no means certain that' snmo measure of success might lint bo achieved. When the rreather conditions are favourable to attack, also in the case of attack by night, thei;e is no means of defence known to the author which would prevent the enemy ,from inflicting enormous damage, if he attacks in sufficient numerical force, and is prepared to act with determination in spite of any losses he may sustain.

This seems to give strong support to the view that the best way of dealing with the enemy Zeppelins is to aim at destroying them in their sheds, and that generally vigorous offensive aerial action .holds out incomparably the best prospects of advantage. ■ •

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19160317.2.24

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2722, 17 March 1916, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
2,218

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2722, 17 March 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2722, 17 March 1916, Page 4

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