PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2709, 2 March 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

6 Such news as there is at tho moment from the Western theatre docs less to lay open any_ new fact than to state and emphasise a question—the question as to where the enemy will strike his next blow. It can no longer be doubted that the assault on the Verdun lines has declined from its maximum power and intensity. As much was suggested yesterday, but with such reservations that there would have been no cause for surprise if the apparent lull had suddenly given place to a renewal of the battle in all its former fury. Matters have not taken this course, and the effect' of to-day's news at time of writing is to make the fact more definitely evident that a comparative lull has now succeeded to the cyclonic conflict of a day or two ago. The latest French communique in hand states that bombardment is abating' on the front, north of Verdun, tnat no infantry action lias been fought in that area in the immediate past, and that the Germans are entrenching on the ground they have won. Some heavy fighting, it is true, is still in evidence. In the V/oeuvrc district, east of Verdun, the Germans have, _ captured the greater part of the village.of ManMullcs, nvhich they were reported yesterday to have attacked unsuccessfully, and lean Imjioi'tant fighting it. yannvtaiS 'v Lam'aine, where the

enemy entered some advanced French positions, only to be thrown out again almost immediately. Even the battle in the Woeuvrc district is described, not by a correspondent, but in an official communique, as an attempt by tho Germans to create a diversion. Such fighting as is visible fjt the moment in no way compares with the tremendous conflict which ragccl for more than a week north of Verdun. It is nearer the truth to say that except for the declining stir in the region of the great battle, the Western front has regained something like the aspect it wore before the battle opened. There is mention of local fighting at many points on the line, with no clear indication as to where the storm of battle will next break forth. 'That the lull is only temporary, and likely to be short-lived, is evidently a general opinion, and tho opinion is one that does not lack supporting evidence. The contention is plausible that In determining to take the offensive in the Western theatre the Germans have_ been largely' influenced by the consideration that climatic 'conditions in Kussia and on the AustroItalian frontier and in the Balkans will hinder action upon any important scale in those theatres for some weeks to. come. The assumption follows, of course, that-they have risked a greater concentration in the Western theatro than they would have risked had the way been in all respects clear for oftensive action by the Allies in other theatres of war. If the Germans are to profit by the bar imposed by winter upon Allied action in other theatres, they must take time by the forelock in prosecuting _ their Western offensive. Otherwise they may present*!)' find themselves arrested in mid-career by assaults on all fronts. * * * * We have heard a good deal lately about the danger of the Allies being drawn _ into a premature offensive, but this need not be taken to mean that it is the natural and wise policy on their part to sit tight in theirlines until the Germans are reduced to inertia because they are no longer ablo to muster force for an assault. It would be a very risky policy on the part of the Western Allies to take the offensive ly?ore Russia - and Italy, and possibly the Allied forces in tho Near East, arc ready to act Simultaneously, but it does not follow that the Allies are likely to adhere to the policy of sitting tight after the weather has opened. At a reasonable view conditions will then ibe in tTie degree favourable to a policy pi vigorous enterprise. To gcther with the. immense expansion of the Allied military power, it is to be considered that the enemy, with his declining resources, is committed to the defence of enormously extended lines, and that he must defend them without tho enormous advantage which first-class communications conferred upon him in the opening stages of the war. Even in the furthest extension of his Western front his communications are excellent, but this is emphatically not true of the opposite main front, where he has to depend largely upon slow travelling over bad roads of enormous extent, and though unbroken railway communication may have been established with Turkey, the rapid movement of troops to or from the south-eastern theatre, as occasion may demand, can hardly lie regarded as a practical possibility. It must rather be assumed that the return of gobd weather will find the Germanic Allies threatened everywhere and in no such position as they formerly were to rapidly mass troops at any threatened point. .* * Si * ■Visible circumstances as a whole 'point strongly to a probability that the Allies will be content with' a defensive policy only until conditions enable them to act' simultaneously and in concert. When that point is reached it should be wholly in their interests to abandon a ■ defensive attitude for one of violent aggression, calculated to impose a maximum strain and pressure upon the enemy, and intensify the difficulties in which he is encompassed by reason of his general circumstanccs and the location of his widely separated armies. We thus return to the point that the Germans are presumably hoping to make profitable use of the margin of time supposed to bo available before the Allies will be able to open a simultaneous offensive. in all theatres. This is the theory_ in favour at the moment, and if it is sound the Germans must cither develop their Western offensive in its maximum effect, with all possible speed, or. confess themselves •at a loss. The present lull does not discredit the theory, nor does it necessarily imply that the Germans are any less set than they have been upon a_ determined effort to smash the Allied front. Nothing more is implied than that this effort, liki others which have preceded it, is an affair of pulsations, in which the full storm of Dattle alternates with intervals devoted to reorganisation of tho forces employed and to the accdmalation of material, in, preparation for renewed assault. » * * * No better evidence is needed that the Germans intend to persevere in their efforts to shatter the Allied armies in the Western theatre than is to bo found in tho nature and magnitude of their opening assault on the Verdun lines, 'and in the fac!» that as yet. they have nothing of moment to set a era ins t tlw tcrribla sacrifices_ they have icurred. It is not possible on available information to set German and Allied losses in the Verdun battle in contrast and strike a balance, but tho essential fact stands unchallenged that the Germans have suffered appalling losses without getting perceptibly nearer to the object they set themselves to attain. The German losses in the battle during seven days, to February 27, arc semi-officially estimated at 130,000, and against this they have gained nothing more than a few additional miles of French territory. The line .they set themselves to break is apparently more firmly established than ever. Considering that a time is rapidly approaching" when the Germans will be called upon to defend their farflung lines against' definitely l superior forces, these are decisive facts, As to tho immediate outlook, if the Germans now desist from their assault they have sacrificed a {treat body of strength for an inconsiderable' gain. It is not easy, however, to imagine thorn desisting at this stage. Good grounds exist for classing the assault on the Verdun lines as dictated by a policy of desperation, but now that tho effort to break the Allied line has gone so far, its abandonment could hardly bo distinguished from a confession of despair. * •» » *

The Duke of Richmond is quoted as relating that a friencl of his found General Joffre delighted at the German .•uisault™"Utevally rubbing hie hands," This mv bo

only the kind of story that old gentlemen are fond of • passing around, but it gives e'oncrete shape to a hope that is alive in many hearts to-day—the hope that Germany has been betrayed to her undoing into tactics of the beast at bay. All that We know of the position goes to show that the hope rests upon a firm basis of fact, and seeing his enemy in such a case General Joffke might reasonably manifest delight even in presence of the terrible tribute of lives that is being levied. ■ Victory in the war is not to be won save at terrible cost, but such a blunder as Germany appears to have made should lighten the cost, and bring an Allied victory nearer. * *' * * The sinking of the French auxiliary cruiser Provence with the loss of more than a thousand lives may seem to carry special point and significance on account of the German threats of a new and more frightful submarine campaign, but in point of fact no such connection between this tragic event and the German threat can reasonably be supposed to exist. Being an auxiliary cruiser, employed on her last and fateful voyage as a transport, the Provenco would have been exposed to attack without warning even by the submarines of a Power paying some regard to international law. It has to be recognised that the possibility of such disasters will exist so long as Jin enemy submarine .is at largo in the Mediterranean. Much has been done by the Allied navies to cut down the submarine mcnacc, but it has from the first been recognised that the task is immensely more difficult in the Mediterranean than in the seas around Great Britain. The area to be patrolled is immensely greater, and the underwater craft are favoured by. the presence of numerous archipelagoes where it must be a difficult matter to discover their depots, even bv the most persevering and vigilant patrolling. As 'far as is known attention has had to be largely concentratcd upon safeguarding the approaches to Salonika and other ports, and in this department the anti-submarine campaign has achieved a largo measure of success.' Further afield ships traversing the Mediterranean must of necessity to a great extent take their chance. The Provence, it is stated, was torpedoed in the Central Mediterranean. That a ship should be overtaken in this way far out at sea implies a measure of ill-fortune, since the factors of area and distance which make close patrolling impossible also make it difficult for the submarine .to -get within striking distance ' of .■ its quarry. •' • * 9 It is' noteworthy that at the inquest on the victims of the Maloja disaster,, the chief officer said he was of opinion that the ship was torpedoed. According to earlier reports the liner struck a mine, hut an expert opinion to-the contrary cannot be altogether disregarded. If the Maloja was torpedoed by a submarine tne event marks the first break in a- long period of immunity from submarine attack by ships passing through the Straits of JDover. Even so, it might be no more than the exception to an established rule, a case of one exceptionally lucky submarine penetrating a 'defensive screen which many submarines have failed to penetrate. It may bo noted, however, that if the Germans succeed in turning out a more effective submarine- the improvements are more likely to take the form of superior navigating power and increased facilities for concealed approach than that of greater striking power.' There has been, some talk lately; of new super-submarines, carrying six-inch guns and armoured on their upper surface, but what new purpose such a craft would serve other than that db a slow and inefficient snrfacc-cruiser it is impossible to imagine. So far as torpedo work is concerned," it could hardly cjccel the ordinary submarine, which carries torpedoes of the most powerful type ancl is capable, under its own conditions, of sinking capital ships. On the otlvir hand, improvements in the periscope, and generally in _ .methods of underwater navigation and concealed approach, might materially incrcaso tho offensive power of the submarine. * * « The official announcement that tho Provence was carrying troops to Salonika is the first definite, intimation for some time that the Allied army in Greece is still being reinforced, though there have been numerous unofficial reports to that effect. Stoi ies are again current that discontent with German rule is running high in. Bulgaria and Turkey, and since grounds for such discontent are not wanting the stories probably contain at least an element of truth. *** ' • i Little has been, heard for soma time of events in the Kussian main theatre, but there is news to-day of an outburst, of fighting in the Baltic Provinces, which has turned to tlu advantage of_ the Russians, and resulted in a limited gain of ground on their part. At some points the Germans took the initiative, but where they did their attacks seem to have been decisively repelled.