PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2707, 29 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As one day follows another, it becomes more clear that tho Verdun battle marks an cpoch in the war, and that infinitely more is at stake than possession of the fortified tract of wooded hills and ravines which is now the scene of one of the most sanguinary conflicts ever fought. Much is said: in the news about the magnitude of tho battle, its .appalling slaughter, and its holocaust of artillery fire, which calls for little comment here, but furnishes an impressive body of evidence as to tho unsparing calls the Germans are making upon their resources in a frantic bid for victory. Less is said and less is known about the strain imposed upon the Allied organisation by the almost superhuman efforts the Germans are putting forth, but there is nothing yet to show that the enemy have made any appreciable progress towards the essential object they have in view, and this in itself is a good and hopeful sign. So far as tho immediate fortunes of the battle are concerncd, tlw position reported to-day is better than that disclosed yesterday. An overshadowing ■.'.vent yesterday was the capture by the Germans of Fort Douaumont, but the report of the capture had hardly been confirmed before it 1 was followod by others announcing that the lost position bad been won hack

again. This is excellent news, chiefly I on account of the proof it affords that the French arc capable, not only of making head against the German phalanx which has been jet to blast its way through tho Verdun lines, but on occasion of rolling it back. The general effect of news in hand at the moment is that the French aro offering a firm resistance in the contracted lines to which they have fallen back along the northern front, of the fortress, and towards its eastern Hank.

While the recovery of Fort Douaurnont is in itself an event to be welcomed, it is becoming plainer that the issue of the conflict which has opened at Verdun will not be determined by such events. A section of the news to-day which deserves attention is that which emphasises the fact that though a great and epochmaking battle is being fought at Verdun, it is not materially greater or more important for being fought there. One or two messages, it is true, have spoken of- Verdun itself as the stake of battle, and the prize of victory. The Spectator was quoted yesterday as saying: "If Verdun, which is the hinge of the defensivo door, continues to hold, ■ the Allies cannot be beaten." This is a similo and a generalisation which in no way fits the case. As a fortress or entrcnched camp, Verdun is of considerable value, but the Germans cannot afford to squander lives by the ten thousand, and an almost incalculable wealth of shells, in the capture of any fortress, however important it may be. Their essential aim undoubtedly is not to capture Verdun, but to brcach the French line, and if they capture Verdun and fail to brcach the French line they have not gained their end. Returning for a moment to the Spectator's simile, it fails to fit the facts because the Allies rely for a stable defence not upon > the fortress strength of Verdun, but upon the French- Army which is now fighting at Verdun, _ and can fight, if need be, behind Verdun, without its having to admit a vital defeat, and without the Germans being able to claim a decisive victory. Another statement which is open to objection as tending to, distort tho facts of the position is credited today to a neutral, "just arrived from. Germany." He is made to say that the Germans arc ready to sacrifice 200,000 men on the capture of Verdun. It may be said with all confidence that" the Germans have no idea of squandering anything like 200,000 men for the sake of capturing Verdun, though they would, doubtless be ready to pay a much heavier price for the decisive victory they aspire to win.

Sojie definite information is now available which serves to correct erroneous impressions as to the place occupied by Verdun in the French defensive -organisation. It was already known that the practical experience of the war had necessitated radical changes and readjustments where fortresses are concerned, but

the facts now supplied in_ regard to the Verdun defences are illuminating as showing how completely conditions have been altered. Thus

we are told in a French official message that the Germans attributed over-great importance to Douaumont fort. Thev called it an armoured fortress, the north-eastern cornex pillar of Verdun's permanent mainline fortifications." In point of fact, Douaumont is an out-ol'-dato fort, which was dismantled when tho wai began. According to the French official message, it no longer-contained a gun or ■ a soldier. Even moro striking is the statement, originating with the Matin newspaper, but quoted in tho official message, that if the Germans, v,after their- frightful losses, succeeded in capturing Verdun, they would find it empty, shells and all supplies having been removed months ago. These statements are of great value as assisting to place the conflict at Verdun in true perspective. They do not mean, of course, that the Verdun lines are of less than vital importance, but as much might be said of any other section of the Allied Western front. What is implied is that the fortress, aa a fortress, has lost the paramount importance it onco possessed in war, and it follows that no local gain of ground at Verdun, whether or not it includes some or all of the Verdun forts, will in itself give the Germans tho decisive victory for which they are striving so desperately.. The facts now presented concerning Verdun might almost have been surmised, but they have perhaps not received the attention they deserve. They arc, in brief, that here as elsewhere the French rely upon such defences, as modern practice has shown to be effective. Forts of the old style no- longer count, and Verdun not even a rich storehouse of war-supplies, but is supplied, as are other sections of the front, from depots situated well to the rear.

At an immediate view, insistence upon the distinction between Verdun as a great fortress, a vitally important stronghold, and Verdun a sector in the French defensive line, is warranted, because it means that the bearing and importance of such progress as the enemy has made in his assault is not to be measured from the standpoint of the old fortifications, the defences which have been superseded. If Verdun were still a fortress in the old sense, it would have to be admitted that it was in imminent peril. This, however, it is not, and what has actually hap- ' pened is that the enemy has penetrated for a few miles into defensive lines manned by _ a mobile army which 6 is capable, if necessary, of falling back upon other similar lines. If the enemy is capable of mastering some additional miles of ground, a point which at present seems doubtful, he will reap certain positive advantages. Mastering a section of the Mouse immediately west and south of his present line of attack, he would cut across an important French railway, and might conceivably compel the French to retreat to the western side of the Mouse further south. It is tolerably certain, however, that the German assault has not been inspired by the hope of any limited gains "of this character, and all that is established meantime is that the enemy has made slow headway for t a few miles, and that at appalling cost, against a defence which, upon the whole, has stiffened as it has contracted, and which, at worst, is not confined to the Verdun perimeter or to any other limited area. There is such a thing as winning an inconclusive advantage at disproportionate cost, and already some grounds exist for believing 'that the Germans are learning as much by bitter experience in their assault on the Verdun lilies.

Convincing proof of the carc with which the Allies have guarded the secret of their strategical plans is to he foiiKt! i>i some of the current con.i- ---' meat unon tiw Gorman oftensi.ve and

its surrounding circumstances. Thus in a London budget published yesterday, which apparently epitomised the views of various experts, it was stated tlmt,the attack on Verdun had forestalled tlse Franco-British offensive in Flanders, and another view expressed was that the Verdun battle was likely to compel a halt in the French offensive in the Champagne. To-day we have the London Observer suggesting that Germany is intent upon compelling France and Britain to launch a premature offensive before their Allies are able or ready to co-operate in other theatres. There is here a wide divergence, but of the two opinions that credited to the Observer seems to carry the greater air of probability. 'While many things remain in doubt, it is abundantly clear that Germany has taken the initiative at a terrible cost, not only as regards tho sacrifices she is incurring at Verdun, but in the circumstances under which she has elected to precipitate a conflict which can hardly be less than decisive in its ultimate effccts. Instead of relying upon the fortified Western lino •which she has laboured to make impregnable, she is exposing her troops, relatively in the open, under conditions which make losses upon a maximum scale inevitable, and there does not seem to be any way in which she can logically proceed from her present action except by developing the maximum offensive of which she is capable against the Allied Western front. That can hardly mean anything but slaughter, indefinitely prolonged, upon a very much greater scale than losses she can hope to inflict upon the Allies. The issue is not to be foretold, but whatever risks she may take meantime in other theatres, Germany cannot hope to again bring to bear in the Western theatre any such superiority of forca_ as she had at command in her abortive effort in 1914. According to the best information available, she should be instead in a decided inferiority, o * *

Nevertheless, no more plausible explanation is available of present developments on the Western front than that Germany has decided to take all risks in the hope of being able to -achieve sonic decisive advantage before the Allies have perfected their preparations for a conccrted offensive in all' theatres. Accepting this opinion as correct, the Allies in the AVcstcrn theatre may elect to meet on the defensive an. assault of which the Verdun attack is but a first instalment. But the position so far as it is disclosed in the news to-day is that the enemy has incurred frightful losses,. in all likelihood vastly greater than he has inflicted, without gaining or coming into immediate prospect of anything that could be called a compensating advantage. To a full understanding of the position it would be necessary to know much that is necessarily hidden, but even on the facts as tliey appear it is possible to understand in part the optimism that is said to reign in Paris.

The Western theatre almost monopolises attention at the _ moment, but there, is neivs of particular interest regarding Albania. The Austrians report that they have captured Durazzo, and Italian reports, while 'they- do not explicitly admit the fact, are of a nature to suggest that the Austrian report is true. Assuming so much it must be supposed that the Allies have decided to Albania, with the possible exception of Valona, in pursuance of the policy of concentration to which they are now evidently committed.