PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2699, 19 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Additional light upon the capture of 'Er/.ornin more than confirms the impression that it is an achievement of magnitude which may be expected to exert a far-reaching influence upon the events of the war. Emphasis is laid in more than one -eport upon the element of surprise in the Russian onslaught, but it tho same time it is quite clear that the Turks had organised their defences upon an elaborate scale, and that they were mastered by an immensely powerful attack. The'garrison, according to one report, consisted of n* hundred thousand men, and tho forts contained nearly six hundred pieces of artillery. If the Russian attack was developed" with a rapid-ity-which staggered and disconcerted the enemy, it was evidently made also in overwhelm] ng_ strength. It js described as a "triple combined movement,' 5 a powerful assault on the enemy's centre being developed simultaneously with turning moveirßnts on both flanks. In order to proceed on these lines the Russians must have had a very heavy margin of strengthen their favour, and the surprise sprung upon Enver Bey and Marshal von Der Goltz would seem to have consisted largely in the concentration of such a powerful army on the approaches to Erzerum without their knowledge.

Petrograd newspapers, which comment on the victory, assume, it will bo noted, that the immediate aim of Ihe Russians will be to .defend their conquest. That the Turks will attempt to win back their lost stronghold is taken for grafted, but it is considered that it will take them two months to bring up the reinforcements which will enable theni to venture upon an attack. The margin of time seems liberal, but it is perhaps not too liberal in view of the magnitude of the task by which the Turks are faced. Erzerum was formidable in their hands; it is likely to be much more so in the hands of the Russians. Full details have yet to be given officially of the Russian capture of prisoners and guns, but reports agree that the fortress has been captured in i'ood condition, the overwhelming character of the attack giving the Turks little time to demolish the works tliey were no longer able to defend. When the Russians entered Przemysl they found most of the guns and stocks of munitions destroyed, but in all likelihood there is a very different story to be told about Erzerum, even if a report from Rome, which states that the fortress was captured intact, goes somewhat beyond the mark. The Russians have at least an excellent groundwork to build upon, and will be able to strengthen and consolidate their position in the time needed by, the enemy to organise an attack. If the Turks were free to _ concentrate undividedly upon regaining the fortress its future fate would still be an open question, but that they will enjoy such a measure of freedom for any longth of time is most unlikely.

That the capture of Erzerum will shortly have a sequel in the Balkans is highly probable, but for the time reports have outpaced events. No big military movement in -the_ Balkans is reported at time of writing, but there is a crop of rumours which positively scintillate with promise, Taken at anything like their face value they would mean little less than that the whole Balkan Peninsula is about to burst into a blaze. Possibly it is, but some decisive stroke by the Allies, in south or north, is more likely to give the signal than an enterprising,_ but unexpected, flight of Rumanian air squadrons over Bulgaria, such as is reported ' to-day from Bucharest. This and other stories must speak for themselves. The broad fact stands that no important military development in the Balkans is definitely reported at time of writing unless it be the hold-up of the Austrian advance in Albania, said to be due to Italian troops reinforcing Essad Pasha. This is very possibly a record of fact.

It is said in a report from Paris that the bulk of military opinion inclines to the belief that German activity in the Western theatre foreshadows a general offensive. ' The citation of authority is a little too comprehensive to be convincing. It has been said often, and with apparent justice, that if the Germans hope to win the, war they must attack and crush the Allies in the. 'ffestem theatre, but it does not by any means follow that such an attempt is bound to be made. There is much reason to believe that Germany of late has been chiefly intent upon spinning out tho war in the hope that one or all of the Allies may tire before they have completed their task of bringing her to decisive • defeat. The hope looks vain enough, since the Allies are to all apponrancc >» 01 ' a firmly united than thev have ever been, and are making

rapid headway towards the ideal of operating as a single organisation against the common enemy. It may be that the Germans will attempt a big offensive, but the prospects of achieving the decisive military success which they failed to achieve when the odds were heavily in their favour cannot appear as a rosy one even to German eyes. Upon what grounds tho opinion rests which is attributed to "the bulk of military opinion," in Paris, does not appear, but very potent evidence would bo needed to give it weight. The facts now visible go far to support an opposite opinion. The Germans seem to be no further ahead as a result of the score and more of futile and costly attacks they have made upon the Allied line in France and Flanders during the last few wioks. In Russia they must prepare to do battle with an immensely strengthened enemy on the lines on which they_ were brought to a, stand at the beginning of winter, and in the Balkans, apart from tho possible intervention of Rumania, their position.is complicated and jeopardised by the fall of Erzerum and the results which may be expected to follow. It imposes a strain on bc-liof to suppose that they arc prepared in these circumstances to dare all -ipjn a bid for victory in _ the Western j theatre. But even if a contrary opinion seemed valid, the prospect raised should awaken no uneasiness. A decisive struggle in the Western theatre is inevitable sooner or' later, and it would be much better, from the Allied point of view, that the Germans should attack than tint they should wait to be attacked.

An item which stands out prominently to-day in the news relating to German-American negotiations indicates that Germany is trying to drive an astute bargain, ancl has not abandoned hope of receiving a measure of support from American diplomacy. Germany expects, it is stated, that if -armed passenger liners leaving American ports arc to be immune from submarine attack tho liners, on their part, will not attack submarines. Since the liners in question carry guns only for defence, this may seem at first glance an innocent and reasonable demand, but a moment's consideration will show that it is so unreasonable that it can only have been raised with the idea of obstructing a settlement, and in .the hopo of drawing the United States deeper into German toils. Looking at the matter in its simplest elements, an armed liner which waited to be attacked by a submarine before using its own guns would be courting disaster. It is tho aim and practice of German submarines to sink ships without warning. A liner, armed for defence and menaced by foes of this character, which did not make instant use of its guns on sighting a submarine, might iust as well not carry guns at all. Germany's criminal policy makes it quite impossible to_ draw anv clear line between defensive and offensive tactics on the part of ships t.;poscd to submarine attack. The only sound defence -against attack by the under-water craft is to strike' first and effectively. This being so, if the United States admit and second the demand now mado by Germany, they will for practical purposes be reverting to the policy they were lately _ reported to have abandoned, of seeking to restrict, if not to prohibit, the arming of Allied merchantmen using their ports. There is only a nominal difference between demanding that ships shall not carry 'guns and demanding that, if they do sail armed for defence, they shall not make effective use of their guns.

A somewhat ambiguous statement credited to Mr. Lansing is open to an inference that America is still being fooled to some .extent by the red herring which Germany has drawn across the soent in questioning the status of armed merchantmen. A settlement of the Lusitania case, the American Secretary of State is said to have declared, is impossible until questions concerning armed merchantmen have been settled. This is capable of being read as meaning that America is not prepared to admit, as was reported yesterday, _ that the. existing principles of international law relating to armed merchantmen must stand. On the other hand, Mr. Lansing's statement may mean, and should mean in the light of recent news, that America is demanding not only redress for the Lusitania outrage,, but such assurances from Germany as would rcpreseut a guarantee against a repetition of the outrage. According to_one_ message, to-day, America is dissatisfied with Count Bernstorff's assurances that Germany will not torpedo liners without warning, and. wants a definite declaration to that effect from Berlin. For what it is worth, this implies that the authorities at Washington, though they have shown themselves weak and irresolute, are declining to be side-tracked, and still have their eyes fixed on tho goal which was before them when the negotiations opened.

_ Whilb the Gorman-American negotiations are, or apjiear to be, at an inconclusive stage, it is reported by the New York Evcninrj Post, a'newspaper of high standing, that Sweden has invited the United States to join in a conference of,neutrals "in order to compel Britain to observe the international law she now violates," in other words to take joint action against the efficient maintenance of the British blockade of Germany. That Sweden has made such advances is not at all unlikely, and whether or not the United States are likely to take joint action with other neutrals on the lines suggested there is so little reason to anticipate a complaisant attitude towards the blockade on the part of President Wilson and his Government that it will perhaps be as well if they; are kept fully occupied for some time to come with the present negotiations with Germany. The danger must bo recognised that a serious dispute with America over blockade questions might easily lead, if it led to nothing worse, lo a reduction or even stoppage of war supplies from America. In some respects the Allies are .less dependent on America than they were. This is notably true of shell production. A recent American publication declares that few, if any, orders for shells are now going to that country.