PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2698, 18 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Though it is a victory won in a subsidiary campaign it seems plain that tho capture of Erzerum by the Russians must be regarded as the most important success thathas rewarded tlw Allied arms in any theatre of war for many a long day. At an immediate view it is a great military achievement carried to a decisive point in face of tremendous difficulties, and it may be _ expected to exercise a potent and far-reach-ing influence upon in other theatres of war in the Near and Middle East. In Turkey and in tho neighbouring campaign areas —Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, and the Balkans—jn which Turkey is more or less closely concerned, the moral effect of tho Russian victory will undoubtedly be great. As_ will be ser.n from the messages published to-oay, (he capture of tho Turkish stronghold is hailed as a master-stroke by the Graxd Dukb Nicholas, who now ciimes again into open view for the first time since ho laid _ down his command in the Russian main theatre last year. His presence is an additional guarantee, if one were needed, that the capture of Erzerum is no detached and fugitive enterprise, but a vital move in the unfolding scheme of the war.

'No one can doubt that the Russians have accomplished a- brilliant military feat in reducing Erzerum, after reading such particulars as arc given of the nature of the defences and the difficulties that had to bo faced and overcome by the attacking army. Erzerum is in a situation which lends itself naturally to defence. It stands on a plain encircled by hills, and the hills are formidably fortified. The rapid reduction of such a stronghold supplies convincing proof that the Russians are now vastly better off as regards artillery equipment than in the days when they had to be content to starve Przemysl into submission in a siege extending over months. As an example of efficient transport organisation in the most difficult imaginable circumstances, the attack on Erzerum ranks high. Even tho defence of the fortress by the Turks involved transport problems, for it lies 650 miles, as the crow flies, east oi Constantinople, and is not closely approached by any railway, but the Russians, where _ transport is concerned, were infinitely more heavily handicapped than the defending army. Their transport routes from the 'nearest railway, in Trans-Cau-casia lie through some hundreds oi miles of wild and rugged mountair, country still held fast m the grip oi winter' It is no fancy phrase which declares that the conveyance of siege guns through such country in fifty degrees of frost was a herculean task.

Worthy as it is of the highest praise as a direct military achievement, it is in its bearing upon the general course of the war in the Near and Middle East that-the capture of Erzerum' must chiefly coriimand attention. This aspect of tho matter is dealt with at large in the news to-day. In one message tho opinion is expressed that the Graxd Duke Nicholas hastened the assault on Erzerum in order to assist the Russian forces in Persia and the British Army in Mesopotamia, in the same spirit of unselfishness • as dictated the rush into East Prussia at the commencement of the war. There is reason for-hoping and be'lieving that this is an unduly limited and- indeed erroneous estimate of the position. The whole weight of available evidence is that the day has gone by when the Allies wero itridei the necessity of wasting their strength in -premature and inconclusive action. The capture of Erzerum will undoubtedly influence events in Persia and Mesopotamia, but as other correspondents justly note it has a vital bearing also upon the more important south-eastern campaigns in progress and projected.

It is only reasonable to suppose that the Turks regarded Erzerum as a stable barrier against invasion, and that its loss will unsettle - tho whole' of their military plans. This does not mean, of course, that Erzerum is likely to figure as the advanced base of an invasion aimed at the heart of the Turkish Empire, but the statement as made will bear examination. By reason of its defensive strength and its command of roads, Erzerum is the key to Armenia, but it is likely to prove ultimately the key to more than Armenia. It would be rash to assume tlsat capture of 'the fortress will lr, followed by a great forward movement of the Russians into Asia Minor. This is not by any means to be taken foi; granted, but holding Eizerum they are much better placed than they were to embark on such a movement when the appointed hour has struck, and the Turks must or-dc-v their defences accordingly. Whatever force they have hitherto maintained on the Armenian { front they must now increase it, either with a view to an effort to recapture the lost stronghold or by way of making provision against the accentuated danger of invasion which its loss involves. It is a fact to be noted that the fall, of Erzerum endangers the Turkish forces engaged with the Russians on the long front extending south towards Lake Vail and the Persian frontier. There is an evident call for heavy Turkisn reinforcements not only in the region 'west of Erzerum, but on the whole Armenian front. It is quite possible that tho Turks may concentrate in such strength as 't-o brinß the Russians for the time to a standstill but it seems hardly likely that the Turks can take .such measures for the defence of their eastern frontier without being crippled for offensive action elsewhere, not in Mesopotamia only, but against Egypt and in the Balkans.

If the attack on the Suez Canal must now, ;is the correspondent of the London Chronicle considers, be indefinitely postponed, it will become possible to withdraw portion of the British forccs in Egypt for service in the .Balkans, while at tho same time limits are imposed upon the volume of Turkish reinforcements available in that theatre. In order that these conditions may be produced and maintained it is no doubt essential that the Russians should be able not only to retain a firm hold upon Erzerum, but to extend their area of occupation further south. This, in fact, is the prospect opened. There is every indication that the Russians are operating in powerful stiengfch and under conditions their enterprise has created they should be easily able to hold what' they' have won and are likely to win against very much more powerful forces than Turkey has hitherto sent into her north-eastern provinces. There matters might rest for some considerable tirno to come if the Russian forward .movement (mm the Caucasus wp.rr. a cktaehftd

and unrelated operation. This, however, it most certainly is not. Resulting, as it must, in greatly reducing the Turkish forces available for scrvice in other theatres it paves the way for action in these theatres, and the capture of Erzerum. is like-, ly to prove the definite opening move in the.great offensive against Turkey and the allies with whom sht> is in touch, for which ambitious preparations are in train. In itself the Russian achievement is inspiring, and boars witness to the developed offensive strength of the Allies. It affords good ground for the consternation that is said to reign in Constantinople, and for the joy it has occasioned in Allied countries. But it Vill be seen and realised in Jits fill! importance only when it takes place as one in a series of' widelyextended movements directed to the common end of establishing the supremacy of the Entente in Turkey and the Balkans.

Just how far the Petit Parisien is inspired in its exposition of late developments in the Entente organisation remains to bo seen, but if it is anywhere near the truth tremendous strides have been made towards perfect unity of control in the war. It suggests, in fact, that the Entente armies will not merely work to a common plan, but will "operate practically as a single army, surplus force after local requirements in any one theatre have been met being concentrated in that theatre where it can be most advantageously employed. _ Developing its theme, the Petit Parisien hints that Italian troops at a not far distant- date will fight in tho Western theatre. This presumably is what it means by the statement that "Italians will take vengeance on Austria by striking at Germany." The wisdom of concentrating all possible forces against tlw enemy where he is strongest needs no recommendation, but it must be said that the conditions described and foretokl by the French newspaper represent an ideal, the perfect realisation of which seems impossible. There is no doubt, however, that the Allies are determined to go as far as is humanly 'possible in efficient co-operation, and that every step in this direction is _a step towards shortening and winning the war. » » * , •» Somewhat uncertain accounts are given of the position now taken by America in regard to the submarine campaign, but reports agree that the attempt lately made to interfere with the arming of merchantmen for defence will be abandoned. A tentative assurance is thus given that if America is likely to fall back upon its habitual policy, under_ the present administration, of making words serve for action, it is at least unlikely to do anything worse. A notable item to-day in the news relating to America is the brief report o£ a speech in which Senator Elihu Root, a former Republican Minister and a possible candidate for the Presidency, accuses the Wilson Government of being brave in words, but irresolute in action. This, _no doubt, is a shot from the political locker,- but it is a verdict in which no small section of the world will concur.

There is littlo news at tho moment of new developments in tho Western theatre, but a French official report and another, both reviewing the recent German attacks, deserve special attention. In effect it is claimed that the enemy lias undergone enormous losses for the sake of insignificant results.