PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2686, 4 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Not much has been heard for some time about the threatened Turkish attack on Egypt, but the subject is revived to-day in two messages from America. One originates with the Athens correspondent of the New York World. He has a good deal to say about Turkey's financial difficulties, and is of opinion that Germany must grant loans if she desires the further co-operation of Turkey, but lie winds up- his review of the position by quoting Talaat Bey as stating that 280,000 Turks, under Djemal Pasha, will participate in the expedition against Egypt. Another story from America is to the effect that a member of the German General Staff told the editor of the German-Ameri-can Dcutschcs Journal (who was recently in Berlin) that Germany's next great drive would bo in Egypt. These stories, like many of a similar character which have appeared during the last few months, are not in any way conclusive. They are at best doubtful evidence. But it is a fact that until very recently tho opinion was firmly held in well-in-for-med circles in Great Britain that an attack on the Suez Canal was inevitable. Whether reason has appeared for departing fnm this opinion is a moot point. Undoubtedly there, have been campaign developments in tho Near and Middle East which must tend to discourage a Turkish venture against Egypt, but it cannot yet be said with finality that these developments are decisive ns making tho venture impossible.

Germany is undoubtedly eager to launch an attack in force against the British forces on the Suez Canal and this for the best possible reasons. As an objective the Canal must surpass in attraction any other that is now visible in the Near East. Only hard knocks are to be gained by attacking the Russians in Armenia, and the Caucasus, and this would remain true even if the Russians were thrown back into their mountains and compelled to fight a .purely defensive campaign. A great drive through Mesopotamia to the head of the Persian Gulf may be practicable, but whether any very great or positive gains would reward such an enterprise is doubtful. Between these areas of war lies Persia, where Germany and Turkey have gained a footing rather by conspiracy and intrigue than by a military effort. Their success with the means adopted has not been brilliant, and this, with the limited character of their past efforts, is an indication at least that they are not likely to embark upon the doubtful enterprise of a movement towards tho frontiers of India by land.

By comparison an attack on the Suez Canal, intended to lead up to an invasion of Egypt, is a much more attractive enterprise from the enemy point of view. A campaign against Egypt presents no more serious problems as regards transport and communication than would have to bo overcome in pressing any one of tho other campaigns mentioned to a point of decisive advantage and success. An invasion of Egypt constitutes a less complex problem—which is not, of course, to say that it is easy of solution or likely to bo solved —and if a German-directed Turkish Army succeeded in getting across the Suez Canal there would be no doubt about the nature of its victory or tho results that would be bound to follow. The Suez Canal is undoubtedly the place where the Turks, given a military success, could inflict the greatest possible damago upon Britain, and the Entente for a given expenditure of force. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that nothing But lack of strength and the necessity of meeting attacks elsewhere will prevent the enemy from attacking the Canal. A quotation may be made here from tho London Spectator, a journal which displays in it's articles an exceptionally competent grasp upon the problems of the war, amounting on occasions to prescience. In an article published on December 18, 1915, the Spectator said:

Undoubtedly the Germans and Turks, or rather the Turks under German direction, are going to launch a really serious attack upon Egypt, an attack planned willi great care and supported by desert railways, an attack which is very likely to be" launched not merely on the ElArish route (along tho northern ooast), which was attempted last year, but also thro 11 »h the Sinnitic Peninsula. This attack ivill, of course, he based oil the Hcdjaz railway. While ho is, or was, firmly of opinion that an attack would bo attempted, the writer of the Spectator article considers that the invasion is, on the whole, not to be dreaded, but indeed' should be welcomed as likely to bring ruin on its planners. Frfr this there are reasons which may bo briefly traversed. Moving an army against Egypt the Turks will have their backs to a waterless desert, with, at the very best, two lines of attenuated desert railway keeping (hem in touch with the Hcdja). railway, the Pilgrim line k> Mecca, which at its nearest approach comes no nearer than ISO miles, as the crow flies, to the Sue?, Canal. With the arterial communications mentioned, the Turks would have no

moans of lateral communication, not even a road, unless they are able to extemporise these as well as lines of approach. The British army, on the other hand, is backed by Egypt and all its supplies, including water. In the way of lateral communications it has the Suez Canal with its flotillas of gunboats—that is floating batteries of heavy artillery which can lie moved up and down as they arc wanted—and further a railway parallel to the Canal on which troops can be rapidly transported to any threatened point. Over about half its length the Canal is bordered by marshes or inundated ground which defy hostile approach, and there is a front of only about 60 miles where an attack can be made under reasonably favourable conditions. Assuming only that the Canal has boon powerfully fortified and that the defending army is of adequate strength there should be no reason to entertain fears of its ability to .withstand any assault the enemy can launch against it. In other words, if common precautions havo been taken, and it would be absurd to suppose that they have not, there is a most excellent prospect that any venture against the Canal will crumble in dire disaster.

At the moment the question of chief interest is not how an enemy attack upon the Canal is likely to fare, but whether such ar. attack is now likely to be made. That it will be, made seems upon the whole less probable now than it' _ did a few months ago, or even six or seven weeks ago. The incentives to embark upon the venture, with all its risks and dangers, are not Jess than they have been, and at a direct view it presents no more serious difficulties than would face the _ Turkish army if'it took the offensive elsewhere. But factors tending to discourage whatever aggressive designs the Turks may entertain are developing apace while they continue to halt short of decisive action. The greatest, factor of all is the presence of a powerful Allied army at Salonika, which constitutes at once a serious threat to the German communications with the Near East, and a threat against Constantinople itself. That the Allies are assembling great forces for a powerful thrust is no longer open to question. All other opera-tfons in the Balkans are now overshadowed by the concentration at Salonika. Montenegro and the inland areas of Albania have been resigned to the enemy, but from the military point of view this is a small sacrifice to set against the concentration of a great army at one vital key point under conditions which the enemy has thus far been powerless to modify to his advantage. To the concentration at Salonika, which has. a vital bearing upon anything that the enemy may attempt in the Near or Middle East, there is now added the Russian forward movement from the Caucasus. The story of recent events in Armenia is incomplete, but news from Russian and other sources is consistent in indicating that the Turks are finding it necessary to ma.-ss great forces there to stem the Russian progress. Bearing in mind also that considerable enemy forces are engaged in Mesopotamia, it is beginning to be difficult to see where the Turks are to find the forces for an attack on Egypt or for any. other offensive campaign upon a major scale.

Much, of course, depends upon tho operation of factors not yet revealed or imperfectly revealed. But in any attempt to estimate possibilities in tho Near and Middle East account must be taken of the recent turn of events' on the Russial southern front, in Galicia and further north —a turn which has had the effect thus far of imposing a heavy additional drain upon enemy resources in these regions—and of the fact that the Bulgarians now have Se.jia as well as their own country to defend, besides being more or less involved in an Albanian campaign. Whether the Russians intend to co-operate with the Allies at Salonika by entering the Balkans remains as yet an open question, and the future policy and action of Rumania is also to some extent a matter of speculation. But even if possibilities, real enough but something less than definite, arc excluded, there is a fair prospect of the enemy in the Balkans and in Turkey presently finding himself ill-placed to ward off a concentrated onslaught by tho Allies, and in no condition to himself assume the offensive.

Mcst of the stories which are current about the German commerceraider Moewe speak for themselves, but one message raises an interesting point regarding the status of her I prize, the Appam. It is suggested that the Appam entered a United States port not as a prize, but as a German auxiliary cruiser. She was equipped with a gun by her captors, it is stated, and it is argued that she is entitled to claim internment as a warship instead of the treatment to which a prize is subject. It is possible, but hardly likely, that a new ground of dispute has thus been raised. There are formal conditions governing the commissioning of auxiliary cruisers, and they would scarcely be fulfilled by the summary procedure on the high seas suggested in the case of tho Appam. The best proof that the Appam retains the character of an ordinary prize is that the British Ambassador to the United States has demanded her restoration under The Hague Convention rules which were touched upon yesterday. » * * a There is some news from the Western theatre to-day, but an time of writing no specific reference to that section of the French front upon which' the Germans were reported to have made their most effective thrust in their recent offensive operations— th area- south of tho Somme. At least a suggestion that matters have reverted to normal without the enemy securing any material gain is contained, however, in a French official report, which states that "bombardment is general and to our advantage."

Touching the suggestion which has been made that serious dissension may arise between Britain and America over blockade questions, a good point is made by the New York Times. If the United States prohibited the export of munitions to the Allies, it remarks, the latter would send their orders to Japan, whose immense arsenals would become a danger if the America.-! plants were scrapped. Potent considerations are thus rais.ed, but it is a question whether they effectively dominate the issues at stake. The danger is that President Wilson may carry a doctrinaire regard for the nicetics of international law to impossible lengths, and if ho once sets out upon that course* he ma* let Brae-

tical considerations go by the board. However, weight must attach to the reported opinion of American newspapers that Mr. Wilson would veto any Bill prohibiting the export of munitions.

German accounts of the damage done by the Zeppelins on their last visit to England are completely discredited by a War Officc report. It gives a satisfactorily definite and detailed denial to the enemy stories about heavy damage to docks, harbours, factories, and foundries in the West and North of England, and points out that these reports afford further proof of the inability of the airships to so ascertain their position as to shape a course with any degree oi certainty. In the places they did visit the Zeppelins murdered 59 people and injured nearly twice as many, and they did some damage to a railway and to buildings, including a church, a chapel, and two factories, but these last were not of military importance. In a word, the giant airships are as far as ever from having achieved any appreciable military result. Additional proof of the uncertainty of their navigation is to be found in the report that one was fired oil as it flew low over the Dutch island of Ameland, having lost its way in a fog.

Some frank admissions concerning the difficulties of effective defence against Zeppelin raids are made in cabled quotations from the Paris Press, but it is to bo noted that the heavy gun-planes, which cannot rise to as great an altitude as the Zeppelins, _ are yet developing as more effective engines of offence, and are playing a much more important part in the war. The Daily Mail has entered the current discussion with a recommendation that the Government should acquire 25,000 aeroplanes, and wipe out the Kkupp works at Essen and raid German cities. This must be set down as sheer sensationalism. Twenty-five thousand aeroplanes would constitute a wonderful offensive force, but years would be required to develop it. Apparently the Daily Mail has taken up and liberally magnified a proposal mooted months ago by an aeronautical expert, L. Bun Desbleds, that Britain should build a fleet of 2000 aeroplanes to attack the German war factories and lines of communication. It was estimated that such a fleet would entail a cost of £10,000,000, not an excessive price considering the objects in view, but the proposal was subjected to a heavy fire of criticism on practical grounds.