PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2681, 29 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The outlook in_ Mesopotamia is perhaps slightly improved. An official report supplies two brief items of information: the Turks have increased by a mile their distance from a section of the British entrenchments at Kut-el-Amara, and General Aylmer, in command of the relieving column, reports no change. ' Assuming that there is no gap in the official record of tho campaign, tho second statement should mean that tho relieving column is still established at a distance of 23 miles from Kut-cl-Amara, and has suffered no such heavy defeat as was recently reported by the Turks. In the absence of explanatory details, the limited' retirement of a section of tho Turkish line at Kut-cl-Amara can be taken to' mean comparatively little. Such a movement may amount to an attempt to draw out the garrison in attack, or, again, tho Turks may be taking risks at Ivut-el-Amara in order to concentrate as heavily as possible against tho relieving column, or to act against the British communications Btlll further dowa tlie river, Until the seguol appears, tho elieht relax a,-.

tion of the investment counts for little.

Tiibre seems to bo no escape from the conviction 'that any real improvement in Mesopotamia must depend upon action by the Allies elsewhere, Tho British forces on the Tigris' are evidently of limited strength, and so long as the enemy is in a position to throw heavy bodies of troops into Mesopotamia, their situation cannot be other than perilous. The Russian drive towards Erzerum. has no doubt assisted materially to relieve the strain in Mesopotamia, but it would be somewhat optimistic to believe that the Russians are likely within any limited period to carry their enterprise to the point of cutting the communications of the Turkish Armv on the Tigris. To do so the Russians would have to cross nearly the whole breadth of Asia Minor, and in any such attempt they would have to either bring enormous forces to bear or take even heavier risks in regard to maintaining their communications than the_ British arc now taking on the Tigris. It is precisely such risky and doubtful enterprises as this that the Allies may be expected to avoid as their plans mature for united and effective action against the In the past tho strategy of the Allies has been largely dominated by considerations of local necessity, but with the progressive development of their resourcesj these conditions tend to disappear. Tho concentration of a powerful array at Salonika is a- positive indication that tho Allies are determined to concentrate as heavily as possible against the enemy group, which includes Turkey where it is most vulnerable. If Russia is to co-operate on a large scale—and it cannot be taken for granted that she is able to spare any great body of strength from her main theatre—she is more likely to render effective aid by entering the Balkans and co-operating as directly'as possible with the army based on Salonika than by embarking upon an arduous and difficult campaign in Asia Minor, which might be a long time in achieving results.

Limits arc thus set to the possibilities of an effective diversion in favour of the British columns now so critically placed in Mesopotamia. It may be months before the Balkan campaign develops in full vigour, ancl meantime tho Turks have a margin of strength in hand which may _ easily enable them to take formidable action in Mesopotamia, even if the.y encounter additional reverses in Armenia and are unable to make further headway in Persia. The whole situation gives point to a contention which has been advanced by Me._ Lovat Fraser, writing in tn<s_ Daily Mail, that it would have been a wiser policy in Mesopotamia to be content with the occupation of the Euphrates and Tigris delta, _ a couple of hundred miles down river from tho area in which the advanced British columns are now fighting. Contracted within these limits, the Mesopotamia campaign might have exercised a less important influence upon events in Persia, but, on the other hand, a margin of force would probably have been left available for direct action in that country against those sections of the population which have been inspired by the Turks to revolt.

Ever since the fall of Mount Lovchen it has been evident' that Montenegro was in desperate plight, and no ground for surprise is afforded in reports from different quarters to-day that practically the whole country has now been occupied by the enemy. Between this state of affairs and the capitulation announced a week or two ago and subsequently contradicted, there is a wide diiference. Instead of surrendering, the Montenegrins have preferred the fate of Serbia. They are unable to further withstand the invader in their own territory, but many of them, including their King, have chosen exile rather than accept Austrian terms. By their gallant but hopeless resistance they have at once given proof of their indomitable courage and of faith in the ultimate victory of the Allies to whom they have rendered the last service in their power.

Official confirmation is now given of the recent report regarding the purchase of Rumanian wheat by the British Government, but from the particulars supplied it is not clear that the transaction is in the nature of a loan to Rumania. The statement made by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Lord Robert Cecil) in the House of Commons is that the Imperial Government has concluded contracts for the purchase of Rumanian grain which will be held at its disposal for export after the war. This, while it suggests an ordinary . commercial transaction, more likely represents a financial arrangement which would indicate that a friendly understanding exists between Rumania and the Allies. If Britain had been intent only on securing supplies ,of grain to be made available after the war, she could havo fully'satisfied her needs in Russia, where .a great part of the last harvest remains locked up for lack of export outlet. The deal witb Rumania hardly admits of explanation as an ordinary commercial transaction, and the most plausible alternative explanation is that she has been conceded . a measure of financial accommodation at a timo when the Allies are. not drawing upon their financial resources without a strict eye to the main chance. Moreover, there is the probability that this is a counter to Germany in two ways: (1) That it remove's a financial embarrassment which Germany might have turned to advantage with Rumania. (2) It cuts off from Germany supplies of wheat she might be very, glad to secure.

The Imperial authorities have so far taken the public into their confidence regarding the defence of London against air raids as to let it be known that a great development of the defensive organisation has been effected since September. There has been an increase and improvement in the organisation of antiaircraft artillery, but greater importance seems to attach to the improved arrangements for aeroplane defence which havo also been made. The gun as a defenco against the Zeppelin and other aircraft is subicct to very definite limitations, and has accomplished little in the defence of London. _ On the other hand, the aeroplane is developing apace in snccd and power, and it is impossible at present to set any 1 definite limit to its ultimate possibilities. It is probablo that material improvements in aeroplane construction have been effcc'ted even in the few months which have claused since Zepoclins last flew over London, and though Bomo marvellous stories have been circulated about now and formidable and fitted

wise—it is most unlikely that these craft have kept pace in the march of improvement with their smaller Competitors. The Zeppelin has some advantages over the aeroplane, notably in its ability to rise much more rapidly to a maximum elevation, but every advance in the speed and power of aeroplanes increases their prospects of intercepting and engaging the big airships under a defensive scheme which would make full use of observation over an extended area and the rapid transmission of information. That the aeroplane defence of London is being organised on some such lines is to be inferred from the fact that it is to bo under the sole control of the Aclsniralty, which is taking over the responsibility _ from the War Office. Besides having to face whatever local defences London can boast, the Zeppelins will henceforth have to cope with systematised efforts to intercept them as they approach their objective or 'On -their homeward voyage. Something of this kind has, of course, been attempted in the nast. but there is a promise in tho official statement published to-day of improved methods and better organisation.

An illuminating glimpse of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria is given in his commendation of the diplomacy of M. Radoslavoff, his Prime Minister, in hoodwinking the Allies before Bulgaria entered the fray. It was jestingly said long ago that an ambassador was an honest man sent to lie abroad for his country. Tsar Ferdinand evidently considers that it is the proper function of a Prime Minister to lie at homo. That M. Radoslavoff achieved this doubtful distinction is known to all the world. Ho affected to bo putting up his country and its army to the highest bidder when in fact both country and army were fast in the grip of the Central Empires. This was his attitude and policy in face of an honest attempt by the Entente Powers to satisfy Bulgarian claims. Even a German prcftege might have been expected to abstain from publicly lauding' such an achievement and to prefer rather to explain it away, but in the perverted vision of Tsar Ferdinand trickery and a degraded disregard for truth and honour go appropriately hand in hand with statecraft.